8
H index
5
i10 index
192
Citations
Singapore Management University | 8 H index 5 i10 index 192 Citations RESEARCH PRODUCTION: 16 Articles 31 Papers RESEARCH ACTIVITY:
MORE DETAILS IN: ABOUT THIS REPORT:
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Works with: Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Takashi Kunimoto. | Is cited by: | Cites to: |
Journals with more than one article published | # docs |
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Journal of Economic Theory | 5 |
Journal of Mathematical Economics | 2 |
Working Papers Series with more than one paper published | # docs |
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Economics and Statistics Working Papers / Singapore Management University, School of Economics | 12 |
Working Papers / Instituto Madrile�o de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales | 3 |
Year ![]() | Title of citing document ![]() |
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2025 | Implementation with Uncertain Evidence. (2022). Chen, Yi-Chun ; Banerjee, Soumen. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2209.10741. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2025 | Nested Removal of Strictly Dominated Strategies in Infinite Games. (2025). Crescenzi, Michele. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2501.17685. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2025 | Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences. (2025). Serrano, Roberto ; Saran, Rene ; Kunimoto, Takashi. In: Working Papers. RePEc:bro:econwp:2025-001. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2024 | Price & Choose. (2024). Nuñez, Matias ; Nez, Matas ; Echenique, Federico. In: Working Papers. RePEc:crs:wpaper:2024-15. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2024 | Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching. (2024). Sen, Arunava ; Muto, Nozomu ; Mukherjee, Saptarshi. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:216:y:2024:i:c:s0022053123001795. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2024 | Banks skin-in-the-game and hold-up by illiquid firms: strategic bargaining, dynamic inconsistency and credit constraints. (2024). de Belleville, Louis-Marie Harpedanne. In: PSE Working Papers. RePEc:hal:psewpa:hal-04792104. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2024 | Direct implementation with evidence. (2023). Sun, Yifei ; Chen, Yi-Chun ; Banerjee, Soumen. In: Theoretical Economics. RePEc:the:publsh:5015. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
Year ![]() | Title ![]() | Type ![]() | Cited ![]() |
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2022 | Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima In: Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 6 |
2022 | Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima.(2022) In: Theoretical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 6 | article | |
2002 | Bargaining and Competition Revisited In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 18 |
2004 | Bargaining and competition revisited.(2004) In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 18 | article | |
2007 | Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 16 |
2007 | Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine.(2007) In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 16 | paper | |
2010 | A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 8 |
2011 | A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies.(2011) In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 8 | article | |
2010 | A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies.(2010) In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 8 | paper | |
2010 | Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design Abstract: We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility, robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility has been shown to be necessary for any concept of robust implementation, while robust monotonicity and robust measurability have been shown to be necessary for robust (full) exact and virtual implementation, respectively. This paper shows that while violations of ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity do not easily go away, we identify a mild condition on environments in which robust measurability is satisfied by all social choice functions over an open and dense subset of first-order types. We conclude that there is a precise sense in which robust virtual implementation can be significantly more permissive than robust exact implementation. In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2016 | Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 2 |
2020 | Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 2 |
2020 | Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies.(2020) In: Economics and Statistics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 2 | paper | |
2020 | Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 3 |
2020 | Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions.(2020) In: Economics and Statistics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 3 | paper | |
2008 | Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage In: Economics Letters. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
2021 | Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms In: Games and Economic Behavior. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 8 |
2020 | Rationalizable Implementation in Finite Mechanisms.(2020) In: Economics and Statistics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 8 | paper | |
2013 | Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 16 |
2020 | Order on types based on monotone comparative statics In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
2018 | Order on Types based on Monotone Comparative Statics.(2018) In: TSE Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 0 | paper | |
2023 | Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
2022 | Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: Comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
2019 | Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 1 |
2020 | Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information In: Mathematical Social Sciences. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
2012 | Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] | paper | 51 |
2012 | Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations.(2012) In: PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint). [Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 51 | paper | |
2012 | Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations.(2012) In: Scholarly Articles. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 51 | paper | |
2012 | Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations.(2012) In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 51 | article | |
2012 | Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations In: PSE - Labex OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique. [Citation analysis] | paper | 37 |
2015 | Implementation with Transfers In: Discussion Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 6 |
2010 | Evaluating the conditions for robust mechanism design In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 3 |
2019 | Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences In: Management Science. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 9 |
2006 | ON THE NON-ROBUSTNESS OF NASH IMPLEMENTATION In: Departmental Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2006 | THE ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF UNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM In: Departmental Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2024 | The interplay of interdependence and correlation in bilateral trade In: Economics and Statistics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2018 | On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms In: Economics and Statistics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
2021 | On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms.(2021) In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 1 | article | |
2019 | Continuous Implementation with Small Transfers In: Economics and Statistics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2020 | Robust Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies in General Mechanisms In: Economics and Statistics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 3 |
2024 | Robust implementation in rationalizable strategies in general mechanisms.(2024) In: Economics and Statistics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 3 | paper | |
2020 | Efficient Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: The Use of Two-Stage Mechanisms In: Economics and Statistics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
2021 | Efficient Bilateral Trade via Two-Stage Mechanisms under One- Sided Asymmetric Information In: Economics and Statistics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2022 | Compellingness in Nash Implementation In: Economics and Statistics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2024 | Compellingness in Nash Implementation.(2024) In: Economics and Statistics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 0 | paper | |
2010 | Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness In: Review of Economic Design. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 1 |
2023 | Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work In: Journal of Political Economy. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Last updated February, 4 2025. Contact: CitEc Team