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  Updated February, 5 2013 465.484 documents processed, 11.198.332 references and 4.512.497 citations

 

 
 

Working Papers / Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Raw citation data, Main indicators, Most cited papers , cites used to compute the impact factor (2011), Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19900.0910100.04
19910.10200.05
19920.0910100.05
19930.10100.05
19940.1210100.04
19950.17102100.09
19960.090.214311100.09
19970.211452400.09
19980.040.222613281010.040.13
19990.20.2913540837.520.150.15
20000.030.43039100.15
20010.060.3881316110010.130.18
20020.270.411850113080.440.2
20030.150.4411326400.2
20040.10.465229300.2
20050.060.46161116110020.130.25
20060.290.499421616.710.110.22
20070.040.4291325100.19
20080.330.4314318633.30.19
20090.260.4171423616.730.180.19
20100.060.331611312010.060.16
20110.210.516733714.320.130.27
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
II: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y

 

Main indicators

Most cited documents in this series:
YearTitleCited
1973A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many
RePEc:bie:wpaper:008 [Citation Analysis]
22
2002Moral property rights in bargaining
RePEc:bie:wpaper:330 [Citation Analysis]
20
2002Power measurement as sensitivity analysis : a unified approach
RePEc:bie:wpaper:345 [Citation Analysis]
17
1974Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games
RePEc:bie:wpaper:023 [Citation Analysis]
14
2002Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes
RePEc:bie:wpaper:332 [Citation Analysis]
7
1974The Chain Store Paradox
RePEc:bie:wpaper:018 [Citation Analysis]
7
2007Do social preferences matter in competitive markets?
RePEc:bie:wpaper:392 [Citation Analysis]
6
2009Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals
RePEc:bie:wpaper:420 [Citation Analysis]
5
2007Network formation with closeness incentives
RePEc:bie:wpaper:395 [Citation Analysis]
5
1998The Positive Prekernel of a Cooperative Game
RePEc:bie:wpaper:292 [Citation Analysis]
4
1998Implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies
RePEc:bie:wpaper:301 [Citation Analysis]
4
2001The Pazner-Schmeidler Social Ordering: A Defense
RePEc:bie:wpaper:328 [Citation Analysis]
4
1999Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions
RePEc:bie:wpaper:308 [Citation Analysis]
4
2001Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?
RePEc:bie:wpaper:322 [Citation Analysis]
3
2001Game theory
RePEc:bie:wpaper:321 [Citation Analysis]
3
2010Product and Quality Innovations: An Optimal Control Approach
RePEc:bie:wpaper:439 [Citation Analysis]
3
1999A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution
RePEc:bie:wpaper:310 [Citation Analysis]
3
2003A General Strategy Proof Fair Allocation Mechanism
RePEc:bie:wpaper:346 [Citation Analysis]
3
2009An axiomatization of the Sequential Raiffa solution
RePEc:bie:wpaper:425 [Citation Analysis]
3
2005Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
RePEc:bie:wpaper:367 [Citation Analysis]
3
1998Adjusted Winner: An Algorithm for Implementing Bargaining Solutions in Multi-Issue Negotiations
RePEc:bie:wpaper:295 [Citation Analysis]
2
1997Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Drawback for a Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform
RePEc:bie:wpaper:274 [Citation Analysis]
2
2007On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
RePEc:bie:wpaper:393 [Citation Analysis]
2
1995Airport Problems and Consistent Solution Rules
RePEc:bie:wpaper:246 [Citation Analysis]
2
2010Financial markets with volatility uncertainty
RePEc:bie:wpaper:441 [Citation Analysis]
2
2010Optimal Stopping Under Ambiguity in Continuous Time
RePEc:bie:wpaper:429 [Citation Analysis]
2
2012The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
RePEc:bie:wpaper:466 [Citation Analysis]
2
2002Social Choice and Just Institutions: New Perspectives
RePEc:bie:wpaper:333 [Citation Analysis]
2
2011The Dynamics of Continuous Cultural Traits in Social Networks
RePEc:bie:wpaper:457 [Citation Analysis]
2
2008Under-connected and over-connected networks
RePEc:bie:wpaper:400 [Citation Analysis]
2
2011Competitive Outcomes and the Inner Core of NTU Market Games
RePEc:bie:wpaper:449 [Citation Analysis]
2
1998Supporting Cooperative Multi-Issue Negotiations
RePEc:bie:wpaper:299 [Citation Analysis]
2
2001A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games
RePEc:bie:wpaper:323 [Citation Analysis]
2
2009Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core
RePEc:bie:wpaper:417 [Citation Analysis]
2
2005Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?
RePEc:bie:wpaper:375 [Citation Analysis]
2
2002Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games
RePEc:bie:wpaper:331 [Citation Analysis]
2
1996A Further Extension of the KKMS Theorem
RePEc:bie:wpaper:251 [Citation Analysis]
2
2006Convex games versus clan games
RePEc:bie:wpaper:381 [Citation Analysis]
1
2009Irreversible investment in oligopoly
RePEc:bie:wpaper:415 [Citation Analysis]
1

repec:bie:wpaper:340 [Citation Analysis]
1
2010Representation of TU games by coalition production economies
RePEc:bie:wpaper:430 [Citation Analysis]
1
2005On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games
RePEc:bie:wpaper:374 [Citation Analysis]
1
2011The Strategic Use of Ambiguity
RePEc:bie:wpaper:452 [Citation Analysis]
1
1998Should High-Tax Countries Pursue Revenue-Neutral Ecological Tax Reforms?
RePEc:bie:wpaper:304 [Citation Analysis]
1
2004A superadditive solution
RePEc:bie:wpaper:361 [Citation Analysis]
1
2006Polluting technologies and sustainable economic development
RePEc:bie:wpaper:379 [Citation Analysis]
1
2009The Best Choice Problem under ambiguity
RePEc:bie:wpaper:413 [Citation Analysis]
1
2002How to cope with division problems under interval uncertainty of claims?
RePEc:bie:wpaper:339 [Citation Analysis]
1
1997The Selection of Mixed Strategies in 2x2 Bimatrix Games
RePEc:bie:wpaper:268 [Citation Analysis]
1
2005A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games
RePEc:bie:wpaper:373 [Citation Analysis]
1

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 7:
YearTitleSee
2011Endogenous specialization of heterogeneous innovative activities of firms under technological spillovers
RePEc:pra:mprapa:35424
[Citation Analysis]
2011Competitive Outcomes and the Core of TU Market Games
RePEc:bie:wpaper:454
[Citation Analysis]
2011Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests
RePEc:use:tkiwps:1125
[Citation Analysis]
2011Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension
RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:4:p:545-553
[Citation Analysis]
2011An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution
RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:77-83
[Citation Analysis]
2011Experimental comparison of compulsory and non compulsory arbitration mechanisms
RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00584328
[Citation Analysis]
2011On irreversible investment
RePEc:spr:finsto:v:15:y:2011:i:4:p:607-633
[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY

Recent citations received in: 2011

YearTitleSee
2011Inner Core, Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions and Competitive Payoffs
RePEc:bie:wpaper:453
[Citation Analysis]
2011Competitive Outcomes and the Core of TU Market Games
RePEc:bie:wpaper:454
[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2010

YearTitleSee
2010The Economics of Cultural Transmission and Socialization
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16512
[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2009

YearTitleSee
2009Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core
RePEc:bie:wpaper:417
[Citation Analysis]
2009Strong core equivalence theorem in an atomless economy with indivisible commodities
RePEc:bie:wpaper:418
[Citation Analysis]
2009Core allocations may not be Walras allocations in any large finite economy with indivisible commodities
RePEc:bie:wpaper:419
[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2008

YearTitleSee

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

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