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 Updated January, 2 2009 180.482 documents processed, 3.979.807 references and 1.716.086 citations

 

 
 

University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences / CARESS Working Papres

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.20.18105204500.08
19970.170.19331533054080.240.09
19980.280.215944312040.270.12
19990.40.29143048195.30.19
20000.690.4115162920020.130.21
20010.170.37029500.19
20020.4201500.2
20030.430000.21
20040.490000.26
20050.480000.29
20060.540000.28
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-20 Optimal Prediction Under Asymmetric Loss (1997).
Cited: 51 times.

(2) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-12 Who Wants a Good Reputation? (1998).
Cited: 28 times.

(3) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-02 An Economic Model of Representative Democracy (1995).
Cited: 16 times.

(4) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-05 Democratic Choice of an Education System: Implications for Growth and Income Distribution (1997).
Cited: 16 times.

(5) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-09 Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (1999).
Cited: 13 times.

(6) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-14 Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models (1995).
Cited: 13 times.

(7) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-23 Child Health and Schooling Achievement: Association, Causality and Household Allocations (1997).
Cited: 12 times.

(8) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-8 Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory (1997).
Cited: 11 times.

(9) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-13 Efficient Non-Contractible Investments (1998).
Cited: 11 times.

(10) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-14 Earnings and Wealth Inequality and Income Taxation: Quantifying the Trade-Offs of Switching to a Proportional Income Tax in the U.S. (1998).
Cited: 11 times.

(11) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-18 The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information* (1995).
Cited: 10 times.

(12) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-11 Your Reputation Is Who Youre Not, Not Who Youd Like To Be (1998).
Cited: 10 times.

(13) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-22 How Strongly is Child Schooling Associated with Household Income? (1997).
Cited: 10 times.

(14) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-01 Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory (1998).
Cited: 10 times.

(15) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-08 The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives (1998).
Cited: 9 times.

(16) RePEc:wop:pennca:endo-one Endogenous Interactions (1997).
Cited: 9 times.

(17) RePEc:wop:pennca:rep-is-sep Your Reputation Is Who Youre Not, Not Who Youd Like To Be (1998).
Cited: 8 times.

(18) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-06 Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search (1998).
Cited: 8 times.

(19) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-6 Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(20) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-04 Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem'DONE' (2000).
Cited: 6 times.

(21) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-4 Indeterminacy, Home Production, and the Business Cycle: a Calibrated Analysis (1997).
Cited: 6 times.

(22) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-18 Evaluating Density Forecasts (1997).
Cited: 5 times.

(23) RePEc:wop:pennca:imp-mon Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(24) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-07 Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(25) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-06 Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence (1999).
Cited: 5 times.

(26) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-02 Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching (1997).
Cited: 5 times.

(27) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-15 An Anti-Folk Theorem for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games (1995).
Cited: 5 times.

(28) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-14 Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (1999).
Cited: 5 times.

(29) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-05 Learning Correlated Equilibria in Potential Games (1998).
Cited: 4 times.

(30) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-04 Justifying Rational Expectations (1995).
Cited: 4 times.

(31) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-05 Co-operation and Timing (1995).
Cited: 4 times.

(32) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-17 A Rudimentary Model of Search with Divisible Money and Prices (1995).
Cited: 3 times.

(33) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-01 Contagion (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(34) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-03 Endogenous Lobbying (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(35) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-21 Child Nutrition, Child Health, and School Enrollment: A Longitudinal Analysis (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(36) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-9 A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(37) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-2 Policy Persistence (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(38) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-17 Technological Innovations: Slumps and Booms (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(39) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-12 A Theory of Negotiation and Formation of Coalition (1999).
Cited: 2 times.

(40) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-05 Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(41) RePEc:wop:pennca:eff-inv-large Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(42) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-13 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case (1999).
Cited: 2 times.

(43) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-09 Cooperation, Corporate Culture and Incentive Intensity (1997).
Cited: 2 times.

(44) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-08 Reducing Overlapping Generations Economies to Finite Economies (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(45) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-7 A Model of Commodity Money, With Application to Greshams Law and the Debasement Puzzle (1997).
Cited: 2 times.

(46) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-11 Quantity Discounts for Taste-Varying Consumers (1999).
Cited: 2 times.

(47) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-02 The Drawbacks of Electoral Competition (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(48) RePEc:wop:pennca:96-04 Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms (1996).
Cited: 2 times.

(49) RePEc:wop:pennca:sell-rep Who Wants a Good Reputation'DONE' (2000).
Cited: 1 times.

(50) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-10 Ergodicity and Clustering in Opinion Formation (1998).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2006 | 2005 | 2004 | 2003

Recent citations received in: 2006

Recent citations received in: 2005

Recent citations received in: 2004

Recent citations received in: 2003

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2009 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es