3
H index
1
i10 index
36
Citations
| 3 H index 1 i10 index 36 Citations RESEARCH PRODUCTION: 9 Articles 18 Papers RESEARCH ACTIVITY:
MORE DETAILS IN: ABOUT THIS REPORT:
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Works with: Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Ahmed Doghmi. | Is cited by: | Cites to: |
Journals with more than one article published | # docs |
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Economics Letters | 2 |
Mathematical Economics Letters | 2 |
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics | 2 |
Year | Title of citing document |
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2021 | Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games. (2021). Moyouwou, Issofa ; Diss, Mostapha ; Deschamps, Marc ; Beal, Sylvain. In: Working Papers. RePEc:crb:wpaper:2021-01. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2020 | Social acceptability of Condorcet committees. (2020). Diss, Mostapha ; Mahajne, Muhammad. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:105:y:2020:i:c:p:14-27. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2020 | The probability of violating Arrow’s conditions. (2020). Heckelman, Jac C ; Dougherty, Keith L. In: European Journal of Political Economy. RePEc:eee:poleco:v:65:y:2020:i:c:s0176268020300847. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2020 | On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle. (2020). Kamwa, Eric ; Diss, Mostapha ; Tlidi, Abdelmonaim. In: Post-Print. RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02147735. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2021 | Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention. (2020). Kamwa, Eric ; Diss, Mostapha ; Smaoui, Hatem ; Moyouwou, Issofa. In: Post-Print. RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02196387. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2020 | Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation. (2020). Kamwa, Eric ; Diss, Mostapha. In: Post-Print. RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02424936. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2020 | Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting. (2020). Diss, Mostapha ; Gori, Michele ; Bubboloni, Daniela. In: Public Choice. RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:183:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00692-6. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2020 | Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections. (2020). Smaoui, Hatem ; Lepelley, Dominique ; el Ouafdi, Abdelhalim. In: Theory and Decision. RePEc:kap:theord:v:88:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-019-09724-5. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
Year | Title | Type | Cited |
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2013 | On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 6 |
2013 | On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition.(2013) In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 6 | paper | |
2016 | On Nash Implementability in Allotment Economies under Domain Restrictions with Indifference In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 1 |
2013 | Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations In: Mathematical Economics Letters. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
2014 | Nash Implementation in Rationing Problems with Single-Crossing Preferences In: Mathematical Economics Letters. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
2008 | Reexamination of Maskins Theorem on Nash implementability In: Economics Letters. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 2 |
2008 | Reexamination of Maskins Theorem on Nash implementability.(2008) In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 2 | paper | |
2008 | Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences In: Economics Letters. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 3 |
2008 | Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences.(2008) In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 3 | paper | |
2015 | Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems In: Mathematical Social Sciences. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 1 |
2015 | Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems.(2015) In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 1 | paper | |
2013 | Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences In: Games. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 1 |
2015 | Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2015 | Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences.(2015) In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 0 | paper | |
2016 | Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences.(2016) In: MPRA Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 0 | paper | |
2016 | Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 22 |
2016 | Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes.(2016) In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 22 | paper | |
2016 | Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes.(2016) In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 22 | paper | |
2016 | Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes.(2016) In: Public Choice. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 22 | article | |
2008 | Sur la théorie de limplémentation et ses applications économiques In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2009 | On reciprocal Behavior in Prisoner Dilemma game In: Jena Economic Research Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2009 | Faulty Nash Implementation in Exchange Economies with Single-peaked Preferences In: Jena Economic Research Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2015 | A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation In: MPRA Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2007 | Fault Tolerant Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies In: MPRA Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2016 | Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets In: MPRA Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2012 | On Partial Honesty Nash Implementation In: Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen). [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2013 | Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences In: Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen). [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated March, 30 2022. Contact: CitEc Team