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 Updated May, 1 2008 147.392 documents processed, 3.154.300 references and 1.403.701 citations

 

 
 

Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.310.16724165010.140.07
19970.110.17569100.09
19980.080.1928121010.50.12
19990.290.29787200.19
20000.110.3914519100.2
20010.380.34193721812.510.050.18
20020.090.39181233333.310.060.2
20030.430.4192291371631.3230.250.21
20040.450.47791331105010170.220.25
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
 
Impact Factor:
 
Immediacy Index:
 
Documents published:
 
Citations received:
 

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:ide:wpaper:654 Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets (2003).
Cited: 121 times.

(2) RePEc:ide:wpaper:4561 On the Management of Innovation (1994).
Cited: 59 times.

(3) RePEc:ide:wpaper:4564 Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector (1994).
Cited: 45 times.

(4) RePEc:ide:wpaper:612 A Primer on Foreclosure (2005).
Cited: 42 times.

(5) RePEc:ide:wpaper:4380 Collusion and the Theory of Organizations (1991).
Cited: 40 times.

(6) RePEc:ide:wpaper:739 Formal and Real Authority in Organizations (1994).
Cited: 36 times.

(7) RePEc:ide:wpaper:1225 Connectivity in the Commercial Internet (2000).
Cited: 29 times.

(8) RePEc:ide:wpaper:2708 Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2006).
Cited: 26 times.

(9) RePEc:ide:wpaper:2145 Two-Sided Markets : A Progress Report (2005).
Cited: 23 times.

(10) RePEc:ide:wpaper:745 Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory (1996).
Cited: 22 times.

(11) RePEc:ide:wpaper:630 Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria (2003).
Cited: 21 times.

(12) RePEc:ide:wpaper:644 Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort : Was Bagehot Right After All? (2004).
Cited: 21 times.

(13) RePEc:ide:wpaper:770 Regulation by Duopoly (1992).
Cited: 20 times.

(14) RePEc:ide:wpaper:762 Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks (1992).
Cited: 20 times.

(15) RePEc:ide:wpaper:637 Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information (2003).
Cited: 19 times.

(16) RePEc:ide:wpaper:569 The Art of Making Everybody Happy : How to Prevent a Secession (2003).
Cited: 16 times.

(17) RePEc:ide:wpaper:634 The Double Dividend of Postponing Retirement (2003).
Cited: 16 times.

(18) RePEc:ide:wpaper:655 Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle (2001).
Cited: 15 times.

(19) RePEc:ide:wpaper:4554 First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices (1993).
Cited: 15 times.

(20) RePEc:ide:wpaper:586 Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains (2003).
Cited: 14 times.

(21) RePEc:ide:wpaper:581 The Economics of Tacit Collusion (2003).
Cited: 12 times.

(22) RePEc:ide:wpaper:2173 The New Keynesian Model with Imperfect Information and Learning (2004).
Cited: 10 times.

(23) RePEc:ide:wpaper:1757 Why are European Countries Diverging in their Unemployment Experience? (2004).
Cited: 10 times.

(24) RePEc:ide:wpaper:4548 Econometric Analysis of Collusive Behavior in a Soft Drink Market (1992).
Cited: 10 times.

(25) RePEc:ide:wpaper:4383 Econometrics of First-Price Auctions (1991).
Cited: 10 times.

(26) RePEc:ide:wpaper:681 Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion (2000).
Cited: 9 times.

(27) RePEc:ide:wpaper:1283 Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation (1998).
Cited: 8 times.

(28) RePEc:ide:wpaper:2122 Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets (2004).
Cited: 8 times.

(29) RePEc:ide:wpaper:580 Stock Prices, News and Economic Fluctuations (2003).
Cited: 8 times.

(30) RePEc:ide:wpaper:629 The Organization of Delegated Expertise (2004).
Cited: 8 times.

(31) RePEc:ide:wpaper:1040 Instrumental Variables, Local Instrumental Variables and Control Functions (2003).
Cited: 8 times.

(32) RePEc:ide:wpaper:2267 Collective Labour Supply: Heterogeneity and Nonparticipation (2005).
Cited: 8 times.

(33) RePEc:ide:wpaper:2319 Retail Electricity Competition (2004).
Cited: 7 times.

(34) RePEc:ide:wpaper:766 Rules of Thumb for Social Learning (1992).
Cited: 7 times.

(35) RePEc:ide:wpaper:576 Russias Role in the Kyoto Protocol (2003).
Cited: 7 times.

(36) RePEc:ide:wpaper:683 IPO Auctions: English, Dutch, ... French and Internet (2000).
Cited: 6 times.

(37) RePEc:ide:wpaper:4546 Multi-Principaux avec Anti-Sélection (1992).
Cited: 6 times.

(38) RePEc:ide:wpaper:1231 Competing in Network Industries: Divide and Conquer (2001).
Cited: 6 times.

(39) RePEc:ide:wpaper:1852 Continuous Preferences Can Cause Discontinuous Choices : an Application to the Impact of Incentives on Altruism (2004).
Cited: 6 times.

(40) RePEc:ide:wpaper:794 Privatizations in Developing Countries and the Governments Budget Constraint (2004).
Cited: 6 times.

(41) RePEc:ide:wpaper:623 Plafond de concentration atmosphérique en carbone et substitutions entre ressources énergétiques (2004).
Cited: 6 times.

(42) RePEc:ide:wpaper:1544 Stability of Jurisdiction Structures under the Equal Share and Median Rule (2005).
Cited: 6 times.

(43) RePEc:ide:wpaper:664 Enforcement, Regulation and Development (2001).
Cited: 6 times.

(44) RePEc:ide:wpaper:4549 Efficient Governance Structure : Implications for Banking Regulation (1992).
Cited: 5 times.

(45) RePEc:ide:wpaper:5015 Advertising, Competition and Entry in Media Industries (2006).
Cited: 5 times.

(46) RePEc:ide:wpaper:631 Merchant Transmission Investment (2004).
Cited: 5 times.

(47) RePEc:ide:wpaper:559 Railway (De) Regulation : A European Efficiency Comparison (2007).
Cited: 5 times.

(48) RePEc:ide:wpaper:641 Quality Signaling through Certification. Theory and an Application to Agricultural Seed Market (2003).
Cited: 5 times.

(49) RePEc:ide:wpaper:1782 A Minimum of Rivalry : Evidence from Transition Economies on the Importance of Competition for Innovation and Growth (2004).
Cited: 5 times.

(50) RePEc:ide:wpaper:2829 Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence (2007).
Cited: 5 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:cam:camdae:0430 ‘Retail Electricity Competition’ (2004). Faculty of Economics (formerly DAE), University of Cambridge / Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

(2) RePEc:cam:camdae:0450 Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets (2004). Faculty of Economics (formerly DAE), University of Cambridge / Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

(3) RePEc:cam:camdae:0465 Regulation of transmission expansion in Argentina Part II: Developments since the Fourth Line (2004). Faculty of Economics (formerly DAE), University of Cambridge / Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

(4) RePEc:del:abcdef:2004-02 Calcul économique et développement durable. (2004). DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) / DELTA Working Papers

(5) RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20040385 Euro area sovereign yield dynamics - the role of order imbalance (2004). European Central Bank / Working Paper Series

(6) RePEc:ide:wpaper:2122 Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets (2004). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(7) RePEc:ide:wpaper:2319 Retail Electricity Competition (2004). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(8) RePEc:ide:wpaper:2990 Pensions with Endogenous and Stochastic Fertility (2004). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(9) RePEc:ide:wpaper:3371 Pensions with Heterogenous Individuals and Endogenous Fertility (2004). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(10) RePEc:man:sespap:0403 Liberal Regulation: Privatization of Natural Monopolies with Adverse Selection (2004). School of Economics, The University of Manchester / The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series

(11) RePEc:mee:wpaper:0408 Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets (2004). Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research / Working Papers

(12) RePEc:mee:wpaper:0417 Transmission Policy in the United States (2004). Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research / Working Papers

(13) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10472 Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(14) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10473 Retail Electricity Competition (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(15) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11015 Crises and Prices: Information Aggregation, Multiplicity and Volatility (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(16) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11017 Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(17) RePEc:ucy:cypeua:4-2004 Education Policies and Economic Growth (2004). University of Cyprus Department of Economics / University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:cep:stitep:459 Dynamic Yardstick Regulation (2003). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE / STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series

(2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_909 Collective Risk-Taking Decisions with Heterogeneous Beliefs (2003). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:cie:wpaper:0213 Smallness of Invisible Dictators (2003). Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM / Working Papers

(4) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3907 Delegated Job Design (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4035 Dynamic Yardstick Regulation (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4069 Competitive Non-Linear Pricing in Duopoly Equilibrium: The Early US Cellular Telephone Industry (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(7) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1421 Robust Mechanism Design (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:fip:fedpdp:03-09 Theory of credit card networks: a survey of the literature (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia / Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper

(9) RePEc:hit:hitcei:2003-23 Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies (2003). Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University / Working Paper Series

(10) RePEc:ide:wpaper:1034 Non Parametric Instrumental Regression (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(11) RePEc:ide:wpaper:558 Attribute Choices and Structural Econometrics of Price Elasticity of Demand (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(12) RePEc:ide:wpaper:571 Entry in the Passenger Rail Industry : A Theoretical Investigation (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(13) RePEc:ide:wpaper:605 Who Should we Believe? Collective Risk-Taking Decisions with Heterogeneous Beliefs (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(14) RePEc:ide:wpaper:632 Social Insurance Competition between Bismark and Beveridge (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(15) RePEc:ide:wpaper:638 The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth (2003). Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse / IDEI Working Papers

(16) RePEc:nus:nusewp:wp0311 Competing Payment Schemes (2003). National University of Singapore, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

(17) RePEc:rne:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:2:p:69-79 An Economic Analysis of the Determination of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems (2003). Review of Network Economics

(18) RePEc:rne:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:2:p:80-96 An Introduction to the Economics of Payment Card Networks (2003). Review of Network Economics

(19) RePEc:rne:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:2:p:97-124 The Theory of Interchange Fees: A Synthesis of Recent Contributions (2003). Review of Network Economics

(20) RePEc:rne:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:3:p:191-209 Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-Sided Platform Industries (2003). Review of Network Economics

(21) RePEc:wpa:wuwpfi:0311003 A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations (2003). EconWPA / Finance

(22) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0304002 Modeling collusion as an informed principal problem (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(23) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0310006 Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:568.03 Is Bundling Anticompetitive? (2002). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:2:p:287-291 Internet Peering (2001). American Economic Review

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2008 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es