Yannick Viossat : Citation Profile


Are you Yannick Viossat?

Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)

3

H index

0

i10 index

38

Citations

RESEARCH PRODUCTION:

10

Articles

21

Papers

RESEARCH ACTIVITY:

   13 years (2003 - 2016). See details.
   Cites by year: 2
   Journals where Yannick Viossat has often published
   Relations with other researchers
   Recent citing documents: 0.    Total self citations: 14 (26.92 %)

MORE DETAILS IN:
ABOUT THIS REPORT:

   Permalink: http://citec.repec.org/pvi210
   Updated: 2018-06-23    RAS profile: 2017-12-06    
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Relations with other researchers


Works with:

Zapechelnyuk, Andriy (2)

Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Yannick Viossat.

Is cited by:

Hofbauer, Josef (5)

Hopkins, Ed (4)

Serrano, Roberto (2)

Hommes, Cars (2)

Germano, Fabrizio (1)

Sorin, Sylvain (1)

Arce, Daniel (1)

Lahkar, Ratul (1)

Cites to:

Hofbauer, Josef (23)

Aumann, Robert (16)

Hart, Sergiu (12)

Weibull, Jörgen (11)

Sorin, Sylvain (10)

Mas-Colell, Andreu (8)

Myerson, Roger (7)

Gilboa, Itzhak (6)

Matsui, Akihiko (6)

Mertens, Jean-François (5)

Ritzberger, Klaus (5)

Main data


Where Yannick Viossat has published?


Journals with more than one article published# docs
Journal of Mathematical Economics2

Working Papers Series with more than one paper published# docs
Post-Print / HAL12
Working Papers / HAL7

Recent works citing Yannick Viossat (2018 and 2017)


YearTitle of citing document

Works by Yannick Viossat:


YearTitleTypeCited
2007The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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2007The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria.(2007) In: Post-Print.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 5
paper
2013No-regret dynamics and fictitious play In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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2013No-regret Dynamics and Fictitious Play.(2013) In: Post-Print.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 0
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2008Is having a unique equilibrium robust? In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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2008Is Having a Unique Equilibrium Robust?.(2008) In: Post-Print.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 0
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2011Equilibrium payoffs of finite games In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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2011Equilibrium payoffs in finite games.(2011) In: Post-Print.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 2
paper
2008Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
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article3
2008Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria.(2008) In: Post-Print.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 3
paper
2006Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium.(2006) In: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 3
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2010Properties and applications of dual reduction In: Post-Print.
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2010Properties and applications of dual reduction.(2010) In: Economic Theory.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 3
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2009Time Average Replicator and Best Reply Dynamics In: Post-Print.
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2009Time Average Replicator and Best-Reply Dynamics.(2009) In: Mathematics of Operations Research.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 8
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2014Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria In: Post-Print.
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2015Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies In: Post-Print.
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2015Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies.(2015) In: Economic Theory Bulletin.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 0
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2012Evolutionary strategic beliefs and financial markets In: Post-Print.
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2012Evolutionary Beliefs and Financial Markets In: Post-Print.
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2013Evolutionary beliefs and financial markets.(2013) In: Post-Print.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 4
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2013Evolutionary Beliefs and Financial Markets.(2013) In: Review of Finance.
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This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 4
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2004Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium In: Working Papers.
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2005Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium: Elimination of All Strategies in the Support of Correlated Equilibria In: Working Papers.
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2003Elementary Games and Games Whose Correlated Equilibrium Polytope Has Full Dimension In: Working Papers.
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2003Properties of Dual Reduction In: Working Papers.
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2003Geometry, Correlated Equilibria and Zero-Sum Games In: Working Papers.
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2005Openness of the set of games with a unique correlated equilibrium In: Working Papers.
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2011Deterministic monotone dynamics and dominated strategies In: Working Papers.
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2006The Geometry of Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria and a Generalization of Zero-Sum Games In: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
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paper2
2016Imitation dynamics with payoff shocks In: International Journal of Game Theory.
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