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RAND Journal of Economics Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.
Most cited documents in this series: (1) RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:summer:p:176-188 The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (1986). RAND Journal of Economics (2) RePEc:rje:randje:v:25:y:1994:i:summer:p:242-262 Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation (1994). RAND Journal of Economics (3) RePEc:rje:randje:v:19:y:1988:i:winter:p:495-515 Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries (1988). RAND Journal of Economics (4) RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:winter:p:546-554 Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly (1984). RAND Journal of Economics (5) RePEc:rje:randje:v:16:y:1985:i:spring:p:70-83 Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation (1985). RAND Journal of Economics (6) RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:spring:p:48-58 Free Entry and Social Inefficiency (1986). RAND Journal of Economics (7) RePEc:rje:randje:v:25:y:1994:i:summer:p:334-347 Entrepreneurial Decisions and Liquidity Constraints (1994). RAND Journal of Economics (8) RePEc:rje:randje:v:16:y:1985:i:winter:p:473-486 Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition (1985). RAND Journal of Economics (9) RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:summer:p:171-196 Monopoly with Incomplete Information (1984). RAND Journal of Economics (10) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:172-187 A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations (1990). RAND Journal of Economics (11) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:1-26 Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior (1990). RAND Journal of Economics (12) RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:summer:p:163-179 Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem (1995). RAND Journal of Economics (13) RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:spring:p:1-17 Business Cycles and the Relationship Between Concentration and Price-Cost Margins (1986). RAND Journal of Economics (14) RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:spring:p:18-32 Relying on the Information of Interested Parties (1986). RAND Journal of Economics (15) RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:spring:p:1-37 Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing (1998). RAND Journal of Economics (16) RePEc:rje:randje:v:31:y:2000:i:winter:p:674-692 Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation (2000). RAND Journal of Economics (17) RePEc:rje:randje:v:18:y:1987:i:autumn:p:452-458 The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives (1987). RAND Journal of Economics (18) RePEc:rje:randje:v:33:y:2002:i:winter:p:549-570 Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics Of Payment Card Associations (2002). RAND Journal of Economics (19) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:106-112 Optimal Patent Length and Breadth (1990). RAND Journal of Economics (20) RePEc:rje:randje:v:34:y:2003:i:2:p:309-28
Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers. (2003). RAND Journal of Economics (21) RePEc:rje:randje:v:16:y:1985:i:autumn:p:319-327 A Theory of Yardstick Competition (1985). RAND Journal of Economics (22) RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:winter:p:527-543 An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development (1986). RAND Journal of Economics (23) RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:spring:p:20-33 On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation (1995). RAND Journal of Economics (24) RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:spring:p:57-76 The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts (1998). RAND Journal of Economics (25) RePEc:rje:randje:v:25:y:1994:i:winter:p:555-589 Computing Markov-Perfect Nash Equilibria: Numerical Implications of a Dynamic Differentiated Product Model (1994). RAND Journal of Economics (26) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:27-44 The Evolution of New Industries and the Determinants of Market Structure (1990). RAND Journal of Economics (27) RePEc:rje:randje:v:16:y:1985:i:winter:p:504-520 On the Licensing of Innovations (1985). RAND Journal of Economics (28) RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:autumn:p:404-415 Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information (1984). RAND Journal of Economics (29) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:113-130 How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be? (1990). RAND Journal of Economics (30) RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:autumn:p:537-556 Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies (1995). RAND Journal of Economics (31) RePEc:rje:randje:v:19:y:1988:i:summer:p:221-234 Mix and Match: Product Compatibility without Network Externalities (1988). RAND Journal of Economics (32) RePEc:rje:randje:v:24:y:1993:i:summer:p:198-211 The Profitability of Innovating Firms (1993). RAND Journal of Economics (33) RePEc:rje:randje:v:32:y:2001:i:3:p:387-407 Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts. (2001). RAND Journal of Economics (34) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:131-146 Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law (1990). RAND Journal of Economics (35) RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:1:p:16-38 Market Value and Patent Citations (2005). RAND Journal of Economics (36) RePEc:rje:randje:v:15:y:1984:i:summer:p:255-267 Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency (1984). RAND Journal of Economics (37) RePEc:rje:randje:v:19:y:1988:i:autumn:p:408-419 Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger (1988). RAND Journal of Economics (38) RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:autumn:p:404-415 Long-Run Competition in Capacity, Short-Run Competition in Price, and the Cournot Model (1986). RAND Journal of Economics (39) RePEc:rje:randje:v:30:y:1999:i:summer:p:214-231 Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries (1999). RAND Journal of Economics (40) RePEc:rje:randje:v:23:y:1992:i:spring:p:52-63 Patent Policy and Costly Imitation (1992). RAND Journal of Economics (41) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:summer:p:314-340 Environmental Regulation and U.S. Economic Growth (1990). RAND Journal of Economics (42) RePEc:rje:randje:v:23:y:1992:i:summer:p:263-283 Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results (1992). RAND Journal of Economics (43) RePEc:rje:randje:v:22:y:1991:i:spring:p:89-106 The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior (1991). RAND Journal of Economics (44) RePEc:rje:randje:v:21:y:1990:i:spring:p:147-160 Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information (1990). RAND Journal of Economics (45) RePEc:rje:randje:v:28:y:1997:i:winter:p:629-640 Auditing Without Commitment (1997). RAND Journal of Economics (46) RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:spring:p:38-56 Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination (1998). RAND Journal of Economics (47) RePEc:rje:randje:v:25:y:1994:i:spring:p:37-57 Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee (1994). RAND Journal of Economics (48) RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:summer:p:280-305 Collusion and Delegation (1998). RAND Journal of Economics (49) RePEc:rje:randje:v:24:y:1993:i:autumn:p:380-398 Competition in a Market for Informed Experts Services (1993). RAND Journal of Economics (50) RePEc:rje:randje:v:19:y:1988:i:spring:p:147-155 Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack (1988). RAND Journal of Economics Latest citations received in: | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000 Latest citations received in: 2003 (1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:1:p:133-149 Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions (2003). American Economic Review (2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1070 Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation (2003). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series (3) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_992 Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction (2003). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series (4) RePEc:cir:cirwor:2003s-64 Directors and Officers Insurance and Shareholders Protection (2003). CIRANO / CIRANO Working Papers (5) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000098 Efficient Sorting in a Dynamic Adverse Selection Model (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Theory workshop papers (6) RePEc:clm:clmeco:2003-05 Ordinal Cheap Talk (2003). Claremont Colleges / Claremont Colleges Working Papers (7) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3976 Endogenous Contracts Under Bargaining in Competing Vertical Chains (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (8) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp355 Adding the Noise: A Theory of Compensation-Driven Earnings Management (2003). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series (9) RePEc:ide:wpaper:589 Efficient Patent Pools (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers (10) RePEc:ide:wpaper:641 Quality Signaling through Certification. Theory and an Application to Agricultural Seed Market (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers (11) RePEc:ide:wpaper:654 Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers (12) RePEc:mlb:wpaper:885 BUYER-SUPPLIER INTERACTION, ASSET SPECIFICITY, AND PRODUCT CHOICE (2003). The University of Melbourne / Department of Economics - Working Papers Series (13) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9518 Time in Purgatory: Determinants of the Grant Lag for U.S. Patent Applications (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (14) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9978 Lessons from Patents: Using Patents To Measure Technological Change in Environmental Models (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (15) RePEc:net:wpaper:0305 Network Interconnection With Competitive Transit (2003). NET Institute / Working Papers (16) RePEc:net:wpaper:0311 Adoption Delay in a Standards War (2003). NET Institute / Working Papers (17) RePEc:nus:nusewp:wp0311 Competing Payment Schemes (2003). National University of Singapore, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers (18) RePEc:nus:nusewp:wp0314 Multihoming and compatibility (2003). National University of Singapore, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers (19) RePEc:rne:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:2:p:50-68 Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature (2003). Review of Network Economics (20) RePEc:rne:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:2:p:97-124 The Theory of Interchange Fees: A Synthesis of Recent Contributions (2003). Review of Network Economics (21) RePEc:usn:usnawp:3 Mergers with Quality Differentiated Products (2003). United States Naval Academy Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers (22) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0308001 Do Buyer-Size Discounts Depend on the Curvature of the Surplus Function? Experimental Tests of Bargaining Models (2003). EconWPA / Experimental (23) RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2003-24 Buyers Alliances for Bargaining Power (2003). Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competitiveness and Industrial Change (CIC) / CIC Working Papers Latest citations received in: 2002 (1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3214 The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences (2002). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (2) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3215 How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions (2002). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (3) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200234 Socially optimal mechanisms (2002). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (4) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200244 The effectiveness of caps on political lobbying (2002). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (5) RePEc:ide:wpaper:660 The Activities of a Monopoly Firm in Adjacent Competitive Markets: Economic Consequences and Implications for Competition Policy (2002). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers (6) RePEc:nbr:nberte:0280 Identification and Inference in Nonlinear Difference-In-Differences Models (2002). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Technical Working Papers (7) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8976 Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Strategic Behavior (2002). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (8) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8989 Ownership Form and Trapped Capital in the Hospital Industry (2002). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (9) RePEc:nuf:econwp:0214 Buyer Countervailing Power versus Monopoly Power: Evidence from Experimental Posted-Offer Markets (2002). Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford / Economics Papers (10) RePEc:soz:wpaper:0212 Estimating Vertical Foreclosure in U.S. Gasoline Supply (2002). University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute / Working Papers (11) RePEc:van:wpaper:0221 Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses In Settlement Bargaining (2002). Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University / Working Papers (12) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0201003 Competition or Predation? Schumpeterian Rivalry in Network Markets (2002). EconWPA / Industrial Organization (13) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0209001 Price Adjustments and Asymmetry in the Philippine Retail Gasoline Market (2002). EconWPA / Industrial Organization (14) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0211012 Plastic Clashes: Competition among Closed and Open Systems in the Credit Card Industry. (2002). EconWPA / Industrial Organization Latest citations received in: 2001 (1) RePEc:cir:cirwor:2001s-64 Real Options, Preemption, and the Dynamics of Industry Investments (2001). CIRANO / CIRANO Working Papers (2) RePEc:cre:uqamwp:20-10 Real Options, Preemption, and the Dynamics of Industry Investments (2001). Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques / Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM (3) RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp260 Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream Costs (2001). DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research / Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin (4) RePEc:hhs:osloec:2001_018 The TV industry : advertising and programming (2001). Oslo University, Department of Economics / Memorandum (5) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp327 A Product Market Theory of Training and Turnover in Firms (2001). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers (6) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:4:y:2001:i:3:p:203-219 Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game (2001). Experimental Economics (7) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8445 Consumers and Agency Problems (2001). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (8) RePEc:sef:csefwp:76 The Political Economy of Finance (2001). Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy / CSEF Working Papers Latest citations received in: 2000 (1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:3:p:695-704 Herd Behavior and Investment: Comment (2000). American Economic Review (2) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:3:p:705-706 Herd Behavior and Investment: Reply (2000). American Economic Review (3) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:5:p:1239-1254 Globalization and Vertical Structure (2000). American Economic Review (4) RePEc:cdl:econwp:1019 The DVD vs. DIVX Standard War: Empirical Evidence of Vaporware (2000). Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley / Department of Economics, Working Paper Series (5) RePEc:cla:levrem:1996 Perfectly Competitive Innovation (2000). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography (6) RePEc:cla:uclaol:318 Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with Hongbin Cai) (2000). UCLA Department of Economics / UCLA Economics Online Papers (7) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2581 What Really Matters in Auction Design (2000). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers (8) RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0089 Size, Monitoring and Plea Rate: An Examination of United States Attorneys (2000). Econometric Society / Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers (9) RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1197 Exclusionary Practices and Entry Under Asymmetric Information (2000). Econometric Society / Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers (10) RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2000:i:sep:p:33-40:n:v.82no.5 Are prime rate changes asymmetric? (2000). Review (11) RePEc:lev:levppb:70 Physician Incentives In Managed Care Organizations Medical Practice Norms and the Quality of Care (2000). Levy Economics Institute, The / Economics Public Policy Brief Archive (12) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7537 Medical Liability, Managed Care, and Defensive Medicine (2000). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (13) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7832 Enrollee Mix, Treatment Intensity, and Cost in Competing Indemnity and HMO Plans (2000). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (14) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7877 When Does Funding Research by Smaller Firms Bear Fruit?: Evidence from the SBIR Program (2000). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (15) RePEc:vir:virpap:346 Bidding for the Future (2000). University of Virginia, Department of Economics / Virginia Economics Online Papers (16) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0004008 What Really Matters in Auction Design (2000). EconWPA / Microeconomics (17) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0004009 Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory (2000). EconWPA / Microeconomics (18) RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv00-12 Market Structure, Bargaining, and Technology Choice (2000). Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competitiveness and Industrial Change (CIC) / CIC Working Papers Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results. Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series. |
