Hiroshi Osano : Citation Profile


Are you Hiroshi Osano?

Kyoto University (50% share)
Konan University (50% share)

5

H index

3

i10 index

89

Citations

RESEARCH PRODUCTION:

30

Articles

14

Papers

RESEARCH ACTIVITY:

   35 years (1985 - 2020). See details.
   Cites by year: 2
   Journals where Hiroshi Osano has often published
   Relations with other researchers
   Recent citing documents: 7.    Total self citations: 12 (11.88 %)

MORE DETAILS IN:
ABOUT THIS REPORT:

   Permalink: http://citec.repec.org/pos19
   Updated: 2020-08-01    RAS profile: 2020-07-06    
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Relations with other researchers


Works with:

Hori, Keiichi (6)

Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Hiroshi Osano.

Is cited by:

Fanti, Luciano (7)

Hauck, Achim (5)

Pourpourides, Panayiotis (4)

wang, cheng (4)

Spear, Stephen (3)

Otrok, Christopher (3)

Winker, Peter (3)

Jovanovic, Boyan (2)

Sardoni, Claudio (2)

Ham, John (2)

Yamada, Ken (2)

Cites to:

Tirole, Jean (15)

Fudenberg, Drew (13)

Biais, Bruno (10)

DeMarzo, Peter (9)

Wang, Neng (9)

Shleifer, Andrei (9)

Hori, Keiichi (9)

Rochet, Jean (8)

He, Zhiguo (8)

wang, cheng (7)

Kaplan, Steven (7)

Main data


Where Hiroshi Osano has published?


Journals with more than one article published# docs
The Japanese Economic Review6
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies3
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control2
Journal of Corporate Finance2
Journal of Banking & Finance2
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)2
Journal of Economic Theory2

Working Papers Series with more than one paper published# docs
KIER Working Papers / Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research8
Discussion Papers / Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science4

Recent works citing Hiroshi Osano (2020 and 2019)


YearTitle of citing document
2019Cross-shareholding networks and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China. (2019). Zhou, Wei-Xing ; Yuan, Yujie ; Wen, Fenghua. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:1903.01655.

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2017Efficient non-cooperative bargaining despite keeping strategic information private. (2017). Lukas, Elmar ; Welling, Andreas . In: Journal of Corporate Finance. RePEc:eee:corfin:v:42:y:2017:i:c:p:287-294.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2020Off-balance sheet funding, voluntary support and investment efficiency. (2020). Zeng, Jing ; Segura, Anatoli. In: Journal of Financial Economics. RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:137:y:2020:i:1:p:90-107.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2020ISS’s Proxy Voting Guidelines and ROE Management. (2020). Kochiyama, Takuma ; Ishida, Souhei. In: Working Paper Series. RePEc:hit:hmicwp:235.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2018Investments under vertical relations and agency conflicts: a real options approach. (2018). Zormpas, Dimitrios. In: 2018 Papers. RePEc:jmp:jm2018:pzo81.

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2020The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Relationship between Accounting Quality and Trade Credit: Evidence from Japan. (2019). Enomoto, Masahiro. In: Discussion Paper Series. RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2018-12.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Works by Hiroshi Osano:


YearTitleTypeCited
1996BREACH OF CONTRACTS AND RENEGOTIATION IN CORPORATE TAKEOVERS In: The Japanese Economic Review.
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article0
1998Default and Renegotiation in Financial Distress in the Multiple Bank Model: An Analysis of the Main Bank System In: The Japanese Economic Review.
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article0
2003Wealth Dynamics and the Endogenous Design of Firm Organization In: The Japanese Economic Review.
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article0
2004OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS AND PUBLIC DEBT POLICY* In: The Japanese Economic Review.
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article1
2005AN OPTIMAL SCHEME FOR INJECTING PUBLIC FUNDS UNDER THE MORAL HAZARD INCENTIVE FOR BANKS In: The Japanese Economic Review.
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article3
2017Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options In: The Japanese Economic Review.
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article1
2011Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies, and Real Options.(2011) In: KIER Working Papers.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 1
paper
2017Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options.(2017) In: The Japanese Economic Review.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 1
article
1985Implicit Contracts in the Japanese Bank Loan Market In: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
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article11
2004Stock options and employees firm-specific human capital under the threat of divestitures and acquisitions In: Journal of Corporate Finance.
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article2
2014Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts In: Journal of Corporate Finance.
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article5
2020Dynamic contract and discretionary termination policy under loss aversion In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
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article0
2009Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
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article3
2020Credit default swaps and market information In: Journal of Financial Markets.
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article0
1986Credit rationing and implicit contract theory : An empirical study In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
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article2
1996Intercorporate shareholdings and corporate control in the Japanese firm In: Journal of Banking & Finance.
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article19
2002Managerial compensation contract and bank bailout policy In: Journal of Banking & Finance.
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article9
1998Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
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article1
1990Dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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article0
1995Renegotiation-Proof Lotteries Equilibrium in an Economy with Private Information In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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article2
2012Nonrecourse financing and securitization In: Journal of Financial Intermediation.
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article2
1997An Evolutionary Model of Corporate Governance and Employment Contracts, In: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies.
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article2
2011The new main bank system In: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies.
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article1
1988Implicit contracts in the Japanese labor market In: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies.
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article1
2005Double moral hazard and renegotiation In: Research in Economics.
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article0
2003Double Moral Hazard and Renegotiation.(2003) In: KIER Working Papers.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 0
paper
2003日本における銀行モニタリングのガバナンス機能 In: CEI Working Paper Series.
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paper0
1991Testing between Competing Models of Real Business Cycles. In: International Economic Review.
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article13
2020Information Investment Regulation and Portfolio Delegation In: KIER Working Papers.
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paper0
2002Lender Liability and Cleanup Procudure: A Comparison In: KIER Working Papers.
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paper0
2003Prudential Regulation and Capital Injection under Moral Hazard in Banks and Entrepreneurs In: KIER Working Papers.
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paper0
2013Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model In: KIER Working Papers.
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paper1
2013Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model.(2013) In: Review of Financial Studies.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 1
article
2015A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement In: KIER Working Papers.
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paper2
2017Debt Maturity, Default, and Investment under Rollover Risk and Solvency Concern In: KIER Working Papers.
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paper0
2010Incentive Transfer Schemes with Marketable and Nonmarketable Public Services In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE).
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article1
2011Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE).
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article5
1988Testing Between Competing Models of Business Cycles: The Efficient Long-Term Contract Hypothesis Versus the Intertemporal Substitution Hypothesis In: Discussion Papers.
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paper0
1988Involuntary Unemployment and the Threat to Shirking Workers In: Discussion Papers.
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paper0
1988Real Business Cycles in a Dynamic Labor Contract Equilibrium In: Discussion Papers.
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paper1
1989Coordination Failure and Long Run Growth In: Discussion Papers.
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paper0
2001Stock Options and Employees Firm-Specific Human Capital under the Threat of Divesture and Aquisition In: Working Papers.
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paper0
1999Security Design, Insider Monitoring, and Financial Market Equilibrium In: Review of Finance.
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article1
1999Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principals renegotiation offer In: Review of Economic Design.
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article0

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