Journal of Law, Economics and Organization

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.33 0.18 20 177 40 13 0 0.08 1997 0.39 0.21 18 216 41 16 0 5 0.28 0.08 1998 0.37 0.22 19 104 38 14 0 1 0.05 0.1 1999 0.51 0.28 34 840 37 19 0 8 0.24 0.13 2000 0.79 0.37 20 228 53 42 0 1 0.05 0.16 2001 0.78 0.37 19 119 54 42 0 2 0.11 0.16 2002 0.82 0.41 20 147 39 32 0 13 0.65 0.19 2003 0.64 0.42 21 182 39 25 0 4 0.19 0.2 2004 0.83 0.47 22 70 41 34 0 5 0.23 0.21 2005 0.91 0.5 22 82 43 39 0 7 0.32 0.23 2006 0.73 0.51 21 113 44 32 0 10 0.48 0.22 2007 0.91 0.4 31 25 43 39 0 3 0.1 0.18 2008 0.63 0.42 21 38 52 33 0 6 0.29 0.21 2009 0.19 0.43 24 17 52 10 0 5 0.21 0.19
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:222-79 The Quality of Government. (1999).
Cited: 569 times.

(2) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:24-52 Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. (1991).
Cited: 193 times.

(3) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:2:p:181-214 Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations. (1986).
Cited: 111 times.

(4) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:3:y:1987:i:2:p:243-77 Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. (1987).
Cited: 97 times.

(5) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:3:p:523-46 The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform. (1992).
Cited: 83 times.

(6) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:201-46 The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation. (1994).
Cited: 66 times.

(7) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:335-61 Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment. (1995).
Cited: 61 times.

(8) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:1:p:221-277 Courts and Relational Contracts (2002).
Cited: 58 times.

(9) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:74-102 The Firm as a Subeconomy. (1999).
Cited: 58 times.

(10) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:1:p:1-25 The (1997).
Cited: 56 times.

(11) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:1-24 The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach. (1996).
Cited: 55 times.

(12) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:141-61 The Theory of the Firm Revisited. (1988).
Cited: 54 times.

(13) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:2:p:387-409 Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach. (1997).
Cited: 53 times.

(14) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:407-26 The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy. (1994).
Cited: 48 times.

(15) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:2:p:279-303 Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards. (1986).
Cited: 47 times.

(16) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:84-105 Privatization and Incentives. (1991).
Cited: 46 times.

(17) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:2:p:381-409 Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency. (1990).
Cited: 44 times.

(18) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:1:y:1985:i:1:p:101-24 Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition. (1985).
Cited: 44 times.

(19) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:22:y:2006:i:2:p:366-413 Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms Market Values? Evidence from Korea (2006).
Cited: 43 times.

(20) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:56-73 Informal Authority in Organizations. (1999).
Cited: 42 times.

(21) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:1:p:119-140 Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments (2003).
Cited: 41 times.

(22) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:205-26 Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History. (1995).
Cited: 41 times.

(23) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:2:p:321-45 Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective. (1992).
Cited: 37 times.

(24) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:2:p:281-306 The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina (2003).
Cited: 36 times.

(25) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:334-64 The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment. (2000).
Cited: 36 times.

(26) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:1:p:1-32 The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement. (1986).
Cited: 34 times.

(27) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:25-61 The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier. (1996).
Cited: 33 times.

(28) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:1:p:1-25 The Costs of Organization. (1991).
Cited: 33 times.

(29) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:230-55 Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach. (1993).
Cited: 33 times.

(30) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:95-117 Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence. (1988).
Cited: 33 times.

(31) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:5:y:1989:i:1:p:109-26 Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry. (1989).
Cited: 31 times.

(32) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:365-94 On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias. (2000).
Cited: 31 times.

(33) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:1-49 A Theory of Legal Presumptions. (2000).
Cited: 29 times.

(34) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:1-31 The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development. (1995).
Cited: 29 times.

(35) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:2:p:201-28 Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form. (1991).
Cited: 28 times.

(36) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:306-42 Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective. (1999).
Cited: 27 times.

(37) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:0:p:213-53 Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story. (1990).
Cited: 27 times.

(38) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:205-29 Monopolization by Sequential Acquisition. (1993).
Cited: 26 times.

(39) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:199-213 Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited. (1988).
Cited: 26 times.

(40) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:2:p:428-454 An Experimental Bribery Game (2002).
Cited: 26 times.

(41) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:62-97 Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness. (1996).
Cited: 26 times.

(42) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:1:y:1985:i:2:p:225-83 Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle. (1985).
Cited: 25 times.

(43) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:14:y:1998:i:2:p:205-31 Why Dont More Households File for Bankruptcy? (1998).
Cited: 25 times.

(44) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:637-58 Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam. (1999).
Cited: 24 times.

(45) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:119-39 Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. (1988).
Cited: 24 times.

(46) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:362-78 Start-ups, Spin-offs, and Internal Projects. (1995).
Cited: 24 times.

(47) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:704-36 The Role of Risk in Contract Choice. (1999).
Cited: 24 times.

(48) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:659-84 Optimal Soft or Tough Bankruptcy Procedures. (1999).
Cited: 24 times.

(49) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:17:y:2001:i:2:p:413-48 Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives. (2001).
Cited: 23 times.

(50) RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:181-98 A Legal Basis for the Firm. (1988).
Cited: 23 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006

Recent citations received in: 2009

(1) RePEc:anr:reseco:v:1:y:2009:p:485-512 The Economics of Endangered Species (2009). Annual Review of Resource Economics

(2) RePEc:kap:revind:v:35:y:2009:i:1:p:1-18 Public–Private Agreements, Institutions, and Competition: When Economic Theory Meets Facts (2009). Review of Industrial Organization

(3) RePEc:kap:revind:v:35:y:2009:i:1:p:41-71 Multidimensionality and Renegotiation: Evidence from Transport-Sector Public-Private-Partnership Transactions in Latin America (2009). Review of Industrial Organization

(4) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15618 Insider Econometrics: Empirical Studies of How Management Matters (2009). NBER Working Papers

(5) RePEc:pra:mprapa:14368 On unilateral divorce and the selection of marriages hypothesis (2009). MPRA Paper

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:aah:aarhec:2008-16 Aligning Ambition and Incentives (2008). Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:ags:aaea08:6204 Statutory Rewards to Environmental Self-Auditing: Do They Reduce Pollution and Save Regulatory Costs? Evidence from a Cross-State Panel (2008). 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida

(3) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20060111 Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations (2008). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:emo:wp2003:0810 The Economics of Search Warrants (2008). Emory Economics

(5) RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:134:y:2008:i:3:p:247-254 Voting to anger and to please others (2008). Public Choice

(6) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14239 Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs (2008). NBER Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:eti:dpaper:07030 Does Corporate Culture Matter? An Empirical Study on Japanese Firms (2007). Discussion papers

(2) RePEc:ide:wpaper:7804 The Market for Lawyers: The Value of Information on the Quality of Legal Services. (2007). IDEI Working Papers

(3) RePEc:kap:expeco:v:10:y:2007:i:4:p:439-454 Amended final-offer arbitration over an uncertain value: A comparison with CA and FOA (2007). Experimental Economics

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_575_1065 Limpact des politiques répressives sur loffre de drogues illicites. Une revue de la littérature théorique (2006). Revue économique

(2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1673 Evaluation of Researchers: A Life Cycle Analysis of German Academic Economists (2006). CESifo Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1847 Should Courts always Enforce what Contracting Parties Write? (2006). CESifo Working Paper Series

(4) RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~06-06-07 Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (2006). Working Papers

(5) RePEc:hwe:certdp:0605 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Ukraine (2006). CERT Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:knz:hetero:0608 Evaluation of researchers : a life cycle analysis of German academic economists (2006). Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor

(7) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12209 Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups Participation in Policy Making - A Selective Survey (2006). NBER Working Papers

(8) RePEc:pen:papers:06-024 Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write? (2006). PIER Working Paper Archive

(9) RePEc:pra:mprapa:1550 The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence (2006). MPRA Paper

(10) RePEc:qed:wpaper:1107 Work-Related Perks, Agency Problems, and Optimal Incentive Contracts (2006). Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.