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 Updated May, 1 2008 147.392 documents processed, 3.154.300 references and 1.403.701 citations

 

 
 

Economics and Politics

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.170000.08
19970.216300020.130.08
19980.250.23143416400.1
19990.230.321547307010.070.16
20000.030.4315120291020.130.19
20010.20.391552306020.130.17
20020.470.4215203014010.070.2
20030.30.471418309010.070.22
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
 
Impact Factor:
 
Immediacy Index:
 
Documents published:
 
Citations received:
 

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:1-31 The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth (2000). Economics and Politics
Cited: 64 times.

(2) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:69-81 Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth (2000). Economics and Politics
Cited: 27 times.

(3) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:9:y:1997:i:3:p:205-205 Introduction (1997). Economics and Politics
Cited: 19 times.

(4) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:1:p:1-27 Political Institutions and Policy Volatility (2004). Economics and Politics
Cited: 15 times.

(5) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:37-75 PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MEASURE OF CORRUPTION, ILLUSTRATED WITH ITALIAN DATA (2005). Economics and Politics
Cited: 11 times.

(6) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:63-83 Political Control of Administrative Spending: The Case of Local Governments in Norway (1998). Economics and Politics
Cited: 11 times.

(7) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:171-199 Does Distributional Skewness Lead to Redistribution? Evidence from the United States (1999). Economics and Politics
Cited: 11 times.

(8) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:1:p:53-76 The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments (2004). Economics and Politics
Cited: 10 times.

(9) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:1-17 Rationalizing the Political Business Cycle: A Workhorse Model (1998). Economics and Politics
Cited: 10 times.

(10) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:201-220 The Political Economy of the IRS (2001). Economics and Politics
Cited: 10 times.

(11) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:275-295 Delays of Inflation Stabilizations (2000). Economics and Politics
Cited: 10 times.

(12) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:177-213 WHICH VARIABLES EXPLAIN DECISIONS ON IMF CREDIT? AN EXTREME BOUNDS ANALYSIS (2005). Economics and Politics
Cited: 10 times.

(13) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:225-245 Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance (2000). Economics and Politics
Cited: 9 times.

(14) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:225-253 Aid, Taxation and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (1999). Economics and Politics
Cited: 9 times.

(15) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:237-256 Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina (2001). Economics and Politics
Cited: 9 times.

(16) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:2:p:155-182 Corruption, Income Distribution, and Growth (2000). Economics and Politics
Cited: 8 times.

(17) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:109-144 Do Gatt Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments? (1999). Economics and Politics
Cited: 7 times.

(18) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:275-297 Aid, Growth and Democracy (1999). Economics and Politics
Cited: 7 times.

(19) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:129-157 Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom (2001). Economics and Politics
Cited: 7 times.

(20) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:2:p:109-135 Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information (2000). Economics and Politics
Cited: 7 times.

(21) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i::p:321-345 VOTING TRANSPARENCY, CONFLICTING INTERESTS, AND THE APPOINTMENT OF CENTRAL BANKERS (2004). Economics and Politics
Cited: 7 times.

(22) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:9:y:1997:i:1:p:27-54 Politically Motivated Fiscal Deficits: Policy Issues in Closed and Open Economies (1997). Economics and Politics
Cited: 7 times.

(23) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:2:p:135-162 Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance (2003). Economics and Politics
Cited: 7 times.

(24) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:3:p:225-257 Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance (2002). Economics and Politics
Cited: 6 times.

(25) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:151-176 ELECTIONS AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY CYCLES (2005). Economics and Politics
Cited: 6 times.

(26) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:2:p:127-142 Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange (1998). Economics and Politics
Cited: 5 times.

(27) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:2:p:117-146 Adjustments in Different Government Systems (2004). Economics and Politics
Cited: 5 times.

(28) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:18:y:2006:i:2:p:103-120 SOCIAL COHESION, INSTITUTIONS, AND GROWTH (2006). Economics and Politics
Cited: 4 times.

(29) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:257-279 Campaign Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies (2001). Economics and Politics
Cited: 4 times.

(30) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:1:p:31-47 Cooption and Repression in the Soviet Union (2001). Economics and Politics
Cited: 4 times.

(31) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:1-35 ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS MATTER (2005). Economics and Politics
Cited: 4 times.

(32) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:2:p:99-131 Factor or Industry Cleavages in Trade Policy? An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (2002). Economics and Politics
Cited: 4 times.

(33) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:159-184 Political Competition in Weak States (2001). Economics and Politics
Cited: 4 times.

(34) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:113-128 Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries and Agricultural Trade Disputes (2001). Economics and Politics
Cited: 4 times.

(35) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:129-150 FISCAL CONSTRAINTS, COLLECTION COSTS, AND TRADE POLICIES (2005). Economics and Politics
Cited: 4 times.

(36) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:2:p:161-183 To Shock or Not to Shock? Economics and Political Economy of Large-Scale Reforms (1998). Economics and Politics
Cited: 3 times.

(37) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:p:41-63 Private Investment and Political Institutions (2002). Economics and Politics
Cited: 3 times.

(38) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:145-169 Russias Tax Crisis: Explaining Falling Revenues in a Transitional Economy (1999). Economics and Politics
Cited: 3 times.

(39) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:1:p:33-50 Estimating Presidential Elections: The Importance of State Fixed Effects and the Role of National Versus Local Information (1999). Economics and Politics
Cited: 3 times.

(40) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:18:y:2006:i:3:p:339-365 PROMISES MADE, PROMISES BROKEN: A MODEL OF IMF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION (2006). Economics and Politics
Cited: 3 times.

(41) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:133-149 The Evolutionary Stability of Moral Objections to Free Riding (1997). Economics and Politics
Cited: 3 times.

(42) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:213-223 New Deal or Same Old Shuffle? The Distribution of New Deal Dollars Across Alabama (1999). Economics and Politics
Cited: 3 times.

(43) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i::p:233-251 DID TIME INCONSISTENCY CONTRIBUTE TO THE GREAT INFLATION? EVIDENCE FROM THE FOMC TRANSCRIPTS (2004). Economics and Politics
Cited: 3 times.

(44) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:2:p:189-212 Inequality, Democracy, and Persistence: Is There a Political Kuznets Curve? (2004). Economics and Politics
Cited: 3 times.

(45) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:1:p:1-29 Choosing Democracy (2001). Economics and Politics
Cited: 2 times.

(46) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i:3:p:297-330 REAL EXCHANGE RATE CYCLES AROUND ELECTIONS (2005). Economics and Politics
Cited: 2 times.

(47) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:2:p:133-161 On the Political Economy of Temporary Stabilization Programs (2002). Economics and Politics
Cited: 2 times.

(48) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:1:p:33-59 Will Gradualism Work When Shock Therapy Doesnt? (2003). Economics and Politics
Cited: 2 times.

(49) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:1:p:95-112 Why Do Poor democracies Collect a Lot of Tariff Revenue? (2001). Economics and Politics
Cited: 2 times.

(50) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:2:p:213-231 Donor Strategy under the Fungibility of Foreign Aid (2004). Economics and Politics
Cited: 2 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:got:cegedp:21 Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict (2003). Center for Globalization and Europeanization of the Economy, University of Goettingen (Germany). / CeGE Discussion Papers

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv02-34 The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data (2002). Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competitiveness and Industrial Change (CIC) / CIC Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8108 The Impact of New Deal Expenditures on Local Economic Activity: An Examination of Retail Sales, 1929-1939 (2001). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(2) RePEc:nzt:nztwps:01/26 Three Steps Towards More Effective Development Assistance (2001). New Zealand Treasury / Treasury Working Paper Series

Latest citations received in: 2000

(1) RePEc:cem:doctra:168 Por qué importan las instituciones políticas para el desempeño económico: incertidumbre política y s (2000). Universidad del CEMA / CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo.

(2) RePEc:idb:wpaper:1011 Political Institutions and Growth Collapses (2000). Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department / Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2008 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es