University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton / Working Papers and Published Papers by Peter Cramton and Co-Authors

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.16 0 0 0 0.07 1997 0.17 4 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.19 30 54 4 0 10 0.33 0.12 1999 0.15 0.29 5 26 34 5 20 2 0.4 0.19 2000 0.17 0.39 4 2 35 6 33.3 0.2 2001 0.67 0.34 4 40 9 6 16.7 3 0.75 0.18 2002 0.38 0.39 6 99 8 3 0 8 1.33 0.2 2003 1.6 0.41 2 1 10 16 12.5 0.21 2004 2.5 0.47 5 9 8 20 20 2 0.4 0.25
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98wpdr Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (2002).
Cited: 88 times.

(2) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02barg Bargaining with Incomplete Information (2001).
Cited: 20 times.

(3) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98wpoe The Optimality of Being Efficient (1999).
Cited: 19 times.

(4) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01hte Spectrum Auctions (2001).
Cited: 15 times.

(5) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98wpas Auctioning Securities (1998).
Cited: 13 times.

(6) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98eer Ascending Auctions (1998).
Cited: 12 times.

(7) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02eptc Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather (2002).
Cited: 11 times.

(8) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98jlefcc The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions (1998).
Cited: 8 times.

(9) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04jeea Auctioning Many Divisible Goods (2004).
Cited: 5 times.

(10) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02collude Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(11) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99wpvic Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing (1999).
Cited: 4 times.

(12) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98jleer Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents (1998).
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit Combinatorial Auctions (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(14) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:96slr Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(15) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98mdi A Review of ISO New Englands Proposed Market Rules (1998).
Cited: 3 times.

(16) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01calpx Pricing in the California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch from Uniform Pricing to Pay-as-Bid Pricing? (2001).
Cited: 3 times.

(17) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:87econ Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(18) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97elec Using Auctions to Divest Generation Assets (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(19) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:05licap A Capacity Market that Makes Sense (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(20) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01ej Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(21) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:92aer Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(22) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:91beq Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality in Pratice (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(23) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99eedecr The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation: Why Auctioned Carbon Permits are Attractive and Feasible (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(24) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:97jems Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(25) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:85roth Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:93beq Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:91ms Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs (1998).
Cited: 2 times.

(28) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99ej The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM (1999).
Cited: 2 times.

(29) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:03ferc1 Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(30) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98cra2 Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (1998).
Cited: 1 times.

(31) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:00jre Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions (1999).
Cited: 1 times.

(32) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:94clr Relational Investing and Agency Theory (1998).
Cited: 1 times.

(33) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99reserves Review of the Reserves and Operable Capability Markets: New Englands Experience in the First Four Months (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04hicss Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:00senate Lessons from the United States Spectrum Auctions (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02ubs Unions, Bargaining and Strikes (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit5 The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2004 | 2003 | 2002 | 2001

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit4 Simultaneous Ascending Auction (2004). University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton / Working Papers and Published Papers by Peter Cramton and Co-Authors

(2) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:04mit5 The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design (2004). University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton / Working Papers and Published Papers by Peter Cramton and Co-Authors

Latest citations received in: 2003

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:aea:jecper:v:16:y:2002:i:1:p:169-189 What Really Matters in Auction Design (2002). Journal of Economic Perspectives

(2) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200235 The chopstick auction (2002). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(3) RePEc:nys:sunysb:03-02 Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders are Asymmetric. (2002). SUNY-Stony Brook, Department of Economics / Department of Economics Working Papers

(4) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02collude Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions (2002). University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton / Working Papers and Published Papers by Peter Cramton and Co-Authors

(5) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02eptc Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather (2002). University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton / Working Papers and Published Papers by Peter Cramton and Co-Authors

(6) RePEc:ste:nystbu:02-14 Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Budget Constraints (2002). New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(7) RePEc:wop:stanec:02004 Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2002). Stanford University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(8) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0203006 Competition in Electricity Spot Markets: Economic Theory and International Experience (2002). EconWPA / Industrial Organization

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:502.01 Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with (2001). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3072 Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdoms Third Generation Spectrum Auction (2001). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:jhu:papers:453 Econometric Models of Asymmetric Ascending Auctions (2001). The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics / Economics Working Paper Archive

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.