Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.16 0 0 0 0.07 1997 0.17 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.19 0 0 0 0.12 1999 0.29 0 0 0 0.19 2000 0.39 8 24 0 0 0.2 2001 0.25 0.34 25 67 8 2 50 7 0.28 0.18 2002 0.3 0.39 22 28 33 10 30 2 0.09 0.2 2003 0.51 0.41 13 13 47 24 20.8 5 0.38 0.21
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:gco:abcdef:7 Strongly Stable Networks (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 25 times.

(2) RePEc:gco:abcdef:16 A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency (2000). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 22 times.

(3) RePEc:gco:abcdef:78 The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players (2004). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 9 times.

(4) RePEc:gco:abcdef:10 Stable Organizations with Externalities (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 8 times.

(5) RePEc:gco:abcdef:6 A Computational Laboratory for Evolutionary Trade Networks (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 7 times.

(6) RePEc:gco:abcdef:24 Coalition Formation as a Dynamic Process (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 6 times.

(7) RePEc:gco:abcdef:19 NP-completeness in Hedonic Games (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 6 times.

(8) RePEc:gco:abcdef:49 Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 5 times.

(9) RePEc:gco:abcdef:23 Coalition Formation and Stability (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 5 times.

(10) RePEc:gco:abcdef:31 Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 4 times.

(11) RePEc:gco:abcdef:43 When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 4 times.

(12) RePEc:gco:abcdef:57 Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:gco:abcdef:70 Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games (2004). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 4 times.

(14) RePEc:gco:abcdef:33 Migration-proof Tiebout equilibrium: Existence and asymptotic efficiency (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 4 times.

(15) RePEc:gco:abcdef:52 The Coalition Structure Core is Accessible (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 3 times.

(16) RePEc:gco:abcdef:73 Defining rules in cost spanning tree problems through the canonical form (2004). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 3 times.

(17) RePEc:gco:abcdef:25 Farsighted Stability in Hedonic Games (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 3 times.

(18) RePEc:gco:abcdef:13 Models of Network Formation in Cooperative Games (2003). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 3 times.

(19) RePEc:gco:abcdef:76 Counting Combinatorial Choice Rules (2004). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 2 times.

(20) RePEc:gco:abcdef:4 Bargaining on Networks: An Experiment (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 2 times.

(21) RePEc:gco:abcdef:14 Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-Intern Markets (2003). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 2 times.

(22) RePEc:gco:abcdef:37 A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium for Strategic Form Games (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 2 times.

(23) RePEc:gco:abcdef:22 Coalition Formation Games with Separable Preferences, (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 2 times.

(24) RePEc:gco:abcdef:12 Fair Allocation in Evolving Networks (2003). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 2 times.

(25) RePEc:gco:abcdef:28 Coalitions, Agreements and Efficiency (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:gco:abcdef:15 Allocation Rules for Network Games (2003). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:gco:abcdef:72 Stable Matchings for Three-Sided Systems: A Comment (2004). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 2 times.

(28) RePEc:gco:abcdef:55 The Stable Demand Set: General Characterization and Application to Weighted Majority Games (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 2 times.

(29) RePEc:gco:abcdef:21 Tops Responsiveness, Strategy-Proofness and Coalition Formation Problems (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

(30) RePEc:gco:abcdef:62 Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

(31) RePEc:gco:abcdef:18 Equitable and Decentralized Solution for the Allocation of Indivisible Objects (2003). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

(32) RePEc:gco:abcdef:26 The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2000). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

(33) RePEc:gco:abcdef:54 The Nucleolus as a Consistent Power Index in Noncooperative Majority Games (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:gco:abcdef:67 The Core in Normal Form Games (2003). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:gco:abcdef:77 Search and the Strategic Formation of Large Networks: When and Why do We See Power Laws and Small Worlds? (2004). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:gco:abcdef:60 On Potential Maximization as a Refinement of Nash Equilibrium (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:gco:abcdef:17 Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power and Wealth Distribution (2003). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:gco:abcdef:40 The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

(39) RePEc:gco:abcdef:75 A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets (2004). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

(40) RePEc:gco:abcdef:59 Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game (2000). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:gco:abcdef:39 Calculus of Bargaining Solution on Boolean Tables (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

(42) RePEc:gco:abcdef:34 Decentralized Job Matching (2003). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1161 A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency (2003). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(2) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200353 The role of trust in costly network formation (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(3) RePEc:esx:essedp:563 Learning in Networks: a survey (2003). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:gco:abcdef:69 Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores: A Comment (2003). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(5) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303011 A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:gco:abcdef:48 Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(2) RePEc:upf:upfgen:645 Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict (2002). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0011 The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games (2001). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:wp14-01 Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection Models (2001). Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara / University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:cvs:starer:01-06 Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions (2001). C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University / Working Papers

(4) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200139 The nucleolus as a consistent power index in noncooperative majority games (2001). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(5) RePEc:gco:abcdef:31 Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(6) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2001-11 TOPS RESPONSIVENESS, STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND COALITION FORMATION PROBLEMS (2001). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

(7) RePEc:sce:scecf1:279 Unemployment Insurance and the Evolution of Worker-Employer Cooperation: Experiments with Real and Artificial Agents (2001). Society for Computational Economics / Computing in Economics and Finance 2001

Latest citations received in: 2000

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.