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 Updated May, 1 2008 147.392 documents processed, 3.154.300 references and 1.403.701 citations

 

 
 

Economics of Governance

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.170000.08
19970.20000.08
19980.230000.1
19990.320000.16
20000.43149000.19
20010.39151714040.270.17
20020.140.421650294020.130.2
20030.160.471739315020.120.22
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
 
Impact Factor:
 
Immediacy Index:
 
Documents published:
 
Citations received:
 

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:2:p:87-99 Trust breeds trust: How taxpayers are treated (2002). Economics of Governance
Cited: 31 times.

(2) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:23-45 Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty? (2002). Economics of Governance
Cited: 10 times.

(3) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:2:p:91-102 On the negative social value of central banks knowledge transparency (2003). Economics of Governance
Cited: 9 times.

(4) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:5:y:2004:i:3:p:255-267 A political economy model of immigration quotas (2004). Economics of Governance
Cited: 9 times.

(5) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:2:p:143-160 Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility (2003). Economics of Governance
Cited: 9 times.

(6) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:1:p:81-89 Lobbying contests with alternative instruments (2003). Economics of Governance
Cited: 7 times.

(7) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:5:y:2004:i:3:p:235-253 Moral suasion: An alternative tax policy strategy? Evidence from a controlled field experiment in Switzerland (2004). Economics of Governance
Cited: 7 times.

(8) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2005:i:2:p:177-197 Influence costs and hierarchy (2005). Economics of Governance
Cited: 7 times.

(9) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:3:p:173-202 The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not (2001). Economics of Governance
Cited: 6 times.

(10) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:1:p:1-18 Trade intensity, country size and corruption (2003). Economics of Governance
Cited: 4 times.

(11) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2004:i:1:p:75-90 Does better governance foster efficiency? An aggregate frontier analysis (2004). Economics of Governance
Cited: 4 times.

(12) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:1:p:57-80 Voting on public pensions with hands and feet (2003). Economics of Governance
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2004:i:1:p:13-31 Frames of reference, the environment, and efficient taxation (2004). Economics of Governance
Cited: 3 times.

(14) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:1:y:2000:i:1:p:3-11 The state: Agent or proprietor? (2000). Economics of Governance
Cited: 3 times.

(15) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:3:p:177-186 On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests (2003). Economics of Governance
Cited: 3 times.

(16) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:2:p:153-170 The flypaper effect and political strength (2002). Economics of Governance
Cited: 3 times.

(17) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:1-21 When should central bankers be fired? (2002). Economics of Governance
Cited: 3 times.

(18) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:3:p:231-242 Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players (2001). Economics of Governance
Cited: 3 times.

(19) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:3:p:227-239 Central government subsidies to local public goods (2002). Economics of Governance
Cited: 3 times.

(20) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:1:y:2000:i:1:p:25-51 Property rights and the evolution of the state (2000). Economics of Governance
Cited: 2 times.

(21) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:1:p:59-67 Social decision rules are not immune to conflict (2001). Economics of Governance
Cited: 2 times.

(22) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:1:p:3-24 Targeting and political support for welfare spending (2001). Economics of Governance
Cited: 2 times.

(23) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:1:y:2000:i:2:p:105-122 Federalism, distributive politics and representative democracy (2000). Economics of Governance
Cited: 2 times.

(24) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:3:p:203-229 Endogenous institutions in bureaucratic compliance games (2001). Economics of Governance
Cited: 2 times.

(25) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:3:p:229-243 How corruption affects persistent capital flows (2003). Economics of Governance
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:3-29 When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict (2006). Economics of Governance
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:4:y:2003:i:3:p:187-214 Organizational structure and innovative activity (2003). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(28) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:3:p:211-227 No Pretense to Honesty: County Government Corruption in Mississippi (2006). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(29) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:8:y:2007:i:3:p:233-261 Political institutions and economic growth (2007). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(30) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:53-73 On thugs and heroes: Why warlords victimize their own civilians (2006). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(31) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:8:y:2007:i:2:p:111-128 Party alternation, divided government, and fiscal performance within US States (2007). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(32) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2005:i:3:p:245-252 Preemptive behavior in sequential-move tournaments with heterogeneous agents (2005). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(33) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2001:i:1:p:35-58 How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economists view (2001). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:5:y:2004:i:2:p:167-186 The impact of performance-based budgeting on state fiscal performance (2004). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:3:p:271-291 Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game (2006). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2005:i:2:p:159-175 Maximin choice of voting rules for committees (2005). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:3:p:229-243 The Nature of Corruption Deterrence in a Competitive Media Sector (2006). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:3:p:183-209 Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa (2002). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(39) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:1:p:85-99 Social identity, inequality and conflict (2001). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(40) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:75-87 Fighting against the odds (2006). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2004:i:1:p:1-12 The rise of environmentalism, pollution taxes and intra-industry trade (2004). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(42) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:8:y:2007:i:3:p:179-179 Introduction (2007). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(43) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:1:p:35-58 How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economists view (2001). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(44) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:8:y:2007:i:1:p:37-49 Budgetary Procedures and Deficits in Norwegian Local Governments (2007). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(45) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:1:y:2000:i:3:p:199-212 Social pressure, uncertainty, and cooperation (2000). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(46) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:5:y:2004:i:2:p:119-135 The break-up of municipalities: Voting behavior in local referenda (2004). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(47) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:3:p:245-269 Corruption, Growth, and Income Distribution: Are there Regional Differences? (2006). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(48) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:1:y:2000:i:1:p:77-103 The rationality of revolution (2000). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

(49) RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:6:y:2005:i:2:p:105-111 A note on CEO compensation, elimination tournaments and bankruptcy risk (2005). Economics of Governance
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000315 The W effect of incentives (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(2) RePEc:diw:diwvjh:72-20-2 Bildung im Zeitalter mobilen Humankapitals (2003). Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_760 Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis (2002). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:uct:uconnp:2002-29 Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker? (2002). University of Connecticut, Department of Economics / Working papers

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3050 Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages (2001). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2001-01 A method to define strata boundaries (2001). Department of Economics University of Milan Italy / Departemental Working Papers

(3) RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2001-02 Statistical analysis of the inhomogeneous telegraphers process (2001). Department of Economics University of Milan Italy / Departemental Working Papers

(4) RePEc:nzt:nztwps:01/26 Three Steps Towards More Effective Development Assistance (2001). New Zealand Treasury / Treasury Working Paper Series

Latest citations received in: 2000

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2008 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es