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 Updated May, 1 2008 147.392 documents processed, 3.154.300 references and 1.403.701 citations

 

 
 

Contributions to Theoretical Economics

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.170000.08
19970.20000.08
19980.230000.1
19990.320000.16
20000.430000.19
20010.39680010.170.17
20020.170.42496100.2
20030.30.47931103030.330.22
20040.150.51812132020.250.23
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
 
Impact Factor:
 
Immediacy Index:
 
Documents published:
 
Citations received:
 

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1058-1058 Homothetic or Cobb-Douglas Behavior Through Aggregation (2003).
Cited: 12 times.

(2) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1084-1084 Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information (2003).
Cited: 9 times.

(3) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:4:y:2004:i:1:p:1158-1158 Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry (2004).
Cited: 8 times.

(4) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:1:y:2001:i:contributions/1/1:p:1030-1030 Bilateral Trade and Opportunism in a Matching Market (2001).
Cited: 7 times.

(5) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:2:y:2002:i:1:p:1046-1046 Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (2002).
Cited: 5 times.

(6) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1048-1048 Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments (2003).
Cited: 4 times.

(7) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:5:y:2005:i:1:p:1129-1129 On the Welfare Evaluation of Income and Opportunity (2005).
Cited: 3 times.

(8) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:4:y:2004:i:1:p:1109-1109 Players With Limited Memory (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(9) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1080-1080 Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(10) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:2:y:2002:i:1:p:1016-1016 Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(11) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1060-1060 Competitive Equilibria With Incomplete Markets and Endogenous Bankruptcy (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(12) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:1:y:2001:i:contributions/1/1:p:1017-1017 Incomplete Contracts. Non-Contractible Quality, and Renegotiation (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(13) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:2:y:2002:i:1:p:1053-1053 The Noisy Duopolist (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(14) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:2:y:2002:i:1:p:1040-1040 Bargaining over Risky Assets (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(15) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1074-1074 Adverse Selection and Insurance Contracting: A Rank-Dependent Utility Analysis (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(16) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:1219-1219 Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(17) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:2:y:2003:i:1:p:1055-1055 Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(18) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:4:y:2004:i:1:p:1103-1103 A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2004-13 Strategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One’s Own Private Value in Auctions (2004). Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy / Working Papers

(2) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1420 Auctions with costly information acquisition Constrained Bidders (2004). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000280 Putting Your Ballot Where you Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(2) RePEc:cla:uclawp:827 Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication* (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / UCLA Economics Working Papers

(3) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1411 Committee Design in the Presence of Communication (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Latest citations received in: 2002

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse28_2001 Holdups, Quality Choice, and the Achilles Heel in Government Contracting (2001). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2008 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es