Rene Kirkegaard : Citation Profile

Are you Rene Kirkegaard?

University of Guelph

7

H index

5

i10 index

188

Citations

RESEARCH PRODUCTION:

16

Articles

14

Papers

RESEARCH ACTIVITY:

   17 years (2003 - 2020). See details.
   Cites by year: 11
   Journals where Rene Kirkegaard has often published
   Relations with other researchers
   Recent citing documents: 19.    Total self citations: 12 (6 %)

MORE DETAILS IN:
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   Permalink: http://citec.repec.org/pki48
   Updated: 2020-09-14    RAS profile: 2020-07-01    
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Relations with other researchers

Works with:

Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Rene Kirkegaard.

Is cited by:

Drugov, Mikhail (8)

Perez-Castrillo, David (8)

Franke, Jörg (8)

Ryvkin, Dmitry (8)

Wasser, Cédric (6)

Kröger, Sabine (5)

Minchuk, Yizhaq (5)

Hubbard, Timothy (4)

Kräkel, Matthias (4)

Chowdhury, Subhasish (4)

Wettstein, David (4)

Cites to:

Maskin, Eric (16)

Riley, John (10)

Lebrun, Bernard (10)

Gavious, Arieh (10)

Athey, Susan (8)

Hopkins, Ed (8)

Rubinchik, Anna (7)

Che, Yeon-Koo (7)

Milgrom, Paul (6)

Holmstrom, Bengt (6)

Klemperer, Paul (6)

Main data

Where Rene Kirkegaard has published?

Journals with more than one article published# docs
Games and Economic Behavior5
RAND Journal of Economics2

Working Papers Series with more than one paper published# docs
Working Papers / University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance6
Working Papers / Brock University, Department of Economics3
CIE Discussion Papers / University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics2

Recent works citing Rene Kirkegaard (2020 and 2019)

YearTitle of citing document
2020Asymmetric auctions with risk averse preferences. (2020). Khurana, Sanyyam. In: Working papers. RePEc:cde:cdewps:304.

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2020Unraveling of Value-Rankings in Auctions with Resale. (2020). Khurana, Sanyyam. In: Working papers. RePEc:cde:cdewps:308.

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2020How noise affects effort in tournaments. (2020). Drugov, Mikhail ; Ryvkin, Dmitry. In: CEPR Discussion Papers. RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14457.

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2020Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement. (2020). Lorentziadis, Panos L. In: European Journal of Operational Research. RePEc:eee:ejores:v:282:y:2020:i:1:p:211-220.

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2019The informativeness principle without the first-order approach. (2019). Edmans, Alex ; Chaigneau, Pierre ; Gottlieb, Daniel. In: Games and Economic Behavior. RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:743-755.

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2019Group contests with private information and the “Weakest Link”. (2019). Kovenock, Dan ; Topolyan, Iryna ; Malueg, David A ; Barbieri, Stefano. In: Games and Economic Behavior. RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:118:y:2019:i:c:p:382-411.

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2019The optimal allocation of prizes in contests with costly entry. (2019). Lu, Jingfeng ; Liu, Bin. In: International Journal of Industrial Organization. RePEc:eee:indorg:v:66:y:2019:i:c:p:137-161.

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2019Communicating subjective evaluations. (2019). Lang, Matthias. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:179:y:2019:i:c:p:163-199.

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2019Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security. (2019). Zheng, Charles Z. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:180:y:2019:i:c:p:135-166.

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2020Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule. (2020). Burkett, Justin ; Woodward, Kyle. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:185:y:2020:i:c:s0022053119301048.

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2020Contracting Under Unverifiable Monetary Costs. (2020). Soubeyran, Raphael ; QUEROU, Nicolas. In: Post-Print. RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02866383.

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2020Optimal Influence Sale. (2020). Yoo, Seung Han. In: Discussion Paper Series. RePEc:iek:wpaper:2002.

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2019Efficiency and Revenue in Asymmetric Auctions. (2019). Koh, Youngwoo ; Kim, Kyungmin. In: Korean Economic Review. RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-20190701-35-2-04.

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2020Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests. (2020). Chowdhury, Subhasish ; Mukherjee, Anwesha ; Esteve-Gonzlez, Patricia. In: Economics Series Working Papers. RePEc:oxf:wpaper:915.

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2020Con?dence Management in Tournaments. (2020). Wu, Zenan ; Fu, Qiang ; Fang, Hanming ; Deng, Shanglyu. In: PIER Working Paper Archive. RePEc:pen:papers:20-017.

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2020Projection of Private Values in Auctions. (2020). Rosato, Antonio ; Pagnozzi, Marco ; Gagnon-Bartsch, Tristan. In: CSEF Working Papers. RePEc:sef:csefwp:571.

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2020Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps. (2019). Burkett, Justin ; Baisa, Brian. In: Theoretical Economics. RePEc:the:publsh:2939.

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2020Countering the winners curse: optimal auction design in a common value model. (2020). Bergemann, Dirk ; Brooks, Benjamin ; Morris, Stephen. In: Theoretical Economics. RePEc:the:publsh:3797.

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2019How do sellers benefit from Buy-It-Now prices in eBay auctions?. (2019). Kroger, Sabine ; Grebe, Tim ; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta. In: Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy. RePEc:zbw:vfsc19:203606.

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Works by Rene Kirkegaard:

YearTitleTypeCited
2003Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand In: Economics Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		paper5
2003Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand..(2003) In: CIE Discussion Papers.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 5		paper
2005Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions In: Economics Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		paper3
2008Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions.(2008) In: Games and Economic Behavior.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 3		article
2005Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions.(2005) In: CIE Discussion Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 3		paper
2008Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands In: RAND Journal of Economics.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article15
2020Contracting with private rewards In: RAND Journal of Economics.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article0
2008Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article5
2005A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions In: Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		paper0
2007Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds In: Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		paper1
2008Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps In: Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		paper5
2011Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions In: Carlo Alberto Notebooks.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		paper4
2013Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions.(2013) In: Computational Economics.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 4		article
2012A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions In: Econometrica.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article26
2005Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers In: Economics Letters.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article4
2013Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders In: European Economic Review.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article11
2017Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach In: Games and Economic Behavior.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article0
2019Scale effects in multi-unit auctions In: Games and Economic Behavior.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article0
2012Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps In: Games and Economic Behavior.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article49
2014Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch In: Games and Economic Behavior.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article7
2013Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article4
2010Incomplete Information and Rent Dissipation in Deterministic Contests.(2010) In: Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 4		paper
2009Asymmetric first price auctions In: Journal of Economic Theory.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article22
2010Preferential Treatment may Hurt: Another Application of the All-Pay Auction In: Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		paper1
2011Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the Dispersive Order In: Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		paper4
2015Asymmetric Auctions with More Than Two Bidders In: Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		paper2
2015Contracting with Private Rewards In: Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		paper2
2020Microfounded Contest Design In: Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		paper0
2006A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result In: Economic Theory.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article9
2017A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems In: Theoretical Economics.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]		article9

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