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  Updated Jun, 1 2012 364.619 documents processed, 8.178.370 references and 3.213.942 citations

 

  
 

International Journal of Game Theory / Springer Economics Journals

Raw citation data, Main indicators, Most cited papers , cites used to compute the impact factor (2010), Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19900.092012246010.050.04
19910.060.09224849300.05
19920.070.084117842300.04
19930.050.0935135633020.060.05
19940.120.12077769010.050.05
19950.050.122510555300.06
19960.040.1630211452020.070.08
19970.240.210551300.08
19980.230.22814683070100.120.09
19990.150.28352128112020.060.13
20000.440.373110011651070.230.16
20010.390.38291236626050.170.16
20020.220.4130506013020.070.2
20030.170.4328645910050.180.2
20040.160.492861589030.110.22
20050.290.5228695616080.290.24
20060.30.542124561711.8100.240.23
20070.30.42416270219.540.10.19
20080.40.4336578333090.250.21
20090.320.4336167725410.030.19
20100.170.36472172128.310.020.15
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y

 

Main indicators

Most cited documents in this series:
YearTitleCited
1998The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:379-401 [Citation Analysis]		81
1998Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:269-299 [Citation Analysis]		79
1990Evolutionary Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1990:i:1:p:59-89 [Citation Analysis]		59
1986On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:15:y:1986:i:3:p:187-200 [Citation Analysis]		51
1996On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:289-301 [Citation Analysis]		50
1993Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:2:p:171-98 [Citation Analysis]		42
1995An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:4:p:323-44 [Citation Analysis]		40
1998Link formation in cooperative situations
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:245-256 [Citation Analysis]		39
1992Games with Permission Structures: The Conjunctive Approach.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:277-93 [Citation Analysis]		37
1998Population uncertainty and Poisson games
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:3:p:375-392 [Citation Analysis]		30
2006Unequal connections
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:3:p:319-349 [Citation Analysis]		30
1989A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:273-91 [Citation Analysis]		29
1999Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:131-152 [Citation Analysis]		28
1999Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:3:p:263-300 [Citation Analysis]		27
1998Ternary Voting Games
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:335-351 [Citation Analysis]		23
1996Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:303-27 [Citation Analysis]		23
2000Loss aversion equilibrium
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:269-287 [Citation Analysis]		23
1988An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:17:y:1988:i:2:p:89-99 [Citation Analysis]		23
1998An Axiomatization of the Disjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Permission Structure
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:27-43 [Citation Analysis]		23
1992The Shapley Value for Cooperative Games under Precedence Constraints.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:3:p:249-66 [Citation Analysis]		22
1996Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:385-406 [Citation Analysis]		22
1989The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:4:p:389-407 [Citation Analysis]		22
1994Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:75-83 [Citation Analysis]		21
2005A characterization of the position value*
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:4:p:505-514 [Citation Analysis]		21
1992Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:419-27 [Citation Analysis]		21
1996The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:245-58 [Citation Analysis]		21
1999Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:4:p:511-520 [Citation Analysis]		19
1999Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:53-68 [Citation Analysis]		18
1989A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:37-44 [Citation Analysis]		18
1998Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:223-227 [Citation Analysis]		18
1989Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:57-89 [Citation Analysis]		17
1992Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:393-418 [Citation Analysis]		17
1989A Value for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:2:p:227-40 [Citation Analysis]		16
2001Assignment games with stable core
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:177-185 [Citation Analysis]		16
2001When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2001:i:4:p:495-515 [Citation Analysis]		16
1998Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:3:p:427-441 [Citation Analysis]		16
1996Mediated Talk.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:177-88 [Citation Analysis]		16
1994Collusion Properties of Values.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:3:p:261-81 [Citation Analysis]		16
2001Stability in coalition formation games
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2001:i:4:p:487-494 [Citation Analysis]		15
1998The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:61-73 [Citation Analysis]		15
1998On implementation via demand commitment games
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:161-189 [Citation Analysis]		14
1991On the Convexity of Communication Games.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1991:i:4:p:421-30 [Citation Analysis]		14
2000The selectope for cooperative games
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:23-38 [Citation Analysis]		14
1996The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:1:p:13-34 [Citation Analysis]		13
1989On Equilibria in Repeated Games with Absorbing States.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:293-310 [Citation Analysis]		13
1999Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:241-252 [Citation Analysis]		13
1992Monotonicity and Dummy Free Property for Multi-choice Cooperative Games.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:3:p:301-12 [Citation Analysis]		13
2001Inferior players in simple games
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:209-220 [Citation Analysis]		13
1999How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:3:p:409-434 [Citation Analysis]		13
1992On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring.
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:211-26 [Citation Analysis]		13

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 12:
YearTitleSee
2010Generosity in bargaining: Fair or fear?
RePEc:pra:mprapa:27444		[Citation Analysis]
2010Consistency and dynamic approach of indexes
RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:34:y:2010:i:4:p:679-694		[Citation Analysis]
2010Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:3:p:503-510		[Citation Analysis]
2010An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method
RePEc:mtl:montec:01-2010		[Citation Analysis]
2010Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm
RePEc:pra:mprapa:22704		[Citation Analysis]
2010The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3211		[Citation Analysis]
2010Where strategic and evolutionary stability depart - a study of minimal diversity games
RePEc:exe:wpaper:1001		[Citation Analysis]
2010The Boston School-Choice Mechanism
RePEc:boc:bocoec:729		[Citation Analysis]
2010Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests
RePEc:bge:wpaper:479		[Citation Analysis]
2010Computation of Nash equilibria in finite games: introduction to the symposium
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:42:y:2010:i:1:p:1-7		[Citation Analysis]
2010Computing uniformly optimal strategies in two-player stochastic games
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:42:y:2010:i:1:p:237-253		[Citation Analysis]
2010Markovian assignment rules
RePEc:emx:ceedoc:2010-18		[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY

Recent citations received in: 2010

YearTitleSee
2010On the coincidence between the Shimomuras bargaining sets and the core
RePEc:bar:bedcje:2010241		[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2009

YearTitleSee
2009Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:39:y:2009:i:3:p:461-471		[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2008

YearTitleSee
2008The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2378		[Citation Analysis]
2008The Relationship Between Classical and Quantum Correlation in Games
RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002312		[Citation Analysis]
2008Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets
RePEc:dgr:umamet:2008010		[Citation Analysis]
2008Markovian assignment rules
RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00356304		[Citation Analysis]
2008On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3862		[Citation Analysis]
2008On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14502		[Citation Analysis]
2008The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule for Combinatorial Auctions
RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08qcspr		[Citation Analysis]
2008The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:333-352		[Citation Analysis]
2008Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets
RePEc:uct:uconnp:2008-29		[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2007

YearTitleSee
2007The Key Party in the Catalan Government
RePEc:aub:autbar:681.07		[Citation Analysis]
2007A Vertex Oriented Approach to Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems
RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200789		[Citation Analysis]
2007Conformism and Cooperation in a Local Interaction Model
RePEc:pra:mprapa:4051		[Citation Analysis]
2007Dissection of solutions in cooperative game theory using representation techniques
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2007:i:3:p:395-426		[Citation Analysis]

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.
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