Most cited documents in this series:

Year	Title	Cited
2002	Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:frontiers.1:y:2002:i:1:n:1 [Citation Analysis]	54
2003	Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.3:y:2003:i:1:n:4 [Citation Analysis]	34
2001	Bilateral Trade and Opportunism in a Matching Market RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.1:y:2001:i:1:n:3 [Citation Analysis]	26
2003	Rationalization and Incomplete Information RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.3:y:2003:i:1:n:3 [Citation Analysis]	23
2001	Genericity with Infinitely Many Parameters RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.1:y:2001:i:1:n:1 [Citation Analysis]	19
2008	Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial Markets RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:24 [Citation Analysis]	19
2003	Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.3:y:2003:i:1:n:5 [Citation Analysis]	14
2003	Homothetic or Cobb-Douglas Behavior Through Aggregation RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.3:y:2003:i:1:n:8 [Citation Analysis]	14
2003	Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.3:y:2003:i:1:n:6 [Citation Analysis]	13
2004	Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.4:y:2004:i:1:n:8 [Citation Analysis]	11
2002	Spontaneous Market Emergence RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.2:y:2002:i:1:n:2 [Citation Analysis]	11
2002	Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.2:y:2002:i:1:n:2 [Citation Analysis]	11
2001	Incentives and Coordination in Hierarchies RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.1:y:2001:i:1:n:4 [Citation Analysis]	11
2008	A Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased Decision Making RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:6 [Citation Analysis]	11
2009	Temptations in General Settings RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:31 [Citation Analysis]	11
2002	Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.2:y:2002:i:1:n:3 [Citation Analysis]	10
2004	Patent Renewal Fees and Self-Funding Patent Offices RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.4:y:2004:i:1:n:6 [Citation Analysis]	10
2004	Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.4:y:2004:i:1:n:1 [Citation Analysis]	9
2005	On the Welfare Evaluation of Income and Opportunity RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.5:y:2005:i:1:n:3 [Citation Analysis]	9
2005	Denial of Death and Economic Behavior RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.5:y:2005:i:1:n:5 [Citation Analysis]	8
2005	On the Right-of-First-Refusal RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.5:y:2005:i:1:n:4 [Citation Analysis]	6
2007	When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments? RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:27 [Citation Analysis]	6
2001	Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Interaction Games RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.1:y:2001:i:1:n:3 [Citation Analysis]	6
2007	Relating Network Structure to Diffusion Properties through Stochastic Dominance RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:6 [Citation Analysis]	6
2006	Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.6:y:2006:i:1:n:7 [Citation Analysis]	5
2003	Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.3:y:2003:i:1:n:7 [Citation Analysis]	5
2010	Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:9 [Citation Analysis]	5
2003	Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.2:y:2003:i:1:n:5 [Citation Analysis]	5
2002	Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.2:y:2002:i:1:n:2 [Citation Analysis]	4
2003	Market Research and Market Design RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.3:y:2003:i:1:n:5 [Citation Analysis]	4
2002	Local Conventions RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.2:y:2002:i:1:n:1 [Citation Analysis]	4
2007	Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:23 [Citation Analysis]	4
2009	Supply Theory sans Profit Maximization RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:26 [Citation Analysis]	4
2005	Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.5:y:2005:i:1:n:4 [Citation Analysis]	4
2006	Party Competition under Private and Public Financing: A Comparison of Institutions RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.6:y:2006:i:1:n:2 [Citation Analysis]	4
2003	Non-robustness of some economic models RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.3:y:2003:i:1:n:1 [Citation Analysis]	3
2009	Asymmetric Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly and Mergers RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:22 [Citation Analysis]	3
2004	Players With Limited Memory RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.4:y:2004:i:1:n:6 [Citation Analysis]	3
2006	The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.6:y:2006:i:1:n:8 [Citation Analysis]	3
2007	First-Degree Discrimination by a Duopoly: Pricing and Quality Choice RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:14 [Citation Analysis]	3
2004	A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.4:y:2004:i:1:n:3 [Citation Analysis]	3
2006	Age Bias in Fiscal Policy: Why Does the Political Process Favor the Elderly? RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.6:y:2006:i:1:n:11 [Citation Analysis]	3
2006	A Vague Theory of Choice over Time RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.6:y:2006:i:1:n:6 [Citation Analysis]	3
2006	Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Cournot Model with Demand Uncertainty RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.6:y:2006:i:1:n:19 [Citation Analysis]	2
2008	Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:18 [Citation Analysis]	2
2009	Continuous Preferences and Discontinuous Choices: How Altruists Respond to Incentives RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:14 [Citation Analysis]	2
2006	The Emergence of a Price System from Decentralized Bilateral Exchange RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.6:y:2006:i:1:n:13 [Citation Analysis]	2
2009	Identifying Community Structures from Network Data via Maximum Likelihood Methods RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:30 [Citation Analysis]	2
2001	Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.1:y:2001:i:1:n:2 [Citation Analysis]	2
2006	Special Interest Politics and Endogenous Lobby Formation RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.6:y:2006:i:1:n:1 [Citation Analysis]	2

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 16:

Year	Title	See
2010	Securitization and Compensation in Financial Institutions RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8089	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Contract enforcement, litigation, and economic development RePEc:pra:mprapa:27501	[Citation Analysis]
2010	International Trade, Factor Mobility and the Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000051	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Identity and Fragmentation in Networks RePEc:pra:mprapa:21632	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Trade Liberalization and Welfare Inequality: a Demand-Based Approach RePEc:pra:mprapa:20199	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Trade Liberalization and Welfare Inequality: a Demand-Based Approach RePEc:lmu:muenec:11492	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in an almost symmetric oligopoly RePEc:pra:mprapa:24228	[Citation Analysis]
2010	An optimal Voting System when Voting is costly RePEc:pra:mprapa:29123	[Citation Analysis]
2010	The Plight of Mixed Race Adolescents RePEc:pra:mprapa:23099	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Identification, screening and stereotyping in labour market discrimination RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:99:y:2010:i:2:p:141-171	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Social choice among complex objects RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2010/02	[Citation Analysis]
2010	The testable implications of competitive equilibrium in economies with externalities RePEc:spr:joecth:v:45:y:2010:i:1:p:349-378	[Citation Analysis]
2010	The use of indicators for unobservable product qualities: inferences based on consumer sorting RePEc:pra:mprapa:28409	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre–Project Planning RePEc:trf:wpaper:303	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Estimating a Structural Model of Herd Behavior in Financial Markets RePEc:imf:imfwpa:10/288	[Citation Analysis]
2010	The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing RePEc:ads:wpaper:0092	[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY