Most cited documents in this series:

Year	Title	Cited
1981	Generalized gini inequality indices RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:1:y:1981:i:4:p:409-430 [Citation Analysis]	69
2003	Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:45:y:2003:i:3:p:249-297 [Citation Analysis]	65
1982	A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:2:y:1982:i:4:p:345-371 [Citation Analysis]	50
1990	Intermediate inequality: concepts, indices, and welfare implications RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:19:y:1990:i:2:p:117-134 [Citation Analysis]	41
1983	A new index of poverty RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:6:y:1983:i:3:p:307-313 [Citation Analysis]	37
2001	The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:42:y:2001:i:3:p:307-328 [Citation Analysis]	36
1995	Redistribution mechanisms based on individual characteristics RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:29:y:1995:i:1:p:1-17 [Citation Analysis]	33
1982	Cores of partitioning games RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:3:y:1982:i:4:p:313-327 [Citation Analysis]	30
1990	Silicon Valley locational clusters: when do increasing returns imply monopoly? RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:19:y:1990:i:3:p:235-251 [Citation Analysis]	28
1986	The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:12:y:1986:i:2:p:105-137 [Citation Analysis]	25
2005	Nash networks with heterogeneous links RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:2:p:181-201 [Citation Analysis]	25
1989	A Tiebout theorem RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:33-55 [Citation Analysis]	22
2001	Numerical measures of segregation: desirable properties and their implications RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:42:y:2001:i:1:p:13-29 [Citation Analysis]	21
1991	Properties of a measure of predictive success RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:21:y:1991:i:2:p:153-167 [Citation Analysis]	20
1995	On Additive Methods to Share Joint Costs. RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:30:y:1995:i:1:p:98-99 [Citation Analysis]	18
1992	Bargaining problems with claims RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:24:y:1992:i:1:p:19-33 [Citation Analysis]	18
1984	Dominance solvability and cournot stability RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:7:y:1984:i:1:p:83-102 [Citation Analysis]	18
1981	The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:1:y:1981:i:3:p:235-267 [Citation Analysis]	18
1983	Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:5:y:1983:i:3:p:269-363 [Citation Analysis]	18
1982	Single-peaked orders on a tree RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:3:y:1982:i:4:p:389-396 [Citation Analysis]	17
2004	The Talmud rule and the securement of agents awards RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:245-257 [Citation Analysis]	17
2002	Opportunity egalitarianism and income inequality RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:44:y:2002:i:1:p:45-64 [Citation Analysis]	17
1993	The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:26:y:1993:i:3:p:287-297 [Citation Analysis]	16
1988	The proportional solution for rights problems RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:15:y:1988:i:3:p:231-246 [Citation Analysis]	16
2000	On diversity and freedom of choice RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:40:y:2000:i:2:p:123-130 [Citation Analysis]	16
1998	Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:35:y:1998:i:2:p:203-218 [Citation Analysis]	16
2003	Coalition formation games with separable preferences RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:45:y:2003:i:1:p:27-52 [Citation Analysis]	15
1999	Individual rights and collective responsibility: the rights-egalitarian solution RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:37:y:1999:i:1:p:59-77 [Citation Analysis]	15
1998	Intertemporal objective functions: Strong pareto versus anonymity RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:35:y:1998:i:1:p:37-55 [Citation Analysis]	14
1994	Comparative statics for aggregative games the strong concavity case RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:28:y:1994:i:3:p:151-165 [Citation Analysis]	14
1993	Relative income, aspiration, environmental quality, individual and political myopia : Why may the rat-race for material growth be welfare-reducing? RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:26:y:1993:i:1:p:3-23 [Citation Analysis]	14
1999	Capacities and probabilistic beliefs: a precarious coexistence RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:38:y:1999:i:2:p:197-213 [Citation Analysis]	14
2004	Responsibility sensitive egalitarianism and optimal linear income taxation RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:48:y:2004:i:2:p:151-182 [Citation Analysis]	14
1996	Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The No Envy approach to compensation RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:32:y:1996:i:1:p:71-93 [Citation Analysis]	13
2003	On coalition formation: durable coalition structures RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:45:y:2003:i:2:p:185-203 [Citation Analysis]	13
1998	Ranking opportunity profiles on the basis of the common opportunities RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:35:y:1998:i:3:p:273-289 [Citation Analysis]	13
1999	Buying several indivisible goods RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:37:y:1999:i:1:p:1-23 [Citation Analysis]	12
2000	Potential maximizers and network formation RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:39:y:2000:i:1:p:55-70 [Citation Analysis]	12
1985	Statistical issues in measurement RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:10:y:1985:i:2:p:131-153 [Citation Analysis]	12
1998	Serial cost sharing methods for multi-commodity situations RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:36:y:1998:i:3:p:229-242 [Citation Analysis]	12
1994	The area monotonic solution to the cooperative bargaining problem RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:28:y:1994:i:2:p:133-142 [Citation Analysis]	11
1991	Segregation curves, Lorenz curves, and inequality in the distribution of people across occupations RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:21:y:1991:i:1:p:31-51 [Citation Analysis]	11
2004	A group bargaining solution RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:48:y:2004:i:1:p:37-53 [Citation Analysis]	11
1990	Arrowian characterizations of latticial federation consensus functions RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:20:y:1990:i:1:p:51-71 [Citation Analysis]	10
1999	Choice functions and abstract convex geometries RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:38:y:1999:i:1:p:35-44 [Citation Analysis]	10
1987	Redistributive properties of progressive taxation RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:14:y:1987:i:2:p:185-191 [Citation Analysis]	10
1995	The Geographic Foundations of Industrial Performance. RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:30:y:1995:i:3:p:319-320 [Citation Analysis]	10
1983	Paternalism, buyers and sellers market RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:6:y:1983:i:2:p:153-169 [Citation Analysis]	10
1988	Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:15:y:1988:i:1:p:11-27 [Citation Analysis]	10
1989	A noncooperative justification for egalitarian surplus sharing RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:17:y:1989:i:3:p:245-261 [Citation Analysis]	10

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 17:

Year	Title	See
2010	Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation. RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10093	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00544134	[Citation Analysis]
2010	On the existence of most-preferred alternatives in complete lattices RePEc:pra:mprapa:27504	[Citation Analysis]
2010	On the number of blocks required to access the core RePEc:pra:mprapa:26578	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:34:y:2010:i:2:p:193-216	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Expected utility theory under non-classical uncertainty RePEc:kap:theord:v:68:y:2010:i:1:p:25-47	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Endogenous preferences in games with type indeterminate players RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00564895	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry RePEc:spr:joecth:v:42:y:2010:i:3:p:523-538	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Another characterization of the Owen value without the additivity axiom RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:4:p:523-536	[Citation Analysis]
2010	The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure RePEc:eee:ejores:v:207:y:2010:i:2:p:795-806	[Citation Analysis]
2010	A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:34:y:2010:i:4:p:597-609	[Citation Analysis]
2010	On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:4:p:513-527	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Hierarchies achievable in simple games RePEc:kap:theord:v:68:y:2010:i:4:p:393-404	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Licensing a Vertical Product Innovation RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:86:y:2010:i:275:p:517-527	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being RePEc:pra:mprapa:25224	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information RePEc:eth:wpswif:10-136	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Benfords Law As an Instrument for Fraud Detection in Surveys Using the Data of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) RePEc:diw:diwsop:diw_sp273	[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY