International Review of Law and Economics

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.01 0.17 34 38 69 1 0 1 0.03 0.08 1997 0.06 0.2 41 59 64 4 0 1 0.02 0.08 1998 0.05 0.23 31 46 75 4 0 3 0.1 0.1 1999 0.13 0.32 33 40 72 9 0 0.16 2000 0.09 0.43 30 53 64 6 0 1 0.03 0.19 2001 0.08 0.39 18 27 63 5 0 1 0.06 0.17 2002 0.25 0.42 32 30 48 12 0 2 0.06 0.2 2003 0.16 0.47 28 31 50 8 0 4 0.14 0.22 2004 0.17 0.51 30 20 60 10 0 2 0.07 0.23
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:6:y:1986:i:1:p:45-58 The judgment proof problem (1986).
Cited: 30 times.

(2) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:75-106 Socioeconomic and demographic factors of crime in Germany: Evidence from panel data of the German states (2000).
Cited: 13 times.

(3) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:15:y:1995:i:1:p:109-126 The effects of criminality and conviction on the labor market status of young British offenders (1995).
Cited: 13 times.

(4) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:1:p:75-87 Casual police corruption and the economics of crime (1997).
Cited: 13 times.

(5) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:13:y:1993:i:2:p:217-224 Optimal sanctions and differences in individuals likelihood of avoiding detection (1993).
Cited: 11 times.

(6) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:22:y:2002:i:2:p:193-216 Rent-seeking through litigation: adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared (2002).
Cited: 10 times.

(7) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:6:y:1986:i:1:p:101-105 Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error (1986).
Cited: 8 times.

(8) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:4:p:393-409 The capture of wealth by monopolists and the protection of property rights (1994).
Cited: 8 times.

(9) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:16:y:1996:i:1:p:81-99 The political economy of immigration policies (1996).
Cited: 8 times.

(10) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:35-51 Casual police corruption and the economics of crime:: Further results (2000).
Cited: 8 times.

(11) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:3:p:371-382 On the joint use of liability and safety regulation (2000).
Cited: 8 times.

(12) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:3:p:233-239 Re-examining liability rules when injurers as well as victims suffer losses (1990).
Cited: 8 times.

(13) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:21:y:2001:i:3:p:287-307 Collective wage setting when wages are generally binding An antitrust perspective (2001).
Cited: 7 times.

(14) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:3:p:341-350 Deterrence effects of sequential punishment policies: Should repeat offenders be more severely punished? (1994).
Cited: 7 times.

(15) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:3:p:253-259 A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders (2003).
Cited: 7 times.

(16) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:2:y:1982:i:1:p:47-65 Evaluating choice (1982).
Cited: 7 times.

(17) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:4:p:509-520 Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(18) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:11:y:1991:i:1:p:3-10 Optimal criminal procedure: Fairness and deterrence (1991).
Cited: 7 times.

(19) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:3:p:431-447 The burden of proof in civil litigation: A simple model of mechanism design (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(20) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:1:p:103-119 Does conviction have a persistent effect on income and employment? (1994).
Cited: 7 times.

(21) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:3:p:295-317 Contingent fees and litigation settlement1 (1999).
Cited: 7 times.

(22) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:13:y:1993:i:3:p:239-257 Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability? (1993).
Cited: 7 times.

(23) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:3:p:341-359 Dissolving the relationship between divorce laws and divorce rates (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(24) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:1:p:1-21 A contractual approach to the gray market (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(25) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:1:p:21-34 Efficient standards of due care: Should courts find more parties negligent under comparative negligence? (1994).
Cited: 6 times.

(26) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:21-33 Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort (2000).
Cited: 6 times.

(27) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:8:y:1988:i:2:p:127-143 Judicial decisionmaking and litigation expenditure (1988).
Cited: 6 times.

(28) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:2:p:275-293 Using decoupling and deep pockets to mitigate judgment-proof problems1 (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(29) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:1:p:1-29 Voting control in German corporations (2003).
Cited: 6 times.

(30) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:127-140 Punishing repeat offenders more severely (2000).
Cited: 6 times.

(31) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:5:y:1985:i:1:p:91-106 Why did inheritance laws change? (1985).
Cited: 6 times.

(32) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:5:y:1985:i:1:p:3-13 A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value (1985).
Cited: 6 times.

(33) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:25:y:2005:i:1:p:75-88 Formal Markets and Informal Insurance (2005).
Cited: 5 times.

(34) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:8:y:1988:i:1:p:109-116 The deterrent effects of settlements and trials (1988).
Cited: 5 times.

(35) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:3:p:305-324 On offense history and the theory of deterrence (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(36) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:9:y:1989:i:2:p:149-164 A method for estimating injury caused by unfair trade practices (1989).
Cited: 5 times.

(37) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:209-228 Law and Economics of Obligations (2005).
Cited: 5 times.

(38) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:16:y:1996:i:2:p:259-276 Limited liability and the requirement to purchase insurance (1996).
Cited: 5 times.

(39) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:21:y:2001:i:3:p:309-327 Trial procedures and optimal limits on proof-taking10 (2001).
Cited: 5 times.

(40) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:1:p:3-27 The effect of frivolous lawsuits on the settlement of litigation (1990).
Cited: 5 times.

(41) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:1:p:31-61 Mandatory rotation of company auditors: A critical examination (1997).
Cited: 5 times.

(42) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:12:y:1992:i:2:p:263-279 A positive theory of statutory interpretation (1992).
Cited: 5 times.

(43) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:3:y:1983:i:1:p:3-26 Legal fees contracts and alternative cost rules: An economic analysis (1983).
Cited: 5 times.

(44) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:4:p:589-608 Tort law and internalization: The gap between private loss and social cost (1997).
Cited: 5 times.

(45) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:2:p:161-171 The influence of litigation costs on deterrence under strict liability and under negligence (1990).
Cited: 5 times.

(46) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:2:y:1982:i:1:p:3-27 The optimum enforcement of laws and the concept of justice: A positive analysis (1982).
Cited: 5 times.

(47) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:1:p:47-68 Do punitive damages promote deterrence?1 (1999).
Cited: 5 times.

(48) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:12:y:1992:i:3:p:345-355 A note on marginal deterrence (1992).
Cited: 4 times.

(49) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:11:y:1991:i:2:p:223-232 The initiation problem in bankruptcy (1991).
Cited: 4 times.

(50) RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:15:y:1995:i:3:p:323-345 Predictable and unpredictable error in tort awards: The effect of plaintiff self-selection and signaling (1995).
Cited: 4 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:ide:wpaper:3349 Lutilisation du droit pénal en matière environnementale (2004). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(2) RePEc:use:tkiwps:0417 The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules (2004). Utrecht School of Economics / Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4131 Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200378 Do corporate control and product market competition lead to stronger productivity growth? : Evidence from market-oriented and blockholder-based governance regimes (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(3) RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0315 Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders (2003). Universitat Bern, Volkswirtschaftliches Institut / Diskussionsschriften

(4) RePEc:use:tkiwps:0313 The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis (2003). Utrecht School of Economics / Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:aea:jecper:v:16:y:2002:i:4:p:67-90 Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World (2002). Journal of Economic Perspectives

(2) RePEc:upf:upfgen:639 Cashing by the Hour: Why Large Law Firms Prefer Hourly Fees Over Contingent Fees (2002). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2001_011 Now and forever? Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants (2001). IFAU - Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation / Working Paper Series

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.