Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 0 0 0 0.08 1997 0.19 0 0 0 0.09 1998 0.2 0 0 0 0.12 1999 0.29 0 0 0 0.19 2000 0.41 2 1 0 0 0.21 2001 0.5 0.37 21 11 2 1 0 2 0.1 0.19 2002 0.04 0.42 32 38 23 1 100 3 0.09 0.2 2003 0.13 0.43 33 29 53 7 57.1 2 0.06 0.21 2004 0.26 0.49 32 30 65 17 5.9 10 0.31 0.26 2005 0.22 0.48 34 13 65 14 28.6 2 0.06 0.29 2006 0.15 0.54 27 28 66 10 0 6 0.22 0.28
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp421 Shapley Value (2006).
Cited: 13 times.

(2) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp298 Individual and Group Decisions in the Centipede Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players? (2002).
Cited: 13 times.

(3) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp297 Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests. (2002).
Cited: 10 times.

(4) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp321 Limit Order Book as a Market for Liquidity (2003).
Cited: 8 times.

(5) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp359 Strategic Merger Waves: A Theory of Musical Chairs (2004).
Cited: 6 times.

(6) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp330 Bounded Rationality and Socially Optimal Limits on Choice in a Self-Selection Model (2002).
Cited: 5 times.

(7) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp266 Scapegoats and Optimal Allocation of Responsibility (2001).
Cited: 5 times.

(8) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp377 Optimal Use of Communication Resources (2004).
Cited: 5 times.

(9) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp385 Declining Valuations in Sequential Auctions (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(10) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp411 Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall (2005).
Cited: 3 times.

(11) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp343 Type Indeterminacy: A Model of the KT(Kahneman-Tversky)-man (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(12) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp336 Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(13) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp438 Honesty of Signaling and Pollinator Attraction: The Case of Flag-Like Bracts (2006).
Cited: 3 times.

(14) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp414 Tournaments with Midterm Reviews (2006).
Cited: 3 times.

(15) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp273 Predictably Incoherent Judgements (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(16) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp435 Complexity and Effective Prediction (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(17) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp295 Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(18) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp461 Rationalizable Expectations (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(19) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp317 One Team Must Win, the Other Need Only Not Lose: An Experimental Study of an Asymmetric Participation Game (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(20) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp315 Bargaining with an Agenda (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(21) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp394 Tight Correlated Equilibrium (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(22) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp284 Long Cheap Talk (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(23) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp387 When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect? (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(24) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp363 A Law of Large Numbers for Weighted Majority (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(25) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp434 Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto Games (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp470 The Strategic Value of Recall (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp319 Markets Versus Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(28) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp361 Assessing Strategic Risk (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(29) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp345 On the Minmax of Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: A Computational Example (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(30) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp316 Online Matching Pennies (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(31) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp285 On the Misperception of Variability (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(32) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp372 Adaptive Heuristics (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(33) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp309 Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(34) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp357 A Theory of Optimal Deadlines (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(35) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp369 Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining - A video experiment (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp353 Corruption and Openness (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp267 Reconfirming the Prenucleolus (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp320 Limited Computational Resources Favor Rationality (2003).
Cited: 1 times.

(39) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp362 Social Indeterminacy (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(40) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp433 Differentiated Annuities in a Pooling Equilibrium (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp350 On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(42) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp378 Binary Effectivity Rules (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(43) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp263 Stability and Segregation in Group Formation (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(44) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp360 On the Non-Emptiness of the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(45) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp403 Longevity and Aggregate Savings (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(46) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp428 War and Peace (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(47) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp291 A Note on Revenue Effects of Asymmetry in Private-Value Auctions (2002).
Cited: 1 times.

(48) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp376 Bargaining Sets of Voting Games (2004).
Cited: 1 times.

(49) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp454 An Operational Measure of Riskiness (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(50) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp261 Learnability and Rationality of Choice (2001).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000374 Optimal Ties in Contests (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(2) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000608 Vertical Orientation and Color Contrast and Choices by Bumblebees (Bombus terrestris L.) (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(3) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2006113 Population monotonic paths schemes for simple games (2006). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(4) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2006114 Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control (2006). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(5) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp430 Optimal Ties in Contests (2006). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(6) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp439 Vertical Orientation and Color Contrast and Choices by Bumblebees (Bombus terrestris L.) (2006). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp394 Tight Correlated Equilibrium (2005). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(2) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp408 Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions (2005). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1364 Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games (2004). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000466 Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (2004). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(3) RePEc:esi:discus:2004-06 The Jena video laboratory for economic experiments (2004). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(4) RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00242940_v1 Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals (2004). HAL / Post-Print

(5) RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242940_v1 Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals (2004). HAL / Working Papers

(6) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp363 A Law of Large Numbers for Weighted Majority (2004). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(7) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp375 Optimal Two Choice Stopping on an Exponential Sequence (2004). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(8) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp376 Bargaining Sets of Voting Games (2004). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(9) RePEc:upf:upfgen:783 Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (2004). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

(10) RePEc:upf:upfgen:804 Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games (2004). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4091 Does Anonymity Matter in Electronic Limit Order Markets? (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp336 Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players (2003). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.