Brian Baisa : Citation Profile


Are you Brian Baisa?

Amherst College

4

H index

2

i10 index

71

Citations

RESEARCH PRODUCTION:

8

Articles

1

Papers

RESEARCH ACTIVITY:

   12 years (2008 - 2020). See details.
   Cites by year: 5
   Journals where Brian Baisa has often published
   Relations with other researchers
   Recent citing documents: 19.    Total self citations: 3 (4.05 %)

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ABOUT THIS REPORT:

   Permalink: http://citec.repec.org/pba1704
   Updated: 2022-06-25    RAS profile: 2019-10-04    
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Relations with other researchers


Works with:

Burkett, Justin (3)

Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Brian Baisa.

Is cited by:

Serizawa, Shigehiro (21)

Mishra, Debasis (12)

ZHOU, YU (6)

MISHRA, DEBASIS (4)

Mishra, Debasis (4)

Stage, Jesper (4)

Kesztenbaum, Lionel (3)

Choumert-Nkolo, Johanna (3)

Kirkegaard, Rene (3)

Andersson, Tommy (2)

Fisher-Vanden, Karen (2)

Cites to:

Che, Yeon-Koo (14)

Gale, Ian (10)

Serizawa, Shigehiro (7)

Matthews, Steven (7)

Maskin, Eric (6)

Nisan, Noam (5)

Riley, John (5)

Myerson, Roger (4)

Weretka, Marek (3)

Li, Fei (3)

Pycia, Marek (3)

Main data


Where Brian Baisa has published?


Journals with more than one article published# docs
Theoretical Economics3

Recent works citing Brian Baisa (2021 and 2020)


YearTitle of citing document
2020Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity. (2020). Mishra, Debasis ; Malik, Komal. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2009.12114.

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2022Selling to a principal and a budget-constrained agent. (2022). Mishra, Debasis ; Paramahamsa, Kolagani. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2202.10378.

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2021.

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2020Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences. (2020). Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Mishra, Debasis ; Kazumura, Tomoya. In: ISER Discussion Paper. RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1001r.

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2020Serial Vickrey Mechanism. (2020). Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Zhou, YU. In: ISER Discussion Paper. RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1095.

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2020Efficient and Strategy-Proof Multi-Unit Object Allocation with Money: (Non)decreasing Marginal Valuations without Guasi-Linearity. (2020). Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Kazumura, Tomoya ; Shinozaki, Hiroki. In: ISER Discussion Paper. RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1097.

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2020Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences: Ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects. (2020). Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Sakai, Ryosuke. In: ISER Discussion Paper. RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1107.

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2021The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction. (2021). Sakai, Toyotaka ; Mikami, Ryo ; Masuda, Takehito ; Wakayama, Takuma ; Serizawa, Shigehiro. In: ISER Discussion Paper. RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1109r.

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2021The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction. (2021). Wakayama, Takuma ; Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Sakai, Toyotaka ; Mikami, Ryo ; Masuda, Takehito. In: ISER Discussion Paper. RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1109rr.

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2022Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices. (2022). Kirkegaard, Rene. In: Games and Economic Behavior. RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:234-239.

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2021Risk aversion and auction design: Theoretical and empirical evidence. (2021). Vasserman, Shoshana ; Watt, Mitchell. In: International Journal of Industrial Organization. RePEc:eee:indorg:v:79:y:2021:i:c:s0167718721000515.

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2020Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences. (2020). Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Mishra, Debasis ; Kazumura, Tomoya. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0022053118305866.

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2021Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: Dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity. (2021). Mishra, Debasis ; Malik, Komal. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:191:y:2021:i:c:s0022053120301216.

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2021Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions. (2021). Kirkegaard, Rene. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. RePEc:eee:mateco:v:95:y:2021:i:c:s0304406821000161.

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2020Strategic Bidding in Product-Mix, Sequential, and Simultaneous Auctions. (2020). Finster, Simon. In: Economics Papers. RePEc:nuf:econwp:2003.

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2020Multi-Unit Auctions: A Survey of Theoretical Literature. (2020). Khezr, Peyman ; Cumpston, Anne. In: MPRA Paper. RePEc:pra:mprapa:101336.

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2020Multi-round auctions in an emissions trading system considering firm bidding strategies and government regulations. (2020). Cheng, Cheng ; Wang, Qunwei ; Zhou, Dequn. In: Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change. RePEc:spr:masfgc:v:25:y:2020:i:7:d:10.1007_s11027-020-09928-z.

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2021Competing Combinatorial Auctions. (2021). Kittsteiner, Thomas ; Steinberg, Richard ; Ott, Marion. In: EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters. RePEc:zbw:espost:240927.

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2020Constraints on Matching Markets Based on Moral Concerns. (2020). Wambach, Achim ; Huesmann, Katharina. In: VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics. RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224636.

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Works by Brian Baisa:


YearTitleTypeCited
2010The welfare costs of unreliable water service In: Journal of Development Economics.
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article21
2008The Welfare Costs of Unreliable Water Service.(2008) In: MPRA Paper.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 21
paper
2016Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets In: Economics Letters.
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article2
2016Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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article4
2018Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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article6
2019Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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article2
2017Auction design without quasilinear preferences In: Theoretical Economics.
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article28
2020Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps In: Theoretical Economics.
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article1
2020Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods In: Theoretical Economics.
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article7

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