UCLA Department of Economics / Theory workshop papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.16 0 0 0 0.07 1997 0.17 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.19 0 0 0 0.12 1999 0.29 1 1 0 0 0.19 2000 1 0.39 0 1 1 0 0.2 2001 0.34 5 40 1 0 8 1.6 0.18 2002 0.8 0.39 13 48 5 4 0 3 0.23 0.2 2003 1.22 0.41 18 26 18 22 0 2 0.11 0.21 2004 0.68 0.47 12 35 31 21 9.5 6 0.5 0.25
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:cla:uclatw:339 Giving According to GARP (2001).
Cited: 31 times.

(2) RePEc:cla:uclatw:357966000000000089 Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private Value Auctions (2002).
Cited: 26 times.

(3) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000002 A Theory of Partnerships (2002).
Cited: 14 times.

(4) RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000081 Collusion and Price Rigidity (2004).
Cited: 14 times.

(5) RePEc:cla:uclatw:357966000000000085 Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle (2001).
Cited: 8 times.

(6) RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000032 The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality (2003).
Cited: 7 times.

(7) RePEc:cla:uclatw:121473000000000021 Multidimensional Private Value Auctions (2004).
Cited: 6 times.

(8) RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000084 An Efficiency Rational for Bundling of Public Goods (2004).
Cited: 5 times.

(9) RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000067 On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting (2004).
Cited: 5 times.

(10) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000006 Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(11) RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000072 Safety in Markets: An Impossibility Theorem for Dutch Books (2004).
Cited: 4 times.

(12) RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000063 Rent Seeking and Innovation (2003).
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000028 Price Discrimination in Matching Markets (2003).
Cited: 4 times.

(14) RePEc:cla:uclatw:357966000000000087 Relational Team Incentives and Ownership (2002).
Cited: 3 times.

(15) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000076 The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(16) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000029 Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(17) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000048 Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(18) RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000044 What to Maximize if You Must (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(19) RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000098 Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(20) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000046 Capacity Choice Counters the Coase Conjecture (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(21) RePEc:cla:uclatw:357966000000000036 Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(22) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000027 Non-Excludable Public Good Experiments (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(23) RePEc:cla:uclatw:168 Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game (1999).
Cited: 1 times.

(24) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000003 Walrasian Bargaining (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(25) RePEc:cla:uclatw:658612000000000076 Monotonicity and Rationalizability in Large Uniform Price and Double Auctions (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(26) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000030 Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0049 A Model of Add-on Pricing (2004). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000334 Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(3) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000530 Contracting with Diversely Naïve Agents (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(4) RePEc:clu:wpaper:0405-07 Collusion with persistent cost shocks (2004). Columbia University, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200469 Competition, incomplete discrimination and versioning (2004). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(6) RePEc:oxf:wpaper:219 Transparency, Recruitment and Retention in the Public Sector (2004). University of Oxford, Department of Economics / Economics Series Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0601 Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior (2003). The Research Institute of Industrial Economics / IUI Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10119 Pareto Efficient Income Taxation with Stochastic Abilities (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:531.02 Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments (2002). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:2002-10 The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation (2002). Department of Economics, UC San Diego / University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9141 The Impact and Inefficiency of the Corporate Income Tax: Evidence from State Organizational Form Data (2002). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:2:p:287-291 Internet Peering (2001). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:cla:levarc:563824000000000075 A Thoeretical Anlysis of Altruism and Decision Error in Public Goods Games (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(3) RePEc:cla:levarc:563824000000000096 Analyzing Choice with Revealed Preference: Is Altruism Rational (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(4) RePEc:cla:levarc:563824000000000132 Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(5) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200186 Family versus public solidarity : theory and experiment (2001). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(6) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8417 Luxury Goods and the Equity Premium (2001). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(7) RePEc:ssb:dispap:310 An Experimental Investigation of Social Norms (2001). Research Department of Statistics Norway / Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0012002 Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model (2001). EconWPA / General Economics and Teaching

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.