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 Updated May, 1 2008 147.392 documents processed, 3.154.300 references and 1.403.701 citations



UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:


Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:cla:levarc:1276 Debt Constrained Asset Markets (1993).
Cited: 122 times.

(2) RePEc:cla:levarc:394 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994).
Cited: 112 times.

(3) RePEc:cla:levarc:2058 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (1994).
Cited: 102 times.

(4) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001080 Global Games: Theory and Applications (2001).
Cited: 63 times.

(5) RePEc:cla:levarc:508 Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (1989).
Cited: 53 times.

(6) RePEc:cla:levarc:1889 A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition (1997).
Cited: 51 times.

(7) RePEc:cla:levarc:563824000000000143 Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device (2001).
Cited: 51 times.

(8) RePEc:cla:levarc:1098 Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information (1985).
Cited: 37 times.

(9) RePEc:cla:levarc:43 Asset Trading Mechanisms and Expansionary Policy (1991).
Cited: 35 times.

(10) RePEc:cla:levarc:219 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games (1983).
Cited: 31 times.

(11) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000813 Sequential Equilibrium (2003).
Cited: 30 times.

(12) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000003 The Case Against Intellectual Property (2002).
Cited: 28 times.

(13) RePEc:cla:levarc:78 Does Market Incompleteness Matter (2001).
Cited: 25 times.

(14) RePEc:cla:levarc:227 On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (1988).
Cited: 25 times.

(15) RePEc:cla:levarc:238 Reputation and Imperfect Information (1999).
Cited: 25 times.

(16) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000000442 International Protection of Intellectual Property (2004).
Cited: 23 times.

(17) RePEc:cla:levarc:625018000000000192 Perfectly Competitive Innovation (2002).
Cited: 22 times.

(18) RePEc:cla:levarc:2147 Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1993).
Cited: 20 times.

(19) RePEc:cla:levarc:1873 Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies (1985).
Cited: 19 times.

(20) RePEc:cla:levarc:1954 Debt Constraints and Equilibrium in Infinite Horizon Economies with Incomplete Markets (1996).
Cited: 19 times.

(21) RePEc:cla:levarc:373 Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium (1993).
Cited: 18 times.

(22) RePEc:cla:levarc:2060 Strategy and Equity: An ERC Analysis of the Guth-van Damme Game (1998).
Cited: 17 times.

(23) RePEc:cla:levarc:228400000000000002 Market Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry (2004).
Cited: 17 times.

(24) RePEc:cla:levarc:470 Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play (1996).
Cited: 17 times.

(25) RePEc:cla:levarc:220 Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (1986).
Cited: 16 times.

(26) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000876 A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control (2005).
Cited: 15 times.

(27) RePEc:cla:levarc:2047 Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments (1997).
Cited: 12 times.

(28) RePEc:cla:levarc:471 Conditional Universal Consistency (1997).
Cited: 12 times.

(29) RePEc:cla:levarc:596 Robust Permanent Income and Pricing (1997).
Cited: 12 times.

(30) RePEc:cla:levarc:592 Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study (1997).
Cited: 12 times.

(31) RePEc:cla:levarc:172 Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1999).
Cited: 11 times.

(32) RePEc:cla:levarc:2092 Financial Contagion (1999).
Cited: 11 times.

(33) RePEc:cla:levarc:627 Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (1994).
Cited: 11 times.

(34) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000748 Bertrand and Walras Equilibria Under Moral Hazard (2003).
Cited: 10 times.

(35) RePEc:cla:levarc:96 When Are Agents Negligible? (1995).
Cited: 10 times.

(36) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001334 Who is “Behavioral”? Cognitive Ability and Anomalous Preferences (2006).
Cited: 9 times.

(37) RePEc:cla:levarc:2122 Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population (2000).
Cited: 9 times.

(38) RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000157 Principles of Policymaking in the European Union: an Economic Perspective (2003).
Cited: 9 times.

(39) RePEc:cla:levarc:666156000000000319 Experiments with Network Formation (2003).
Cited: 9 times.

(40) RePEc:cla:levarc:2028 Growth Cycles and Market Crashes (1999).
Cited: 9 times.

(41) RePEc:cla:levarc:563824000000000090 A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity (2001).
Cited: 9 times.

(42) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000000167 An Empirical Look at Software Patents (2004).
Cited: 9 times.

(43) RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000581 The Case for Mindless Economics (2005).
Cited: 8 times.

(44) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001419 How Important is Money in the Conduct of Monetary Policy? (2007).
Cited: 8 times.

(45) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000784 Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice (2003).
Cited: 8 times.

(46) RePEc:cla:levarc:607 An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information (1991).
Cited: 7 times.

(47) RePEc:cla:levarc:81 Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (1999).
Cited: 7 times.

(48) RePEc:cla:levarc:624 The Theory of Learning in Games (1996).
Cited: 7 times.

(49) RePEc:cla:levarc:14 Liquidity Constrained vs. Debt Constrained Markets (2000).
Cited: 6 times.

(50) RePEc:cla:levarc:625018000000000151 Learning to Play Bayesian Games (2002).
Cited: 6 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:fip:fedpbr:y:2004:i:q3:p:22-32 The software patent experiment. (2004). Business Review

(2) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp350 On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design (2004). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(3) RePEc:ide:wpaper:2894 To What Extent should less Developed Countries Enforce Intellectual Property? (2004). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(4) RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2004-22 Economic growth in an enlarged Europe: the human capital and R&D dimensions (2004). Department of Economics University of Milan Italy / Departemental Working Papers

(5) RePEc:rpi:rpiwpe:0419 Industrial R&D Laboratories: Windows on Black Boxes? (2004). Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Department of Economics / Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:cer:papers:wp210 Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation and some Theoretical Insights (2003). The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Intitute, Prague / CERGE-EI Working Papers

(2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_989 The Deadlock of the EU Budget: An Economic Analysis of Ways In and Ways Out (2003). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_996 On Enhanced Cooperation (2003). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(4) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3744 Regional Policies and EU Enlargement (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3970 Its All About Connections: Evidence on Network Formation (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:cte:werepe:we035722 INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND PRICING UNDER MORAL HAZARD (2003). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(7) RePEc:cte:whrepe:wh030804 THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS TO SOLVE SOVEREING DEBT PROBLEMS: THE SPANISH MONARCHY´S CREDIT (1516-1665) (2003). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Historia Económica e Instituciones / Economics History and Institutions Working Papers

(8) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.115 Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems (2003). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(9) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp777 Its all about Connections: Evidence on Network Formation (2003). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:jae:japmet:v:18:y:2003:i:6:p:665-678 A practical log-linear aggregation method with examples: heterogeneous income growth in the USA (2003). Journal of Applied Econometrics

(11) RePEc:jhu:papers:497 Media as Watchdogs: The Role of News Media in Electoral Competition (2003). The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics / Economics Working Paper Archive

(12) RePEc:lat:legeco:2003-03 Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments. (2003). LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne / LEG - Document de travail - Economie

(13) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9601 Power-hungry Candidates, Policy Favors, and Pareto Improving Campaign Finance Policy (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(14) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0305002 Do Addicts Behave Rationally? (2003). EconWPA / Experimental

(15) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0304002 Modeling collusion as an informed principal problem (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(16) RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2003-14 Private Monitoring in Auctions (2003). Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competitiveness and Industrial Change (CIC) / CIC Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:92:y:2002:i:2:p:209-212 The Case against Intellectual Property (2002). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000003 The Case Against Intellectual Property (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(3) RePEc:fip:fedmsr:303 Perfectly competitive innovation (2002). Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis / Staff Report

(4) RePEc:ide:wpaper:1121 Non Convexities, Imperfect Competition and Growth (2002). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:cir:cirwor:2001s-04 Incentive Pay in the United States: Its Determinants and Its Effects (2001). CIRANO / CIRANO Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2790 Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness (2001). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3017 Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation? (2001). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1336 Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities (2001). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:fip:fedgif:696 Patience, persistence and welfare costs of incomplete markets in open economies (2001). Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) / International Finance Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:hhs:hastef:0466 Social norms and optimal incentives in firms (2001). Stockholm School of Economics / Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance

(7) RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0565 Social Norms and Optimal Incentives in Firms (2001). The Research Institute of Industrial Economics / IUI Working Paper Series

(8) RePEc:lmu:muenec:18 Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness (2001). University of Munich, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers in Economics

(9) RePEc:red:issued:v:4:y:2001:i:4:p:747-766 Incomplete Markets, Transitory Shocks, and Welfare (2001). Review of Economic Dynamics

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2008 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es