Citation profile for Francisco Silva

Francisco Silva : Citation Profile

Deakin University

H index

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Citations

RESEARCH PRODUCTION:

Articles

Papers

RESEARCH ACTIVITY:

   8 years (2016 - 2024). See details.
   Cites by year: 0
   Journals where Francisco Silva has often published
   Relations with other researchers
   Recent citing documents: 4.    Total self citations: 6 (54.55 %)

MORE DETAILS IN:

EconPapers Author's homepage

ABOUT THIS REPORT:

   Permalink: http://citec.repec.org/psi931
   Updated: 2024-11-08    RAS profile: 2024-08-09
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Relations with other researchers

Works with:

Pereyra, Juan (3)

Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Francisco Silva.

Is cited by:

Cites to:

Tirole, Jean (7)

Fudenberg, Drew (6)

Levine, David (5)

Milgrom, Paul (5)

Ekmekci, Mehmet (5)

Crawford, Vincent (4)

spiegler, ran (4)

janssen, maarten (4)

Sobel, Joel (4)

Myerson, Roger (3)

Schmidt, Klaus (3)

Main data

Where Francisco Silva has published?

Journals with more than one article published	# docs
Theoretical Economics	3
Economic Inquiry	3

Working Papers Series with more than one paper published	# docs
Documentos de Trabajo / Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Cat�lica de Chile.	6

Recent works citing Francisco Silva (2024 and 2023)

Year	Title of citing document
2023	Selecting a Winner with External Referees. (2023). Dziubinski, Marcin ; Dutta, Bhaskar ; Bloch, Francis. In: Working Papers. RePEc:ash:wpaper:99. Full description at Econpapers \|\| Download paper
2023	Selecting a winner with external referees. (2023). Dziubiski, Marcin ; Dutta, Bhaskar ; Bloch, Francis. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:211:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000832. Full description at Econpapers \|\| Download paper

Works by Francisco Silva:

Year	Title	Type	Cited
2020	The Importance of Commitment Power in Games with Imperfect Evidence In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2017	INDUCING OVERCONFIDENCE In: Economic Inquiry. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2020	A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE In: Economic Inquiry. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2023	Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit? In: Economic Inquiry. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2023	Modeling Competition over Multiple Variables under Limited Consumer Awareness In: Journal of Industrial Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2022	The role of information in collective decisions In: Documentos CEDE. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	paper	0
2022	The value of uncertainty in determining an experts source of expertise In: Games and Economic Behavior. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2016	Should the Government Provide Public Goods if it Cannot Commit? In: Documentos de Trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	paper	0
2020	Should the government provide public goods if it cannot commit?.(2020) In: Documentos de Trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 0	paper
2016	Euthanasia: The Fear of Becoming a Burden In: Documentos de Trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	paper	0
2020	Optimal object assignment mechanisms with imperfect type veri?cation In: Documentos de Trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	paper	1
2020	The Equivalence Between Sequential and Simultaneous Firm Decisions In: Documentos de Trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	paper	0
2020	Self-evaluations In: Documentos de Trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	paper	0
2019	Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification In: Theoretical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2023	Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification In: Theoretical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	3
2020	Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification.(2020) In: Documentos de Trabajo (working papers). [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 3	paper
2024	Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification In: Theoretical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2019	IF WE CONFESS OUR SINS In: International Economic Review. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	1