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International Journal of Game Theory Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.
Most cited documents in this series: (1) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:379-401 The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities (1998). (2) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:269-299 Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness (1998). (3) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1990:i:1:p:59-89 Evolutionary Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties. (1990). (4) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:289-301 On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games. (1996). (5) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:4:p:323-44 An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives. (1995). (6) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:15:y:1986:i:3:p:187-200 On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse. (1986). (7) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:245-256 Link formation in cooperative situations (1998). (8) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:2:p:171-98 Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information. (1993). (9) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:277-93 Games with Permission Structures: The Conjunctive Approach. (1992). (10) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:273-91 A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games. (1989). (11) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:3:p:375-392 Population uncertainty and Poisson games (1998). (12) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:419-27 Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games. (1992). (13) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:3:p:263-300 Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge (1999). (14) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:4:p:389-407 The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games. (1989). (15) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:303-27 Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment. (1996). (16) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:393-418 Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information. (1992). (17) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:385-406 Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation. (1996). (18) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:75-83 Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities. (1994). (19) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:269-287 Loss aversion equilibrium (2000). (20) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:131-152 Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study (1999). (21) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:27-43 An Axiomatization of the Disjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Permission Structure (1998). (22) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:37-44 A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games. (1989). (23) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:245-58 The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments. (1996). (24) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:4:p:505-514 A characterization of the position value* (2005). (25) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:335-351 Ternary Voting Games (1998). (26) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:57-89 Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions. (1989). (27) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:4:p:511-520 Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems (1999). (28) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:161-189 On implementation via demand commitment games (1998). (29) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:223-227 Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games (1998). (30) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:293-310 On Equilibria in Repeated Games with Absorbing States. (1989). (31) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:3:p:427-441 Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design (1998). (32) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:23-38 The selectope for cooperative games (2000). (33) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:61-73 The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games (1998). (34) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2001:i:4:p:487-494 Stability in coalition formation games (2001). (35) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:2:p:227-40 A Value for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation. (1989). (36) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:177-88 Mediated Talk. (1996). (37) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:3:p:249-66 The Shapley Value for Cooperative Games under Precedence Constraints. (1992). (38) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:3:p:279-302 Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games. (1993). (39) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:3:p:301-12 Monotonicity and Dummy Free Property for Multi-choice Cooperative Games. (1992). (40) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:209-220 Inferior players in simple games (2001). (41) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:3:p:319-349 Unequal connections (2006). (42) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:241-252 Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game (1999). (43) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:1:p:13-34 The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms. (1996). (44) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:17:y:1988:i:2:p:89-99 An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value. (1988). (45) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:229-240 On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games (1999). (46) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:1:p:27-39 Weighted Values and the Core. (1992). (47) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1990:i:1:p:33-44 On the Non-existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games. (1990). (48) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:113-136 Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form (1998). (49) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:3:p:207-36 The Theory of Normal Form Games form the Differentiable Viewpoint. (1994). (50) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:2:p:185-87 Credible Coalitions and the Core. (1989). Recent citations received in: | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 | 2005 Recent citations received in: 2008 (1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2378 The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game (2008). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series (2) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002312 The Relationship Between Classical and Quantum Correlation in Games (2008). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive (3) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2008010 Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets (2008). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda (4) RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00356304_v1 Markovian assignment rules (2008). HAL / Working Papers (5) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3862 On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations (2008). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers (6) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14502 On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations (2008). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers (7) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08qcspr The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule for Combinatorial Auctions (2008). University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton / Working Papers and Published Papers by Peter Cramton and Co-Authors (8) RePEc:uct:uconnp:2008-29 Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets (2008). University of Connecticut, Department of Economics / Working papers Recent citations received in: 2007 (1) RePEc:aub:autbar:681.07 The Key Party in the Catalan Government (2007). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers (2) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200789 A Vertex Oriented Approach to Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems (2007). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (3) RePEc:pra:mprapa:4051 Conformism and Cooperation in a Local Interaction Model (2007). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper (4) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2007:i:3:p:395-426 Dissection of solutions in cooperative game theory using representation techniques (2007). International Journal of Game Theory Recent citations received in: 2006 (1) RePEc:aub:autbar:668.06 Weighted Approval Voting (2006). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers (2) RePEc:cca:wpaper:23 Application Costs in Sequential Admission Mechanisms (2006). Collegio Carlo Alberto / Working Papers (3) RePEc:cca:wpaper:24 Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach (2006). Collegio Carlo Alberto / Working Papers (4) RePEc:cca:wpaper:30 Non mean reverting affne processes for stochastic mortality (2006). Collegio Carlo Alberto / Working Papers (5) RePEc:cor:louvco:2006092 Farsightedly stable networks (2006). Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) / Discussion Papers (6) RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006046 Farsightedly stable networks (2006). Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques / Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Workin (7) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200643 On the Core of Routing Games with Revenues (2006). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (8) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006038 Weighted Approval Voting (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda (9) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006045 A genetic algorithm for the partial binary constraint satisfaction problem: an application to a frequency assignment problem (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda (10) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006046 Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory (2006). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda (11) RePEc:ecl:stabus:1929 Federalism, Taxation, and Economic Growth (2006). Stanford University, Graduate School of Business / Research Papers (12) RePEc:roc:wallis:wp41 A Reputational Theory of Two Party Competition (2006). University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy / Wallis Working Papers Recent citations received in: 2005 (1) RePEc:clu:wpaper:0506-10 Cores of non-atomic market games (2005). Columbia University, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers (2) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2005117 Learning to be Prepared (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (3) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2005127 The Component Fairness Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (4) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200594 The Cutting Power of Preparation (2005). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper (5) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2005056 The Component Fairness Solution for Cycle- Free Graph Games (2005). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda (6) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20050114 The Component Fairness Solution for Cycle-free Graph Games (2005). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers (7) RePEc:lde:journl:y:2005:i:62:p:9-33 How to distribute when there is scarce situation (2005). Lecturas de EconomÃÂa (8) RePEc:mse:wpsorb:b05086 Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in metric games. (2005). Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) / Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques (9) RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2005-16 Interval values for strategic games in which players cooperate (2005). University of Oregon Economics Department / University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results. Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series. |
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