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  Updated Jun, 1 2012 364.619 documents processed, 8.178.370 references and 3.213.942 citations

 

 
 

Review of Economic Design / Springer Economics Journals

Raw citation data, Main indicators, Most cited papers , cites used to compute the impact factor (2010), Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19900.090000.04
19910.090000.05
19920.080000.04
19930.090000.05
19940.122690010.050.05
19950.140.12022300.06
19960.140.16194122333.320.110.08
19970.216261900.08
19980.120.22165425300.09
19990.230.282292225020.090.13
20000.210.37181538800.16
20010.20.3813240800.16
20020.41244631010.040.2
20030.050.432045372080.40.2
20040.320.4911224414030.270.22
20050.390.5216183112010.060.24
20060.070.51519272020.130.23
20070.260.421836318030.170.19
20080.060.43217332020.10.21
20090.180.4323239700.19
20100.090.361810444010.060.15
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y

 

Main indicators

Most cited documents in this series:
YearTitleCited
1994Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:173-203 [Citation Analysis]
36
1999Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:35-55 [Citation Analysis]
21
2003Optimal two-object auctions with synergies
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:143-164 [Citation Analysis]
20
1994Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:1-14 [Citation Analysis]
19
1996On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:193-209 [Citation Analysis]
16
1999Monotonic extensions on economic domains
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:13-33 [Citation Analysis]
14
1998Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:371-387 [Citation Analysis]
13
2002Achieving the first best in sequencing problems
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:75-91 [Citation Analysis]
10
1997Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:29-43 [Citation Analysis]
10
1999Feasible implementation of taxation methods
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:57-72 [Citation Analysis]
10
2004Link bidding in laboratory networks
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:359-372 [Citation Analysis]
9
1998Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:137-147 [Citation Analysis]
9
2004Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:383-411 [Citation Analysis]
9
2007Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:101-124 [Citation Analysis]
8
1997Redistribution and individual characteristics
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:45-55 [Citation Analysis]
8
1999Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:255-272 [Citation Analysis]
8
2006Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:3:p:183-203 [Citation Analysis]
7
1998A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:237-255 [Citation Analysis]
7
1994Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:275-287 [Citation Analysis]
7
2002Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:27-43 [Citation Analysis]
7
1998The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Efficient networks
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:93-127 [Citation Analysis]
6
1999A profit-center game with incomplete information
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:307-343 [Citation Analysis]
6
2000original papers : Spatial social networks
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:3:p:273-299 [Citation Analysis]
6
2002First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:461-480 [Citation Analysis]
6
2007The theory of contests: a survey
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:69-100 [Citation Analysis]
6
2002How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:45-56 [Citation Analysis]
6
1999Organizational restructuring in response to changes in information-processing technology
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:295-305 [Citation Analysis]
6
2003Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:205-215 [Citation Analysis]
6
2007The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:165-174 [Citation Analysis]
6
1998Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:257-269 [Citation Analysis]
5
2002Trust and social efficiencies
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:413-428 [Citation Analysis]
5
1998Managerial costs for one-shot decentralized information processing
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:329-345 [Citation Analysis]
5
2006New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:73-84 [Citation Analysis]
5
1999Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:357-379 [Citation Analysis]
5
2003Optimal design of trade institutions
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:3:p:269-292 [Citation Analysis]
5
1997Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:75-89 [Citation Analysis]
5
2005The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:2:p:145-166 [Citation Analysis]
4
1999Decision-making under risk: Editing procedures based on correlated similarities, and preference overdetermination
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:1-12 [Citation Analysis]
4
1999A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:219-230 [Citation Analysis]
4
1996Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:147-162 [Citation Analysis]
4
1996Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:379-397 [Citation Analysis]
4
1999Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:381-387 [Citation Analysis]
4
1998On durable goods monopolies and the Coase-Conjecture
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:215-236 [Citation Analysis]
4
2002Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:371-396 [Citation Analysis]
4
2005Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:4:p:377-396 [Citation Analysis]
4
1996A continuous double implementation of the constrained Walras equilibrium
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:89-97 [Citation Analysis]
4
2005The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:2:p:73-90 [Citation Analysis]
4
2007The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:3:p:199-216 [Citation Analysis]
4
1998On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:303-328 [Citation Analysis]
3
2006Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:113-142 [Citation Analysis]
3

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 4:
YearTitleSee
2010Aspects of Bureaucratic Corruption
RePEc:swe:wpaper:2010-14
[Citation Analysis]
2010Revenue Maximization in the Dynamic Knapsack Problem
RePEc:huj:dispap:dp544
[Citation Analysis]
2010Competing Auction Houses
RePEc:kse:dpaper:17
[Citation Analysis]
2010Exclusive Nightclubs and Lonely Hearts Columns: Non-monotone Participation in Optional Intermediation
RePEc:edn:esedps:196
[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY

Recent citations received in: 2010

YearTitleSee
2010From Assortative to Dissortative Networks: The Role of Capacity Constraints
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8052
[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2009

YearTitleSee

Recent citations received in: 2008

YearTitleSee
2008Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses
RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1472
[Citation Analysis]
2008Regulating a Monopolist with unknown costs and unknown quality capacity
RePEc:wrk:warwec:858
[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2007

YearTitleSee
2007ALL-PAY AUCTION EQUILIBRIA IN CONTESTS
RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2007-27
[Citation Analysis]
2007Fair and efficient student placement with couples
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:2:p:177-207
[Citation Analysis]
2007The theory of contests: a survey
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:69-100
[Citation Analysis]

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

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