Fabio Michelucci : Citation Profile


Are you Fabio Michelucci?

Università Ca' Foscari Venezia

4

H index

0

i10 index

36

Citations

RESEARCH PRODUCTION:

8

Articles

10

Papers

RESEARCH ACTIVITY:

   11 years (2008 - 2019). See details.
   Cites by year: 3
   Journals where Fabio Michelucci has often published
   Relations with other researchers
   Recent citing documents: 6.    Total self citations: 11 (23.4 %)

MORE DETAILS IN:
ABOUT THIS REPORT:

   Permalink: http://citec.repec.org/pmi360
   Updated: 2022-01-15    RAS profile: 2020-05-09    
   Missing citations? Add them    Incorrect content? Let us know

Relations with other researchers


Works with:

Hernando-Veciana, Angel (2)

Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Fabio Michelucci.

Is cited by:

Goeree, Jacob (6)

Ray, Indrajit (5)

Kushnir, Alexey (5)

Gonçalves, Ricardo (5)

Wu, Hang (2)

Zultan, Ro'i (2)

Pezanis-Christou, Paul (2)

Llorente-Saguer, Aniol (2)

Khoroshilov, Yuri (2)

Hernando-Veciana, Angel (2)

Burtraw, Dallas (1)

Cites to:

Maskin, Eric (6)

Hernando-Veciana, Angel (6)

Riley, John (5)

Klemperer, Paul (5)

Moldovanu, Benny (4)

Krishna, Vijay (4)

Myerson, Roger (4)

Isaac, R. (4)

List, John (3)

Ye, Lixin (3)

Kushnir, Alexey (3)

Main data


Where Fabio Michelucci has published?


Journals with more than one article published# docs
Economics Letters2

Working Papers Series with more than one paper published# docs
Post-Print / HAL3

Recent works citing Fabio Michelucci (2021 and 2020)


YearTitle of citing document
2021I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions. (2021). Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit ; Viossat, Yannick ; Tsodikovich, Yevgeny. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2104.09942.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2020Preemptive bidding in common value takeover auctions: Social surplus and the target’s revenue. (2020). Khoroshilov, Yuri ; Dodonova, Anna. In: The North American Journal of Economics and Finance. RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:53:y:2020:i:c:s1062940820301054.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2020Jump bids in real estate auctions. (2020). Sommervoll, Dag Einar ; EinarSommervoll, Dag. In: Journal of Housing Economics. RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:49:y:2020:i:c:s1051137720300498.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2020Bidding strategies and winner’s curse in auctions of non-distressed residential real estate. (2020). Gunnelin, Rosane Hungria. In: Working Paper Series. RePEc:hhs:kthrec:2020_013.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2020Regret under different auction designs: the case of English and Dutch auctions. (2020). Malekovic, Ninoslav ; Galletta, Dennis ; Sutanto, Juliana ; Goutas, Lazaros. In: Electronic Markets. RePEc:spr:elmark:v:30:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s12525-019-00355-w.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2020Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases. (2020). Ziegler, Andreas ; Romagnoli, Giorgia ; Offerman, Theo. In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers. RePEc:tin:wpaper:20200071.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Works by Fabio Michelucci:


YearTitleTypeCited
2019Manipulating Information Revelation with Reserve Prices In: Annals of Economics and Statistics.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
article0
2012Hiding Information in Open Auctions In: CERGE-EI Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
paper7
2014Hiding Information in Open Auctions.(2014) In: Post-Print.
[Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 7
paper
2013Does Anticipated Regret Really Matter? Revisiting the Role of Feedback in Auction Bidding In: CERGE-EI Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
paper1
2013Do Not Panic: How to Avoid Inefficient Rushes Using Multi-Stage Auctions In: CERGE-EI Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
paper1
2014On the Optimality of Not Allocating In: CERGE-EI Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
paper1
2014On the optimality of not allocating.(2014) In: Economics Letters.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 1
article
2015Creating a Winners Curse via Jump Bids In: CERGE-EI Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
paper1
2016Creating a winners curse via jump bids.(2016) In: Post-Print.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 1
paper
2016Creating a winner’s curse via jump bids.(2016) In: Review of Economic Design.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 1
article
2017Electoral Contests with Dynamic Campaign Contributions In: CERGE-EI Working Papers.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
paper1
2017On the efficiency of the first price auction In: Economics Letters.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
article0
2011Second best efficiency and the English auction In: Games and Economic Behavior.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
article6
2015Does feedback really matter in one-shot first-price auctions? In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
article8
2016Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids In: Post-Print.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
paper7
2016Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids.(2016) In: Economic Journal.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 7
article
2008Second Best Efficiency in Auctions In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
paper1
2018Inefficient rushes in auctions In: Theoretical Economics.
[Full Text][Citation analysis]
article2

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated March, 2 2022. Contact: CitEc Team