H. Reiju Mihara : Citation Profile


Are you H. Reiju Mihara?

4

H index

2

i10 index

55

Citations

RESEARCH PRODUCTION:

11

Articles

14

Papers

RESEARCH ACTIVITY:

   23 years (1994 - 2017). See details.
   Cites by year: 2
   Journals where H. Reiju Mihara has often published
   Relations with other researchers
   Recent citing documents: 8.    Total self citations: 14 (20.29 %)

MORE DETAILS IN:
ABOUT THIS REPORT:

   Permalink: http://citec.repec.org/pmi193
   Updated: 2021-04-17    RAS profile: 2020-12-08    
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Relations with other researchers


Works with:

Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with H. Reiju Mihara.

Is cited by:

Cato, Sususmu (8)

Martinelli, Cesar (4)

Gomberg, Andrei (4)

Basile, Achille (3)

Yeh, Chun-Hsien (2)

Mabrouk, Mohamed (2)

Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar (2)

Elbittar, Alexander (2)

Rao, Surekha (2)

Bossert, Walter (2)

Di Giannatale, Sonia (2)

Cites to:

Kirman, Alan (5)

Anderlini, Luca (5)

Duggan, John (4)

Felli, Leonardo (4)

Rubinstein, Ariel (4)

Lauwers, Luc (3)

Mbih, Boniface (3)

Martinelli, Cesar (3)

Van Liedekerke, Luc (3)

Richter, Marcel (3)

Gomberg, Andrei (3)

Main data


Where H. Reiju Mihara has published?


Journals with more than one article published# docs
Social Choice and Welfare4
Journal of Mathematical Economics3

Working Papers Series with more than one paper published# docs
Public Economics / University Library of Munich, Germany6
MPRA Paper / University Library of Munich, Germany6

Recent works citing H. Reiju Mihara (2021 and 2020)


YearTitle of citing document
2020The structure of two-valued strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference. (2020). K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao, ; Basile, Achille. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2002.06341.

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2020Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections. (2020). Pacuit, Eric ; Holliday, Wesley H. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2008.08451.

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2020Coalitions of concerned voters: a characterization of the majority rule. (2020). Miroiu, Adrian. In: Economics Bulletin. RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-20-00434.

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2020Acyclicity, anonymity, and prefilters. (2020). Bossert, Walter ; Cato, Susumu. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. RePEc:eee:mateco:v:87:y:2020:i:c:p:134-141.

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2021Superset-robust collective choice rules. (2021). Cato, Sususmu ; Bossert, Walter. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:109:y:2021:i:c:p:126-136.

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2020Quasi-stationary social welfare functions. (2020). Cato, Sususmu. In: Theory and Decision. RePEc:kap:theord:v:89:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-020-09746-4.

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2020Implementation in Iterative Elimination of Obviously Dominated Strategies: An Experiment on King Solomons Dilemma. (2020). Yonekura, Fumihiro ; Hagiwara, Makoto. In: Discussion Paper Series. RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2020-17.

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2020An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave. (2020). MacKenzie, Andrew. In: Economic Theory. RePEc:spr:joecth:v:69:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-019-01180-0.

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Works by H. Reiju Mihara:


YearTitleTypeCited
2012THE SECOND-PRICE AUCTION SOLVES KING SOLOMONS DILEMMA In: The Japanese Economic Review.
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article4
2008The second-price auction solves King Solomons dilemma.(2008) In: MPRA Paper.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 4
paper
2011Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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article1
2008Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction.(2008) In: MPRA Paper.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 1
paper
1999Arrows theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators1 In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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article2
2008Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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article2
2006Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core.(2006) In: MPRA Paper.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 2
paper
2011Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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article1
2006Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities.(2006) In: MPRA Paper.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 1
paper
2004Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
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article1
2004Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games.(2004) In: Game Theory and Information.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 1
paper
1994Arrows Theorem and Turing Computability. In: Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
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paper12
1997Arrows Theorem and Turing computability.(1997) In: Economic Theory.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 12
article
1994Arrows Theorem and Turing Computability.(1994) In: Public Economics.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 12
paper
2007The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games In: MPRA Paper.
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paper2
2008The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games.(2008) In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 2
article
2017Characterizing the Borda ranking rule for a fixed population In: MPRA Paper.
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paper2
1997Anonymity and neutrality in Arrows Theorem with restricted coalition algebras In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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article10
1994Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrows Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras.(1994) In: Public Economics.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 10
paper
2000Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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article8
1996Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives.(1996) In: Public Economics.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 8
paper
2001Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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article3
1996Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof.(1996) In: Public Economics.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 3
paper
1997Arrows Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators In: Public Economics.
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paper6
2004Arrows theorem, Weglorz models and the axiom of choice In: Public Economics.
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paper1

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