6
H index
4
i10 index
199
Citations
Tadashi Sekiguchi : Citation Profile
Kyoto University | RESEARCH PRODUCTION: 11 Articles 13 Papers RESEARCH ACTIVITY:
MORE DETAILS IN: ABOUT THIS REPORT:
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19 years (1997 - 2016). Relations with other researchers
Works with: Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Tadashi Sekiguchi. | Is cited by:
| Cites to:
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Main data
Where Tadashi Sekiguchi has published?
| Journals with more than one article published | # docs |
|---|---|
| Journal of Economic Theory | 4 |
| Games and Economic Behavior | 2 |
| Working Papers Series with more than one paper published | # docs |
|---|---|
| KIER Working Papers / Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research | 5 |
Recent works citing Tadashi Sekiguchi (2022 and 2021)
| Year | Title of citing document |
|---|---|
| 2021 | A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games. (2021). Sawa, Ryoji. In: Games and Economic Behavior. RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:129:y:2021:i:c:p:570-589. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
| 2022 | Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting. (2022). Ghosh, Sambuddha ; Dasgupta, Ani. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:200:y:2022:i:c:s0022053121001290. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
| 2021 | Competitive pricing despite search costs when lower price signals quality. (2021). Heinsalu, Sander. In: Economic Theory. RePEc:spr:joecth:v:71:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01247-3. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
Works by Tadashi Sekiguchi:
| Year | Title | Type | Cited |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2005 | UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING* In: The Japanese Economic Review. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 2 |
| 2006 | Reputation and turnover In: RAND Journal of Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 9 |
| 2004 | Reputation and Turnover.(2004) In: KIER Working Papers. [Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 9 | paper | |
| 2004 | Reputation and Turnover.(2004) In: PIER Working Paper Archive. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 9 | paper | |
| 2002 | Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring In: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 25 |
| 2001 | Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring.(2001) In: Penn CARESS Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 25 | paper | |
| The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma In: Penn CARESS Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 17 | |
| 2002 | The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma.(2002) In: Games and Economic Behavior. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 17 | article | |
| 2001 | Product Quality, Reputation and Turnover In: Penn CARESS Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 2 |
| 2001 | A negative result in finitely repeated games with product monitoring In: Economics Letters. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 3 |
| 2002 | Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring In: Games and Economic Behavior. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 4 |
| 2008 | The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 22 |
| 2004 | The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs.(2004) In: KIER Working Papers. [Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 22 | paper | |
| 2007 | The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs.(2007) In: 2007 Meeting Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 22 | paper | |
| 2013 | Finitely repeated games with monitoring options In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 2 |
| 2016 | Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 4 |
| 2008 | Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships.(2008) In: KIER Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 4 | paper | |
| 1997 | Efficiency in Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Private Monitoring In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 98 |
| 2016 | Finitely Repeated Games with Automatic and Optional Monitoring In: Discussion Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2016 | Repeated Games with Recursive Utility:Cournot Duopoly under Gain/Loss Asymmetry In: Discussion papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
| 2003 | Repeated Games with Observation Costs In: KIER Working Papers. [Citation analysis] | paper | 8 |
| 2004 | On the Negative Result in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring In: KIER Working Papers. [Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2015 | Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations In: International Journal of Game Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 2 |
| 2013 | MULTIMARKET CONTACT UNDER DEMAND FLUCTUATIONS: A LIMIT RESULT In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated August, 1st 2022. Contact: CitEc Team