Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo : Citation Profile


Are you Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo?

Duke University
Duke University

11

H index

11

i10 index

243

Citations

RESEARCH PRODUCTION:

11

Articles

19

Papers

RESEARCH ACTIVITY:

   15 years (1995 - 2010). See details.
   Cites by year: 16
   Journals where Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo has often published
   Relations with other researchers
   Recent citing documents: 7.    Total self citations: 6 (2.41 %)

MORE DETAILS IN:
ABOUT THIS REPORT:

   Permalink: http://citec.repec.org/plo38
   Updated: 2021-01-16    RAS profile: 2011-03-30    
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Relations with other researchers


Works with:

Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo.

Is cited by:

Klemperer, Paul (13)

Marx, Leslie (9)

Economides, Nicholas (7)

Vives, Xavier (6)

van der Laan, Gerard (5)

Jehiel, Philippe (5)

Alcalde, Jose (5)

Dahm, Matthias (5)

McAdams, David (4)

Moldovanu, Benny (4)

Murray, Brian (4)

Cites to:

Cramton, Peter (12)

Riley, John (8)

Brusco, Sandro (8)

McAfee, Randolph (6)

McMillan, John (6)

Marx, Leslie (6)

Shobe, William (5)

Maskin, Eric (5)

Wilson, Robert (5)

Rochet, Jean (5)

Moldovanu, Benny (4)

Main data


Where Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo has published?


Journals with more than one article published# docs
Journal of Industrial Economics2
Games and Economic Behavior2

Working Papers Series with more than one paper published# docs
Working Papers / Duke University, Department of Economics2
Industrial Organization / University Library of Munich, Germany2

Recent works citing Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo (2021 and 2020)


YearTitle of citing document
2020Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions. (2020). Marx, Leslie M ; Loertscher, Simon. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:187:y:2020:i:c:s002205312030034x.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2020The impact of telecommunications regulation on less well-off Mexican households. (2020). Cave, Martin ; Mariscal, Elisa V. In: Telecommunications Policy. RePEc:eee:telpol:v:44:y:2020:i:4:s0308596119304537.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2020Collusion in public procurement: the role of subcontracting. (2020). Cesi, B ; Lorusso, M. In: Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics. RePEc:spr:epolit:v:37:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s40888-019-00167-3.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2020Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?. (2020). Balmaceda, Felipe. In: International Journal of Game Theory. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:49:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-019-00700-5.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2020First-price auctions with budget constraints. (2019). Kotowski, Maciej H. In: Theoretical Economics. RePEc:the:publsh:2982.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2020Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting. (2020). Garrett, Daniel F. In: TSE Working Papers. RePEc:tse:wpaper:124664.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2020Split-award auctions and supply disruptions. (2020). Laitenberger, Ulrich ; Fugger, Nicolas. In: ZEW Discussion Papers. RePEc:zbw:zewdip:20082.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Works by Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo:


YearTitleTypeCited
2008BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING‐BID AUCTIONS* In: Journal of Industrial Economics.
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article20
2010NON‐COOPERATIVE ENTRY DETERRENCE IN LICENSE AUCTIONS: DYNAMIC VERSUS SEALED BID* In: Journal of Industrial Economics.
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article4
2005Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
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article6
2001Bargaining, Interdependence and the Rationality of Fair Division In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
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paper12
2001Bargaining, Interdependence, and the Rationality of Fair Division..(2001) In: RAND Journal of Economics.
[Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 12
article
1998Bargaining, Interdependence, and the Rationality of Fair Division.(1998) In: Working Papers.
[Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 12
paper
1998Bargaining, Independence, and the Rationality of Fair Division In: Working Papers.
[Citation analysis]
paper0
2010Split-Award Procurement Auctions with Uncertain Scale Economies: Theory and Data In: Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
paper14
2010Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data.(2010) In: Games and Economic Behavior.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 14
article
Carbon Allowance Auction Design: An Assessment of Options for the U.S. In: Working Papers.
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paper11
2004Mergers Mechanisms In: Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings.
[Citation analysis]
paper4
2004Merger Mechanisms.(2004) In: Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 4
paper
2004Merger Mechanisms.(2004) In: Department of Economics Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 4
paper
2001Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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article16
1995Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction.(1995) In: Working Papers.
[Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 16
paper
2009The [`]Google effect in the FCCs 700Â MHz auction In: Information Economics and Policy.
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article3
2008The `Google Effect in the FCCs 700 MHz Auction.(2008) In: Department of Economics Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 3
paper
1998The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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article21
2007EFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS In: International Economic Review.
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article22
2005Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Complementarities and Known Budget Constraints In: Department of Economics Working Papers.
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paper27
2009Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints.(2009) In: Economic Theory.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 27
article
2007Coordination in Split-Award Auctions with Uncertain Scale Economies: Theory and Data In: Department of Economics Working Papers.
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paper1
2008The Economics of Contingent Re-Auctions In: Department of Economics Working Papers.
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paper6
1996Regulatory Pricing Rules to Neutralize Network Dominance. In: Industrial and Corporate Change.
[Citation analysis]
article7
2002Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Budget Constraints In: Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
paper1
2005Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing In: Working Papers.
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paper26
1997Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing.(1997) In: Industrial Organization.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 26
paper
1996Regulatory Rules to Neutralize Network Dominance. In: Working Papers.
[Citation analysis]
paper7
1999Collusion via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities In: Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
paper20
1997Regulatory Pricing Policies to Neutralize Network Dominance In: Industrial Organization.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
paper15

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