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Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 0 0 0 0.08 1997 0.19 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.2 0 0 0 0.12 1999 0.29 0 0 0 0.19 2000 0.41 0 0 0 0.21 2001 0.37 11 27 0 0 2 0.18 0.19 2002 0.82 0.42 11 27 11 9 0 0.2 2003 0.36 0.43 8 41 22 8 0 6 0.75 0.21 2004 0.74 0.49 3 32 19 14 0 1 0.33 0.26 2005 1.64 0.48 24 73 11 18 0 16 0.67 0.29 2006 1.11 0.54 4 7 27 30 0 0.28
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000593 Robust Mechanism Design (2005).
Cited: 32 times.

(2) RePEc:cla:najeco:122247000000000306 Fairness and Redistribution (2004).
Cited: 26 times.

(3) RePEc:cla:najeco:391749000000000553 Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets (2003).
Cited: 19 times.

(4) RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000586 Whos Who in Networks. Wanted: the Key Player (2005).
Cited: 14 times.

(5) RePEc:cla:najeco:506439000000000019 Persistence in Law-of-One-Price Deviations: Evidence From Micro-Price Data (2002).
Cited: 13 times.

(6) RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000650 Information Transmission with Cheap and Almost-Cheap Talk (2005).
Cited: 10 times.

(7) RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000052 Addiction and Cue-Conditioned Cognitive Processes (2003).
Cited: 9 times.

(8) RePEc:cla:najeco:625018000000000232 Costly Voting (2001).
Cited: 9 times.

(9) RePEc:cla:najeco:625018000000000226 Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games (2001).
Cited: 6 times.

(10) RePEc:cla:najeco:172782000000000006 The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring (2005).
Cited: 5 times.

(11) RePEc:cla:najeco:391749000000000536 Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution? (2002).
Cited: 5 times.

(12) RePEc:cla:najeco:625018000000000251 Consumption Savings Decisions with Quasi-Geometric Discounting (2001).
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:cla:najeco:391749000000000478 Can We Really Observe Hyperbolic Discounting? (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(14) RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000057 The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency (2003).
Cited: 4 times.

(15) RePEc:cla:najeco:784828000000000417 Strategic Experimentation in Networks (2005).
Cited: 3 times.

(16) RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000063 Aggregative Public Goods Games (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(17) RePEc:cla:najeco:122247000000000311 Optimal Voting Schemes with Costly Information Acquisition (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(18) RePEc:cla:najeco:122247000000000241 Price Dispersion, Inflation and Welfare (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(19) RePEc:cla:najeco:321307000000000016 A Theory of Momentum in Sequential Voting (2006).
Cited: 3 times.

(20) RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000068 Building Rational Cooperation (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(21) RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000635 The Canonical Type Space for Interdependent Preferences (2005).
Cited: 3 times.

(22) RePEc:cla:najeco:321307000000000021 Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Innovation (2006).
Cited: 3 times.

(23) RePEc:cla:najeco:234936000000000070 Bounded Memory and Biases in Information Processing (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(24) RePEc:cla:najeco:625018000000000238 The Long March of History: Farm Laborers Wages in England 1208-1850 (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(25) RePEc:cla:najeco:391749000000000488 Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:cla:najeco:391749000000000010 Learning To Play Games In Extensive Form By Valuation (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:cla:najeco:506439000000000025 Buyer Coalition Against Monopolistic Screening: On the Role of Asymmetric Information among Buyers (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(28) RePEc:cla:najeco:172782000000000001 Art and the Internet: Blessing the Curse? (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(29) RePEc:cla:najeco:625018000000000219 Is it Economics and Psychology?: The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(30) RePEc:cla:najeco:391749000000000005 Arms Races and Negotiations (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(31) RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000612 The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(32) RePEc:cla:najeco:625018000000000267 Instantaneous Gratification (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(33) RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000082 Limited Computational Resources Favor Rationality (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000644 Revealing Preferences for Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000616 The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion- A Reply (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:cla:najeco:321307000000000026 A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:cla:najeco:843644000000000216 Equilibrium Degeneracy and Reputation Effects (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:cla:najeco:666156000000000598 Wishful Thinking in Strategic Environments (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(39) RePEc:cla:najeco:784828000000000455 Optimal Menu of Menus with Self-Control Preferences (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(40) RePEc:cla:najeco:391749000000000514 Bad Reputation (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:cla:najeco:172782000000000033 Simultaneous Search (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(42) RePEc:cla:najeco:843644000000000079 Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003

Recent citations received in: 2006

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000925 Intellectual Property and the Efficient Allocation of Surplus from Creation (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(2) RePEc:cla:levarc:784828000000000576 Menu Choice, Environmental Cues and Temptation: A “Dual Self” Approach to Self-control (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(3) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000429 A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(4) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000518 Advances in Dynamic Optimal Taxation (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(5) RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000539 Discussion of BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(6) RePEc:cla:uclaol:366 Folk Theorem with Communication (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / UCLA Economics Online Papers

(7) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5244 Peer Effects and Social Networks in Education and Crime (2005). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5331 Crime and Conformism (2005). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5351 Oppositional Identities and the Labour Market (2005). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:esi:discus:2005-24 On Inequity Aversion (2005). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(11) RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0645 Peer Effects and Social Networks in Education and Crime (2005). The Research Institute of Industrial Economics / IUI Working Paper Series

(12) RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0649 Oppositional Identities and the Labor Market (2005). The Research Institute of Industrial Economics / IUI Working Paper Series

(13) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1852 Oppositional Identities and the Labor Market (2005). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(14) RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_25 Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy (2005). Max Planck Institute for Reserach on Collective Goods / Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Reserach on Collective Goods

(15) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1406 Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria (2005). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(16) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0510002 The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information (2005). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10371 Inequality, Technology, and the Social Contract (2004). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3808 Can Information Heterogeneity Explain the Exchange Rate Determination Puzzle? (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1441 An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9836 Bidding Rings and the Winners Curse: The Case of Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(4) RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2006-20 Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, Drug Purity, and a Test of Rational Drug Use (2003). University of Oregon Economics Department / University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers

(5) RePEc:sce:scecf3:38 Public and Private Information in Monetary Policy Models (2003). Society for Computational Economics / Computing in Economics and Finance 2003

(6) RePEc:szg:worpap:0302 Can Information Heterogeneity Explain the Exchange Rate Determination Puzzle'DONE' (2003). Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee / Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.