M. Remzi Sanver : Citation Profile


Are you M. Remzi Sanver?

Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)

9

H index

8

i10 index

306

Citations

RESEARCH PRODUCTION:

54

Articles

30

Papers

EDITOR:

1

Books edited

RESEARCH ACTIVITY:

   21 years (1999 - 2020). See details.
   Cites by year: 14
   Journals where M. Remzi Sanver has often published
   Relations with other researchers
   Recent citing documents: 47.    Total self citations: 38 (11.05 %)

MORE DETAILS IN:
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   Permalink: http://citec.repec.org/psa232
   Updated: 2021-01-02    RAS profile: 2020-06-15    
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Relations with other researchers


Works with:

Ozkes, Ali (9)

Horan, Sean (5)

Nuñez, Matias (5)

Laslier, Jean-François (5)

Osborne, Martin (5)

Lainé, Jean (4)

Moulin, Herve (3)

Merlin, Vincent (2)

Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with M. Remzi Sanver.

Is cited by:

Laslier, Jean-François (15)

Barberà, Salvador (13)

Diss, Mostapha (13)

Coelho, Danilo (11)

Puppe, Clemens (9)

Cato, Sususmu (9)

Nuñez, Matias (9)

Quesada, Antonio (8)

Sen, Arunava (8)

Kamwa, Eric (7)

Tasnádi, Attila (7)

Cites to:

Barberà, Salvador (34)

Sen, Arunava (22)

Zhou, Lin (13)

Ozyurt, Selcuk (12)

Maskin, Eric (12)

Brams, Steven (12)

Dutta, Bhaskar (11)

Moulin, Herve (10)

Sertel, Murat (10)

Chatterji, Shurojit (9)

Sonnenschein, Hugo (9)

Main data


Where M. Remzi Sanver has published?


Journals with more than one article published# docs
Social Choice and Welfare17
Mathematical Social Sciences7
Economics Letters7
Theory and Decision4
Games and Economic Behavior3
Group Decision and Negotiation3
Economic Theory2
Review of Economic Design2

Working Papers Series with more than one paper published# docs
Post-Print / HAL13
Working Papers / HAL6
AMSE Working Papers / Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France2

Recent works citing M. Remzi Sanver (2020 and 2019)


YearTitle of citing document
2020Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers. (2020). Pacuit, Eric ; Holliday, Wesley H. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2004.02350.

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2020Efficient democratic decisions via nondeterministic proportional consensus. (2020). Simmons, Forest W ; Heitzig, Jobst. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2006.06548.

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2020Polarization in networks. (2020). Ozkes, Ali ; Huremovic, Kenan . In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2007.07061.

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2020Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections. (2020). Pacuit, Eric ; Holliday, Wesley H. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2008.08451.

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2019Is the Preference of the Majority Representative?. (2019). Gravel, Nicolas ; Bhattacharya, Mihir. In: Working Papers. RePEc:ash:wpaper:19.

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2020Coalitions of concerned voters: a characterization of the majority rule. (2020). Miroiu, Adrian. In: Economics Bulletin. RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-20-00434.

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2019Yet another characterization of the majority rule. (2019). Carlos, Jose. In: Economics Letters. RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:177:y:2019:i:c:p:52-55.

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2020A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model. (2020). Pramanik, Anup ; Bandhu, Sarvesh ; Lahiri, Abhinaba. In: Economics Letters. RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:191:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520301221.

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2019Welfare maximization entices participation. (2019). Hofbauer, Johannes ; Brandt, Felix ; Brandl, Florian. In: Games and Economic Behavior. RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:114:y:2019:i:c:p:308-314.

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2020Group identification: An integrated approach. (2020). Cho, Wonki ; Ju, Biung-Ghi ; Jo, Wonki. In: Games and Economic Behavior. RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:123:y:2020:i:c:p:171-181.

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2019Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains. (2019). Zeng, Huaxia ; Chatterji, Shurojit. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:182:y:2019:i:c:p:25-105.

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2019A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting. (2019). Storcken, Ton ; Roy, Souvik. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. RePEc:eee:mateco:v:84:y:2019:i:c:p:46-55.

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2019Dictatorship versus manipulability. (2019). Tasnádi, Attila ; Moskalenko, Anna ; Bednay, Dezs ; Tasnadi, Attila. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:101:y:2019:i:c:p:72-76.

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2020Social acceptability of Condorcet committees. (2020). Diss, Mostapha ; Mahajne, Muhammad. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:105:y:2020:i:c:p:14-27.

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2020Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in k-approval voting. (2020). Slinko, Arkadii ; Rossi, Francesca ; Grandi, Umberto ; Elkind, Edith. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:108:y:2020:i:c:p:193-205.

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2020On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle. (2020). Kamwa, Eric ; Diss, Mostapha ; Tlidi, Abdelmonaim. In: Post-Print. RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02147735.

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2020Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation. (2020). Kamwa, Eric ; Diss, Mostapha. In: Post-Print. RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02424936.

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2019On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle. (2019). Kamwa, Eric ; Diss, Mostapha ; Tlidi, Abdelmonaim. In: Working Papers. RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02147735.

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2019Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation. (2019). Diss, Mostapha ; Kamwa, Eric. In: Working Papers. RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02424936.

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2019Voter Autrement 2017 for the French Presidential Election. (2019). Lebon, Isabelle ; Laslier, Jean-François ; Igersheim, Herrade ; Baujard, Antoinette ; Blanch, Renaud ; Bouveret, Sylvain ; Merlin, Vincent ; Laruelle, Annick ; Lang, Jerome ; Durand, Franois. In: Working Papers. RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02379941.

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2020Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules. (2020). Nesterov, Alexander S ; Kondratev, Aleksei Y. In: Public Choice. RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:183:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00697-1.

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2020The prevalence and consequences of ballot truncation in ranked-choice elections. (2020). Kilgour, Marc D ; Foley, Angele M ; Gregoire, Jean-Charles. In: Public Choice. RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:184:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00723-2.

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2020Approval voting and Shapley ranking. (2020). Dehez, Pierre ; Ginsburgh, Victor. In: Public Choice. RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:184:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00729-w.

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2020Independent collective identity functions as voting rules. (2020). Carlos, Jose ; Laruelle, Annick. In: Theory and Decision. RePEc:kap:theord:v:89:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-019-09743-2.

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2020Governance and Group Conflict. (2020). Kölle, Felix ; Koelle, Felix. In: Discussion Papers. RePEc:not:notcdx:2020-04.

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2020On the structure of division rules. (2020). Sadhukhan, Soumyarup ; Roy, Souvik. In: MPRA Paper. RePEc:pra:mprapa:104402.

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2020Governance and Group Conflict. (2020). Kölle, Felix ; Kolle, Felix. In: MPRA Paper. RePEc:pra:mprapa:98859.

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2019Monotonicity and qualified majority rules. (2019). Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar. In: Economic Theory Bulletin. RePEc:spr:etbull:v:7:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-018-0154-7.

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2019Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules. (2019). Lepelley, Dominique ; Smaoui, Hatem. In: Group Decision and Negotiation. RePEc:spr:grdene:v:28:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-019-09618-5.

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2020Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?. (2020). Veselova, Yuliya A. In: Group Decision and Negotiation. RePEc:spr:grdene:v:29:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-020-09670-6.

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2020Simple Majorities with Voice but No Vote. (2020). Carlos, Jose. In: Group Decision and Negotiation. RePEc:spr:grdene:v:29:y:2020:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-020-09663-5.

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2020Specific Tastes or Cliques of Jurors? How to Reduce the Level of Manipulation in Group Decisions?. (2020). Sosnowska, Honorata ; Kontek, Krzysztof. In: Group Decision and Negotiation. RePEc:spr:grdene:v:29:y:2020:i:6:d:10.1007_s10726-020-09694-y.

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2020The Incidence of Some Voting Paradoxes Under Domain Restrictions. (2020). Nurmi, Hannu. In: Group Decision and Negotiation. RePEc:spr:grdene:v:29:y:2020:i:6:d:10.1007_s10726-020-09697-9.

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2019Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size. (2019). Long, Yan. In: Economic Theory. RePEc:spr:joecth:v:68:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-018-1135-7.

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2019Manipulability in a group activity selection problem. (2019). Darmann, Andreas. In: Social Choice and Welfare. RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:52:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-018-1155-z.

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2020The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity. (2020). Lee, Barton E ; Aziz, Haris. In: Social Choice and Welfare. RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:54:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01208-3.

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2020On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives. (2020). Pramanik, Anup ; Lahiri, Abhinaba. In: Social Choice and Welfare. RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:54:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-019-01220-7.

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2020A note on Murakami’s theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle. (2020). Kelley, Mikayla ; Holliday, Wesley H. In: Social Choice and Welfare. RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:55:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01238-2.

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2020The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions. (2020). Karpov, Alexander. In: Social Choice and Welfare. RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:55:y:2020:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01258-y.

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2019Resource allocation by frugal majority rule. (2019). Puppe, Clemens ; Nehring, Klaus. In: Working Paper Series in Economics. RePEc:zbw:kitwps:131.

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2020Governance and Group Conflict. (2020). Kolle, Felix. In: VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics. RePEc:zbw:vfsc20:224515.

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M. Remzi Sanver has edited the books:


YearTitleTypeCited

Works by M. Remzi Sanver:


YearTitleTypeCited
2016Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter? In: AMSE Working Papers.
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2017Absolute qualified majoritarianism: How does the threshold matter?.(2017) In: Economics Letters.
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2017Absolute qualified majoritarianism: How does the threshold matter?.(2017) In: Post-Print.
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2016Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter?.(2016) In: Working Papers.
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2017Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited In: AMSE Working Papers.
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paper0
2017Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited.(2017) In: Working Papers.
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paper
2020Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited.(2020) In: Department for Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series.
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2001Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners In: Working Papers.
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paper9
2004Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners.(2004) In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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article
2002An Allocation Rule with Wealth‐Regressive Tax Rates In: Journal of Public Economic Theory.
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article0
2005Eighth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare In: Economics Bulletin.
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article0
2010A characterization of the Copeland solution In: Economics Letters.
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article1
2002Another characterization of the majority rule In: Economics Letters.
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article34
2006Maskin monotonic aggregation rules In: Economics Letters.
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article15
2006Nash implementation of the majority rule In: Economics Letters.
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article3
2007On the alternating use of unanimity and surjectivity in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem In: Economics Letters.
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article4
2008Nash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domains In: Economics Letters.
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article0
2017Evaluationwise strategy-proofness In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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article0
2017Evaluationwise strategy-proofness.(2017) In: Post-Print.
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2007On combining implementable social choice rules In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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article3
2009A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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article8
2013On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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article22
2010On Domains That Admit Well-behaved Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions.(2010) In: Working Papers.
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2002Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
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article2
2005Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
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article0
2007A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
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article5
2009Stereotype formation as trait aggregation In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
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article0
2012On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
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article11
2017Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
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article5
2017Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity.(2017) In: Post-Print.
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2016REVISITING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NO-SHOW PARADOX AND MONOTONICITY *.(2016) In: Working Papers.
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2018Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
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2018Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility.(2018) In: Post-Print.
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paper
1999Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games1 In: European Journal of Political Economy.
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2016Hyper-stable social welfare functions In: Post-Print.
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2014Hyper-Stable Social Welfare Functions.(2014) In: Working Papers.
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2016Hyper-stable social welfare functions.(2016) In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2018Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence In: Post-Print.
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2018Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence.(2018) In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2017Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges In: Post-Print.
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2017Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges.(2017) In: Review of Economic Design.
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2018Implementing Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational Outcomes by Veto In: Post-Print.
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2018Implementing Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational Outcomes by Veto.(2018) In: Group Decision and Negotiation.
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2020Metrizable preferences over preferences In: Post-Print.
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2020Metrizable preferences over preferences.(2020) In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2019Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May’s theorem to many alternatives, In: Post-Print.
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2018Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of Mays theorem to many alternatives.(2018) In: Cahiers de recherche.
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2018Positively Responsive Collective Choice Rules and Majority Rule : A Generalization of May’s Theorem to Many Alternatives.(2018) In: Cahiers de recherche.
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2018Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: a generalization of Mays theorem to many alternatives.(2018) In: Working Papers.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 4
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2019POSITIVELY RESPONSIVE COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES AND MAJORITY RULE: A GENERALIZATION OF MAYS THEOREM TO MANY ALTERNATIVES.(2019) In: International Economic Review.
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2019The Future of Economic Design In: Post-Print.
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2019Compromise Rules Revisited In: Post-Print.
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2019Compromise Rules Revisited.(2019) In: Group Decision and Negotiation.
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2019The Future of Economic Design: The Continuing Development of a Field as Envisioned by Its Researchers In: Post-Print.
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2019The Future of Economic Design: The Continuing Development of a Field as Envisioned by Its Researchers.(2019) In: PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint).
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2020A solution to the two-person implementation problem In: PSE Working Papers.
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2020A solution to the two-person implementation problem.(2020) In: Working Papers.
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2012Measuring consensus in a preference-approval context In: Working Papers.
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2007A minimax procedure for electing committees In: Public Choice.
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article29
2009Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences In: Theory and Decision.
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article2
2009Choosers as extension axioms In: Theory and Decision.
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2010Simple Collective Identity Functions In: Theory and Decision.
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2010A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions In: Theory and Decision.
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article1
2009Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence In: Working Papers.
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2014Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence.(2014) In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2009Evaluating the Degree of Manipulability of Certain Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choices In: Journal of the New Economic Association.
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2004Efficiency in the Degree of Compromise: A New Axiom for Social Choice In: Group Decision and Negotiation.
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2006Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards In: Economic Theory.
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2009Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains In: Economic Theory.
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2009One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness In: International Journal of Game Theory.
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2005Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies In: Review of Economic Design.
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2011An individual manipulability of positional voting rules In: SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association.
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2003Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2005Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2006Nash implementation via hyperfunctions In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2006Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2007Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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article4
2007Is abstention an escape from Arrow’s theorem? In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2008Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2008Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2009Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2009Sophisticated preference aggregation In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2012Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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2015Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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article2

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