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  Updated Jun, 1 2012 364.619 documents processed, 8.178.370 references and 3.213.942 citations

 

 
 

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) / World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Raw citation data, Main indicators, Most cited papers , cites used to compute the impact factor (2010), Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19900.090000.04
19910.090000.05
19920.080000.04
19930.090000.05
19940.10000.05
19950.120000.06
19960.160000.08
19970.210000.08
19980.220000.09
19990.280000.13
20000.370000.16
20010.380000.16
20020.410000.2
20030.430000.2
20040.490000.22
20050.523316000.24
20060.5461533010.020.23
20070.040.424731793030.060.19
20080.080.433518937010.030.21
20090.130.43358821100.19
20100.030.3631370200.15
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y

 

Main indicators

Most cited documents in this series:
YearTitleCited
2007THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:353-360 [Citation Analysis]
8
2005AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:63-72 [Citation Analysis]
7
2008COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:257-278 [Citation Analysis]
4
2007MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:307-322 [Citation Analysis]
4
2008DETERMINISTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES UNDER PROBABILITY KNOWLEDGE OF INITIAL CONDITION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:01:p:1-16 [Citation Analysis]
4
2009A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:02:p:207-214 [Citation Analysis]
4
2007BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:105-118 [Citation Analysis]
4
2007TRANSFORMING GAMES FROM CHARACTERISTIC INTO NORMAL FORM
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:87-104 [Citation Analysis]
3
2008FRIENDLINESS AND RECIPROCITY IN EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:01:p:53-72 [Citation Analysis]
3
2006PROPORTIONALITY AND NON-MANIPULABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:127-139 [Citation Analysis]
3
2005HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:p:211-228 [Citation Analysis]
3
2007ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:667-688 [Citation Analysis]
3
2006GLOBAL BIFURCATIONS IN DUOPOLY WHEN THE COURNOT POINT IS DESTABILIZED VIA A SUBCRITICAL NEIMARK BIFURCATION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:1-20 [Citation Analysis]
3
2008ORDINAL GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:02:p:177-194 [Citation Analysis]
3
2010ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION, WAR OF ATTRITION AND INVESTMENT GRANTS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:01:p:37-59 [Citation Analysis]
3
2005CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:43-61 [Citation Analysis]
2
2009UNIQUENESS IN RANDOM-PROPOSER MULTILATERAL BARGAINING
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:04:p:407-417 [Citation Analysis]
2
2006RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:67-93 [Citation Analysis]
2
2007EFFECTIVENESS OF COOP ADVERTISING PROGRAMS IN COMPETITIVE DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:151-167 [Citation Analysis]
2
2007NETWORK FORMATION UNDER HETEROGENEOUS COSTS: THE MULTIPLE GROUP MODEL
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:599-635 [Citation Analysis]
2
2008MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:02:p:145-164 [Citation Analysis]
1
2006HERDING WITH COSTLY INFORMATION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:21-31 [Citation Analysis]
1
2007THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING IN A DUOPOLY GAME
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:565-581 [Citation Analysis]
1
2005SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:p:395-406 [Citation Analysis]
1
2006AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT AFTER DIVORCE
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:561-579 [Citation Analysis]
1
2005CONVEXITY IN STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE SITUATIONS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:25-42 [Citation Analysis]
1
2009A LOCATION GAME ON DISJOINT CIRCLES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:04:p:391-406 [Citation Analysis]
1
2007EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTIONS IN COALITIONAL MODELS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:47-57 [Citation Analysis]
1
2007A NOTE ON LUENBERGERS ZERO-MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR CORE ALLOCATIONS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:03:p:453-460 [Citation Analysis]
1
2008CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SYMMETRIC POTENTIAL GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:245-256 [Citation Analysis]
1
2006THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:03:p:499-514 [Citation Analysis]
1
2007ON BARGAINING SETS IN SYMMETRIC GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:199-213 [Citation Analysis]
1
2005A NOTE ON REPEATED GAMES WITH VANISHING ACTIONS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:107-115 [Citation Analysis]
1
2006COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:111-126 [Citation Analysis]
1
2007THE CONSENSUS VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:03:p:437-452 [Citation Analysis]
1
2005DEADLINE EFFECTS IN SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING — AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:p:117-135 [Citation Analysis]
1
2008COMPETING FOR ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION IN AN IRREVERSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE PROBLEM: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:229-243 [Citation Analysis]
1
2006GUARANTEED INERTIA FUNCTIONS IN DYNAMICAL GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:02:p:185-218 [Citation Analysis]
1
2007A REFINEMENT CONCEPT FOR EQUILIBRIA IN MULTICRITERIA GAMES VIA STABLE SCALARIZATIONS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:169-181 [Citation Analysis]
1
2009SPATIAL OLIGOPOLIES WITH COOPERATIVE DISTRIBUTION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:01:p:33-40 [Citation Analysis]
1
2006A ONE-SHOT PRISONERS DILEMMA WITH PROCEDURAL UTILITY
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:655-668 [Citation Analysis]
1
2005LINK MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:p:473-489 [Citation Analysis]
1
2008COALITION FORMATION IN STRADDLING STOCK FISHERIES: A PARTITION FUNCTION APPROACH
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:303-317 [Citation Analysis]
1
2006BIDDER WELFARE IN AN AUCTION WITH A BUYOUT OPTION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:595-612 [Citation Analysis]
1
2007COMPETITIVE TAX EVASION AND TRANSFER PRICES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:347-351 [Citation Analysis]
1

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 2:
YearTitleSee
2010Difference between the position value and the Myerson value is due to the existence of coalition structures
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:4:p:669-675
[Citation Analysis]
2010Testing Value vs Waiting Value in Environmental Decisions under Uncertainty
RePEc:ler:wpaper:10.01.307
[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY

Recent citations received in: 2010

YearTitleSee

Recent citations received in: 2009

YearTitleSee

Recent citations received in: 2008

YearTitleSee
2008Structural Estimation and Solution of International Trade Models with Heterogeneous Firms
RePEc:eth:wpswif:08-89
[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2007

YearTitleSee
2007The Minority Game: An Economics Perspective
RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200753
[Citation Analysis]
2007Congestion, Equilibrium and Learning: The Minority Game
RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200761
[Citation Analysis]
2007Marginal contributions and externalities in the value
RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2007-04
[Citation Analysis]

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

Hosted by Valencian Economic Research Institute ©2012 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es