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 Updated May, 1 2008 147.392 documents processed, 3.154.300 references and 1.403.701 citations

 

 
 

University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.160000.07
19970.170000.09
19980.190000.12
19990.290000.19
20000.392631000.2
20010.080.34294426200.18
20020.160.39385555911.130.080.2
20030.280.41263967195.30.21
20040.30.473119641910.530.10.25
20050.30.453727571711.870.190.29
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
 
Impact Factor:
 
Immediacy Index:
 
Documents published:
 
Citations received:
 

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse12_2001 Two are Few and Four are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies (2001).
Cited: 24 times.

(2) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse19_2002 Experimentally Observed Imitation and Cooperation in Price Competition on the Circle (2002).
Cited: 18 times.

(3) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse20_2005 Directed Search with Multiple Job Applications (2005).
Cited: 11 times.

(4) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse23_2002 Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment (2002).
Cited: 10 times.

(5) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse12_2003 On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes (2003).
Cited: 6 times.

(6) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse21_2003 Monetary Policy in Europe: Evidence from Time-Varying Taylor Rules (2003).
Cited: 6 times.

(7) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse9_2003 Blowing the Whistle (2003).
Cited: 6 times.

(8) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse20_2002 Trader Anonymity, Price Formation and Liquidity (2002).
Cited: 6 times.

(9) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse5_2003 Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect (2003).
Cited: 6 times.

(10) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse27_2005 Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions (2005).
Cited: 5 times.

(11) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse1_2003 The Further We Stretch the Higher the Sky - On the Impact of Wage Increases on Job Satisfaction (2003).
Cited: 4 times.

(12) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse3_2003 Individual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse12_2004 Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests – An Experimental Analysis (2004).
Cited: 4 times.

(14) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse14_2001 The Impact of Fairness on Decision Making - An Analysis of Different Video Experiments (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(15) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse1_2001 Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Kyle Model with Multiple Informed Traders (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(16) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse16_2000 Imitation Equilibrium (2000).
Cited: 4 times.

(17) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse12_2005 Stability of the Replicator Equation for a Single-Species with a Multi-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space (2005).
Cited: 3 times.

(18) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse22_2003 The Role of Choice in Social Dilemma Experiments (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(19) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse32_2002 Envy and Compassion in Tournaments (2002).
Cited: 3 times.

(20) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse16_2001 Factor Models for Portofolio Credit Risk (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(21) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse23_2004 Minority Game - Experiments and Simulations of Traffic Scenarios (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(22) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse3_2001 How to Play 3x3-Games A Strategy Method Experiment (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(23) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse11_2000 Can You Guess the Game Youre Playing? (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(24) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse13_2001 Economic Growth and Social Poverty: The Evolution of Social Participation (2001).
Cited: 3 times.

(25) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse15_2001 A Libor Market Model with Default Risk (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(26) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse19_2000 Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse10_2001 Learning Direction Theory and the Winner’s Curse (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(28) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse25_2001 An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for the British 3G / UMTS Auction (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(29) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse18_2000 Representative versus Direct Democracy: The Role of Informational Asymmetries (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(30) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse30_2002 The Wage Policy of Firms - Comparative Evidence for the U.S. and Germany from Personnel Data (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(31) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse8_2000 mic Efficiency and Pareto Optimality in a Stochastic OLG Model with Production and Social Security (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(32) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse24_2004 An Extended Reinforcement Algorithm for Estimation of Human Behaviour in Congestion Games (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(33) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse7_2000 On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(34) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse19_2003 Regulation of an Open Access Essential Facility (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(35) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse23_2003 Ambiguity and Social Interaction (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(36) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse6_2000 Trial & Error to Collusion - The Discrete Case (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(37) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse33_2001 Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(38) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse8_2004 Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(39) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse10_2003 Overbidding in Fixed Rate Tenders - An Empirical Assessment of Alternative Explanations (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(40) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse22_2001 Strategic Choice Handicaps when Females Pay the Cost of the Handicap (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(41) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse21_2002 Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal - Pure-Strategy Equilibria for a Common Value Model (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(42) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse2_2002 Strategic Delegation and Mergers in Oligopolistic Contests (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(43) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse19_2004 On the Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Rochet-Vila Model of Market Making (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(44) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse6_2005 An Empirical Study on Risk Taking in Tournaments (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(45) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse8_2003 Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(46) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse14_2004 Emotions and Incentives (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(47) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse4_2003 Submodularity and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(48) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse13_2006 On Irreversible Investment (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(49) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse1_2000 Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(50) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse11_2004 Education, Income Distribution and Innovation (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 | 2002

Latest citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:awi:wpaper:0424 Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case (2005). University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(2) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse25_2005 Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages (2005). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse26_2005 Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? (2005). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse38_2005 Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case (2005). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5292 Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? (2005). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:trf:wpaper:42 Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale (2005). SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, University of Mannheim / Discussion Papers

(7) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0512003 Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

Latest citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse29_2004 Equitable Allocations in Experimental Bargaining Games: Inequality Aversion versus Efficiency (2004). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1325 Partnership Dissolution, Complementarity, and Investment Incentives (2004). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1340 Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection (2004). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

Latest citations received in: 2003

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:550.02 Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis (2002). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse7_2002 Exploring Group Behavior in a Power-to-Take Video Experiment (2002). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000070 Learning to play approximate Nash equilibria in games with many players (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2008 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es