International Journal of Game Theory

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.02 0.18 30 172 45 1 0 3 0.1 0.09 1997 0.18 0.21 0 55 10 0 0.08 1998 0.2 0.25 81 315 30 6 0 9 0.11 0.1 1999 0.14 0.32 35 155 81 11 0 2 0.06 0.15 2000 0.38 0.43 31 67 116 44 0 6 0.19 0.19 2001 0.33 0.41 29 76 66 22 0 5 0.17 0.17 2002 0.2 0.44 29 32 60 12 0 2 0.07 0.2 2003 0.22 0.47 28 36 58 13 0 4 0.14 0.22 2004 0.16 0.52 28 45 57 9 0 3 0.11 0.23 2005 0.23 0.56 28 45 56 13 0 9 0.32 0.25 2006 0.32 0.57 42 64 56 18 11.1 13 0.31 0.24 2007 0.26 0.48 41 29 70 18 11.1 4 0.1 0.22
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:269-299 Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness (1998).
Cited: 65 times.

(2) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:289-301 On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games. (1996).
Cited: 44 times.

(3) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:4:p:323-44 An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives. (1995).
Cited: 39 times.

(4) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:245-256 Link formation in cooperative situations (1998).
Cited: 39 times.

(5) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:15:y:1986:i:3:p:187-200 On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse. (1986).
Cited: 36 times.

(6) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:2:p:171-98 Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information. (1993).
Cited: 35 times.

(7) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1990:i:1:p:59-89 Evolutionary Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties. (1990).
Cited: 30 times.

(8) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:273-91 A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games. (1989).
Cited: 29 times.

(9) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:3:p:375-392 Population uncertainty and Poisson games (1998).
Cited: 28 times.

(10) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:277-93 Games with Permission Structures: The Conjunctive Approach. (1992).
Cited: 26 times.

(11) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:379-401 The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities (1998).
Cited: 24 times.

(12) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:303-27 Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment. (1996).
Cited: 22 times.

(13) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:3:p:263-300 Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge (1999).
Cited: 21 times.

(14) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:131-152 Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study (1999).
Cited: 20 times.

(15) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:4:p:389-407 The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games. (1989).
Cited: 18 times.

(16) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:27-43 An Axiomatization of the Disjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Permission Structure (1998).
Cited: 18 times.

(17) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:385-406 Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation. (1996).
Cited: 17 times.

(18) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:419-27 Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games. (1992).
Cited: 17 times.

(19) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:393-418 Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information. (1992).
Cited: 16 times.

(20) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:269-287 Loss aversion equilibrium (2000).
Cited: 15 times.

(21) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:75-83 Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities. (1994).
Cited: 15 times.

(22) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:245-58 The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments. (1996).
Cited: 15 times.

(23) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:37-44 A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games. (1989).
Cited: 15 times.

(24) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:4:p:511-520 Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems (1999).
Cited: 14 times.

(25) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:241-252 Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game (1999).
Cited: 13 times.

(26) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2001:i:4:p:487-494 Stability in coalition formation games (2001).
Cited: 13 times.

(27) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:223-227 Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games (1998).
Cited: 13 times.

(28) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:161-189 On implementation via demand commitment games (1998).
Cited: 13 times.

(29) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:209-220 Inferior players in simple games (2001).
Cited: 12 times.

(30) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:57-89 Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions. (1989).
Cited: 12 times.

(31) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:61-73 The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games (1998).
Cited: 12 times.

(32) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:113-136 Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form (1998).
Cited: 12 times.

(33) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:3:p:279-302 Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games. (1993).
Cited: 12 times.

(34) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:177-88 Mediated Talk. (1996).
Cited: 12 times.

(35) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:3:p:249-66 The Shapley Value for Cooperative Games under Precedence Constraints. (1992).
Cited: 12 times.

(36) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:293-310 On Equilibria in Repeated Games with Absorbing States. (1989).
Cited: 11 times.

(37) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1990:i:1:p:33-44 On the Non-existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games. (1990).
Cited: 11 times.

(38) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:4:p:505-514 A characterization of the position value* (2005).
Cited: 11 times.

(39) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:3:p:319-349 Unequal connections (2006).
Cited: 11 times.

(40) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:111-130 Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games (1999).
Cited: 10 times.

(41) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:335-351 Ternary Voting Games (1998).
Cited: 10 times.

(42) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:63-79 Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information (2000).
Cited: 10 times.

(43) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:1:p:27-39 Weighted Values and the Core. (1992).
Cited: 10 times.

(44) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:3:p:207-36 The Theory of Normal Form Games form the Differentiable Viewpoint. (1994).
Cited: 10 times.

(45) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:23-38 The selectope for cooperative games (2000).
Cited: 10 times.

(46) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:1:p:13-34 The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms. (1996).
Cited: 10 times.

(47) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:17:y:1988:i:2:p:89-99 An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value. (1988).
Cited: 10 times.

(48) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:2:p:227-40 A Value for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation. (1989).
Cited: 10 times.

(49) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:269-87 An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games. (1996).
Cited: 10 times.

(50) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:3:p:399-424 Cores of non-atomic market games (2006).
Cited: 9 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 | 2004

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:681.07 The Key Party in the Catalan Government (2007). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200789 A Vertex Oriented Approach to Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems (2007). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(3) RePEc:pra:mprapa:4051 Conformism and Cooperation in a Local Interaction Model (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(4) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2007:i:3:p:395-426 Dissection of solutions in cooperative game theory using representation techniques (2007). International Journal of Game Theory

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:668.06 Weighted Approval Voting (2006). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cca:wpaper:23 Application Costs in Sequential Admission Mechanisms (2006). Collegio Carlo Alberto / Working Papers

(3) RePEc:cca:wpaper:24 Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach (2006). Collegio Carlo Alberto / Working Papers

(4) RePEc:cca:wpaper:30 Non mean reverting affne processes for stochastic mortality (2006). Collegio Carlo Alberto / Working Papers

(5) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1258 Political reputations and campaign promises (2006). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(6) RePEc:cor:louvco:2006092 Farsightedly stable networks (2006). Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) / Discussion Papers

(7) RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006046 Farsightedly stable networks (2006). Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques / Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Workin

(8) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200643 On the core of routing games with revenues (2006). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(9) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006038 Weighted Approval Voting (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(10) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006045 A genetic algorithm for the partial binary constraint satisfaction problem: an application to a frequency assignment problem (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(11) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006046 Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(12) RePEc:ecl:stabus:1929 Federalism, Taxation, and Economic Growth (2006). Stanford University, Graduate School of Business / Research Papers

(13) RePEc:roc:wallis:wp41 A Reputational Theory of Two Party Competition (2006). University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy / Wallis Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2005

(1) RePEc:clu:wpaper:0506-10 Cores of non-atomic market games (2005). Columbia University, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2005117 Learning to be prepared (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(3) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2005127 The component fairness solution for cycle-free graph games (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(4) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200594 The cutting power of preparation (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(5) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005056 The Component Fairness Solution for Cycle- Free Graph Games (2005). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(6) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20050114 The Component Fairness Solution for Cycle-free Graph Games (2005). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(7) RePEc:lde:journl:y:2005:i:62:p:9-33 How to distribute when there is scarce situation (2005). Lecturas de Economía

(8) RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b05086 Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in metric games. (2005). Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) / Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques

(9) RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2005-16 Interval values for strategic games in which players cooperate (2005). University of Oregon Economics Department / University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2004

(1) RePEc:kap:theord:v:56:y:2004:i:1:p:35-46 A comparison of non-transferable utility values (2004). Theory and Decision

(2) RePEc:mtl:montde:2004-14 Nearly Serial Sharing Methods (2004). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche

(3) RePEc:upf:upfgen:788 Global Nash Convergence of Foster and Youngs Regret Testing (2004). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.