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 Updated May, 1 2008 147.392 documents processed, 3.154.300 references and 1.403.701 citations

 

 
 

UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.160000.07
19970.170000.09
19980.190000.12
19990.290000.19
20000.39433000.2
200110.34204400.18
20021.170.3971367020.290.2
20030.220.41122511920800.660.21
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
 
Impact Factor:
 
Immediacy Index:
 
Documents published:
 
Citations received:
 

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000515 Bargaining and Markets (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 147 times.

(2) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000413 Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans? (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 86 times.

(3) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000384 Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: I. General Theory (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 63 times.

(4) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000130 The Social Multiplier (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 49 times.

(5) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000394 Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: II. Applications (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 34 times.

(6) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000289 Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 33 times.

(7) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000092 Public and Private Information in Monetary Policy Models (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 29 times.

(8) RePEc:cla:levrem:7616 Risk, Ambiguity, and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs (2000). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 28 times.

(9) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000217 Designing Optimal Disability Insurance (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 26 times.

(10) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000560 Business Cycle Accounting (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 24 times.

(11) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000367 Average Debt and Equity Returns: Puzzling? (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 23 times.

(12) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000880 Sudden Stops and Output Drops (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 23 times.

(13) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000518 A Critique of Structural VARs Using Real Business Cycle Theory (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 22 times.

(14) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000136 Inefficient Foreign Borrowing: A Dual-and Common-Agency Perspective (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 20 times.

(15) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000465 Why is fiscal policy often procyclical? (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 20 times.

(16) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000143 COGNITION AND BEHAVIOR IN TWO-PERSON GUESSING GAMES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 20 times.

(17) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000311 Persistence in Law-of-One-Price Deviations: Evidence from Micro-data (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 19 times.

(18) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000652 Time-Consistent Public Expenditures (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 18 times.

(19) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000098 Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip? (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 18 times.

(20) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000300 A Unified Theory of the Evolution of International Income Levels (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 17 times.

(21) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000484 Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can inform economics. (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 15 times.

(22) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000415 Hot Money (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 15 times.

(23) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000336 Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 15 times.

(24) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000439 Clean Evidence on Peer Effects (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 14 times.

(25) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000252 Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 14 times.

(26) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001139 Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 13 times.

(27) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000116 Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 13 times.

(28) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000715 Taxes, Regulations, and the Value of U.S. and U.K. Corporations (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 13 times.

(29) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000488 Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 13 times.

(30) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000138 Efficient Allocations, with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 12 times.

(31) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000236 Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal Form Games (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 12 times.

(32) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001304 Democratic capital: The nexus of political and economic change (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 12 times.

(33) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000259 Structural Transformation and Cross-Country Income Differences (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 11 times.

(34) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000035 Robust Mechanism Design (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 11 times.

(35) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000108 Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 11 times.

(36) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000018 Market Culture: How Norms Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 11 times.

(37) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000092 Competing Auctions (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 10 times.

(38) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000261 Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 9 times.

(39) RePEc:cla:levrem:234936000000000089 A General Theory of Time Preferences (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 9 times.

(40) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000300 Societal Benefits of Illiquid Bonds (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 9 times.

(41) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000294 Coordination and Policy Traps (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 9 times.

(42) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000587 U.S. Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Relative Price Fluctuations (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 9 times.

(43) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000514 The Limits of Ex Post Implementation Revisited (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 9 times.

(44) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000997 Principal Components and the Long Run (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 9 times.

(45) RePEc:cla:levrem:172782000000000096 A,B,Cs (and Ds)s for Understanding VARS (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 9 times.

(46) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000145 On Non-Exclusive Membership in Competing Joint Ventures (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 8 times.

(47) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000001 Promises and Partnership (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 8 times.

(48) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001030 The Informal Sector (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 8 times.

(49) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000124 Executive Compensation and Short-termist Behavior in Speculative Markets (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 8 times.

(50) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000265 Position-Specific Informtion in Social Networks (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography
Cited: 8 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:2:p:192-195 Models of Thinking, Learning, and Teaching in Games (2003). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:2:p:196-201 Decision Making with Naive Advice (2003). American Economic Review

(3) RePEc:cea:doctra:e2003_11 Computational Errors in Guessing Games1 (2003). Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces / Economic Working Papers at centrA

(4) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1060 Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions: Empirical Evidence and Optimal Policy Using a Structural New Keynesian Model (2003). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(5) RePEc:cfs:cfswop:wp200312 Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge (2003). Center for Financial Studies / CFS Working Paper Series

(6) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000092 Competing Auctions (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(7) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000098 Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip? (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(8) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000350 Attainability of Boundary Points under Reinforcement Learning (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(9) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000495 A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(10) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000514 Functional EWA: A one-parameter theory of learning in games (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(11) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000264 Accuracy of Simulations for Stochastic Dynamic Models (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(12) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000284 Calculating and Using Second Order Accurate Solutions of Discrete Time (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(13) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000426 Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(14) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1161 A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency (2003). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(15) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3723 The Law of Primogeniture and the Transition from Landed Aristocracy to Industrial Democracy (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(16) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3899 Taylor Rules in Practice: How Central Banks can Intercept Sunspot Expectations (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(17) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3928 Backward-Looking Interest Rate Rules, Interest Rate Smoothing and Macroeconomic Instability (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(18) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3966 Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behaviour (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(19) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4006 Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(20) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4028 The Spatial Aspects of Crime (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(21) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4030 Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow in Foreign Currency? (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(22) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4135 The Learning Cost of Interest Rate Reversals (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(23) RePEc:cte:werepe:we034615 ACCURACY OF SIMULATIONS FOR STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC MODELS (2003). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(24) RePEc:cte:werepe:we034716 SIMULATION-BASED ESTIMATION OF DYNAMIC MODELS WITH CONTINUOUS EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTIONS (2003). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(25) RePEc:ctl:louvir:2003010 Diverging patterns of education premium and school attendance in France and the US : a Walrasian view (2003). Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) / Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Eco

(26) RePEc:cvs:starer:03-05 Medium Term Business Cycles (2003). C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University / Working Papers

(27) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1423 Multidimensional Private Value Auctions (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(28) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1432 On the Empirical Content of Quantal Response Equilibrium (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(29) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200353 The role of trust in costly network formation (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(30) RePEc:dnb:wormem:729 Central Bank Communication and Interest Rate Rules (2003). Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department / WO Research Memoranda (discontinued)

(31) RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20030257 Macroeconomic modelling of monetary policy. (2003). European Central Bank / Working Paper Series

(32) RePEc:esx:essedp:563 Learning in Networks: a survey (2003). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers

(33) RePEc:fip:fedawp:2003-21 Inflation scares and forecast-based monetary policy (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta / Working Paper

(34) RePEc:fip:fedfap:2003-11 Inflation scares and forecast-based monetary policy (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco / Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory

(35) RePEc:fip:fedfer:y:2003:p:1-12 Simple rules for monetary policy (2003). Economic Review

(36) RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2003-41 Inflation scares and forecast-based monetary policy (2003). Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) / Finance and Economics Discussion Series

(37) RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2003-61 Calculating and using second order accurate solutions of discrete time dynamic equilibrium models (2003). Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) / Finance and Economics Discussion Series

(38) RePEc:fip:fedkpr:y:2003:p:349-360 Implications of a changing economic structure for the strategy of monetary policy : commentary (2003). Proceedings

(39) RePEc:fip:fedmbp:4-03 Alternative nominal anchors: a welfare comparison (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Banking and Policy Studies

(40) RePEc:fip:fedmem:140 Dynamic optimal taxation with private information (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics

(41) RePEc:fip:fedmsr:316 Financial crises as herds: overturning the critiques (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Staff Report

(42) RePEc:fip:fedmwp:628 Designing optimal disability insurance (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Working Papers

(43) RePEc:fip:fedpwp:03-4 Backward-looking interest-rate rules, interest-rate smoothing, and macroeconomic instability (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia / Working Papers

(44) RePEc:gla:glaewp:2003_9 Assessing Money Supply Rules (2003). Department of Economics, University of Glasgow / Working Papers

(45) RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0100 Do You Enjoy Having More Than Others? Survey Evidence of Positional Goods (2003). Göteborg University, Department of Economics / Working Papers in Economics

(46) RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0157 Indicator Accuracy and Monetary Policy: Is Ignorance Bliss? (2003). Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden) / Working Paper Series

(47) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp319 Markets Versus Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation (2003). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(48) RePEc:ide:wpaper:589 Efficient Patent Pools (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(49) RePEc:ide:wpaper:654 Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(50) RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp03-10 The Difficulty of Discerning Whats Too Tight: Taylor Rules and Japanese Monetary Policy (2003). Peterson Institute for International Economics / Peterson Institute Working Paper Series

(51) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2003-36 THE CURSE AND BLESSING OF FIXED SPECIFIC FACTORS IN SMALL-OPEN ECONOMIES (2003). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

(52) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp846 Diverging Patterns of Education Premium and School Attendance in France and the US: A Walrasian View (2003). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(53) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:6:y:2003:i:1:p:53-73 Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study (2003). Experimental Economics

(54) RePEc:kud:epruwp:03-10 The Equity Risk Premium and the Required Share Returns in a Tobin’s q Model. (2003). Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics (formerly Institute of Economics) / EPRU Working Paper Series

(55) RePEc:kud:kuieca:2004_10 Optimal Unemployment Insurance in an Estimated Job Search Model with Savings (2003). University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics / CAM Working Papers

(56) RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2003-06 Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents (2003). Department of Economics, Louisiana State University / Departmental Working Papers

(57) RePEc:max:cprwps:51 Social Interactions in Labor Supply (revised October 2005) (2003). Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University / Center for Policy Research Working Papers

(58) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10003 Medium Term Business Cycles (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(59) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10119 Pareto Efficient Income Taxation with Stochastic Abilities (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(60) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10125 International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMFs Catalytic Finance (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(61) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9658 Financial Crises as Herds: Overturning the Critiques (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(62) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9767 Coordination and Policy Traps (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(63) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9852 The Value of a Statistical Life and the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(64) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9900 Does Exchange Rate Risk Matter for Welfare? (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(65) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9931 Micro-Foundations of Urban Agglomeration Economies (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(66) RePEc:net:wpaper:0311 Adoption Delay in a Standards War (2003). NET Institute / Working Papers

(67) RePEc:net:wpaper:0312 Differentiation Across Standards and Adoption Failure in 56K Modems (2003). NET Institute / Working Papers

(68) RePEc:nus:nusewp:wp0311 Competing Payment Schemes (2003). National University of Singapore, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

(69) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1372 Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms (2003). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(70) RePEc:pen:papers:03-005 Backward-Looking Interest-Rate Rules, Interest-Rate Smoothing, and Macroeconomic Instability (2003). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(71) RePEc:red:ecodyn:v:4:y:2003:i:2:interview EconomicDynamics Interviews Narayana Kocherlakota (2003). EconomicDynamics Newsletter

(72) RePEc:rne:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:2:p:50-68 Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature (2003). Review of Network Economics

(73) RePEc:rne:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:2:p:97-124 The Theory of Interchange Fees: A Synthesis of Recent Contributions (2003). Review of Network Economics

(74) RePEc:roc:rocher:490 Does Stockholding Provide Perfect Risk Sharing? (2003). University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) / RCER Working Papers

(75) RePEc:rut:rutres:200304 Backward-Looking Interest-Rate Rules, Interest-Rate Smoothing, and Macroeconomic Instability (2003). Rutgers University, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

(76) RePEc:sce:scecf3:263 Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge (2003). Society for Computational Economics / Computing in Economics and Finance 2003

(77) RePEc:sce:scecf3:38 Public and Private Information in Monetary Policy Models (2003). Society for Computational Economics / Computing in Economics and Finance 2003

(78) RePEc:sce:scecf3:61 Does Exchange Rate Risk Matter for Welfare? (2003). Society for Computational Economics / Computing in Economics and Finance 2003

(79) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303011 A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(80) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0308001 Speculation in First-Price Auctions with Resale (2003). EconWPA / Microeconomics

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0585 Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics (2002). The Research Institute of Industrial Economics / IUI Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf178 Honesty-Proof Implementation (2002). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

Latest citations received in: 2001

Latest citations received in: 2000

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2008 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es