Most cited documents in this series:

Year	Title	Cited
2002	Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:frontiers.1:y:2002:i:1:n:1 [Citation Analysis]	67
2003	Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.3:y:2003:i:1:n:4 [Citation Analysis]	43
2003	Rationalization and Incomplete Information RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.3:y:2003:i:1:n:3 [Citation Analysis]	33
2001	Bilateral Trade and Opportunism in a Matching Market RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.1:y:2001:i:1:n:3 [Citation Analysis]	27
2001	Genericity with Infinitely Many Parameters RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.1:y:2001:i:1:n:1 [Citation Analysis]	24
2008	Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial Markets RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:24 [Citation Analysis]	23
2003	Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.3:y:2003:i:1:n:6 [Citation Analysis]	19
2004	Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.4:y:2004:i:1:n:8 [Citation Analysis]	17
2004	Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.4:y:2004:i:1:n:1 [Citation Analysis]	16
2007	Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:23 [Citation Analysis]	15
2009	Temptations in General Settings RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:31 [Citation Analysis]	15
2002	Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.2:y:2002:i:1:n:2 [Citation Analysis]	15
2002	Spontaneous Market Emergence RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.2:y:2002:i:1:n:2 [Citation Analysis]	14
2002	Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.2:y:2002:i:1:n:3 [Citation Analysis]	14
2003	Homothetic or Cobb-Douglas Behavior Through Aggregation RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.3:y:2003:i:1:n:8 [Citation Analysis]	14
2001	Incentives and Coordination in Hierarchies RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.1:y:2001:i:1:n:4 [Citation Analysis]	14
2003	Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.3:y:2003:i:1:n:5 [Citation Analysis]	14
2005	On the Right-of-First-Refusal RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.5:y:2005:i:1:n:4 [Citation Analysis]	13
2008	A Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased Decision Making RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:6 [Citation Analysis]	13
2005	On the Welfare Evaluation of Income and Opportunity RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.5:y:2005:i:1:n:3 [Citation Analysis]	11
2002	Local Conventions RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.2:y:2002:i:1:n:1 [Citation Analysis]	10
2004	Patent Renewal Fees and Self-Funding Patent Offices RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.4:y:2004:i:1:n:6 [Citation Analysis]	10
2006	Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.6:y:2006:i:1:n:7 [Citation Analysis]	9
2007	Relating Network Structure to Diffusion Properties through Stochastic Dominance RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:6 [Citation Analysis]	8
2005	Denial of Death and Economic Behavior RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.5:y:2005:i:1:n:5 [Citation Analysis]	8
2010	Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:9 [Citation Analysis]	7
2003	Competitive Equilibria With Incomplete Markets and Endogenous Bankruptcy RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.3:y:2003:i:1:n:1 [Citation Analysis]	7
2003	Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.2:y:2003:i:1:n:5 [Citation Analysis]	7
2001	Reinforcement Learning in Repeated Interaction Games RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.1:y:2001:i:1:n:3 [Citation Analysis]	7
2001	Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.1:y:2001:i:1:n:2 [Citation Analysis]	6
2005	Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.5:y:2005:i:1:n:4 [Citation Analysis]	6
2007	When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments? RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:27 [Citation Analysis]	6
2006	The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.6:y:2006:i:1:n:8 [Citation Analysis]	6
2003	Market Research and Market Design RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.3:y:2003:i:1:n:5 [Citation Analysis]	5
2003	Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.3:y:2003:i:1:n:7 [Citation Analysis]	5
2006	Party Competition under Private and Public Financing: A Comparison of Institutions RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.6:y:2006:i:1:n:2 [Citation Analysis]	5
2007	Cross and Double Cross: Comparative Statics in First Price and All Pay Auctions RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:19 [Citation Analysis]	5
2005	Asymmetric Vertical Integration RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.5:y:2005:i:1:n:1 [Citation Analysis]	5
2006	A Vague Theory of Choice over Time RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.6:y:2006:i:1:n:6 [Citation Analysis]	5
2009	Supply Theory sans Profit Maximization RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:26 [Citation Analysis]	5
2002	Equilibrium Departures from Common Knowledge in Games with Non-Additive Expected Utility RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.2:y:2002:i:1:n:2 [Citation Analysis]	4
2009	Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:24 [Citation Analysis]	4
2006	General Option Exercise Rules, with Applications to Embedded Options and Monopolistic Expansion RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.6:y:2006:i:1:n:2 [Citation Analysis]	4
2009	Continuous Preferences and Discontinuous Choices: How Altruists Respond to Incentives RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:14 [Citation Analysis]	4
2004	A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.4:y:2004:i:1:n:3 [Citation Analysis]	4
2003	Non-robustness of some economic models RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.3:y:2003:i:1:n:1 [Citation Analysis]	4
2008	Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:8:y:2008:i:1:n:25 [Citation Analysis]	3
2007	Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set Bridges Time-Preferences to the Nash Solution RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:7:y:2007:i:1:n:41 [Citation Analysis]	3
2004	Players With Limited Memory RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:contributions.4:y:2004:i:1:n:6 [Citation Analysis]	3
2006	Status Concerns and Occupational Choice Under Uncertainty RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:advances.6:y:2006:i:1:n:4 [Citation Analysis]	3

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 30:

Year	Title	See
2011	Unilateral Competitive Effects of Mergers: Upward Pricing Pressure, Product Quality, and Other Extensions RePEc:kap:revind:v:39:y:2011:i:1:p:19-38	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Buy-it-now or Take-a-chance: A New Pricing Mechanism for Online Advertising RePEc:net:wpaper:1017	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Irreversible investment and R&D spillovers in a dynamic duopoly RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:7:p:1061-1090	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Credit Risk in General Equilibrium RePEc:onb:oenbwp:172	[Citation Analysis]
2011	The equilibrium set of economies with a continuous consumption space RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:2:p:137-142	[Citation Analysis]
2011	On optimal scarcity prices RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:5:p:589-605	[Citation Analysis]
2011	The Sound of One Hand Clapping: The 2010 Merger Guidelines and the Challenge of Judicial Adoption RePEc:kap:revind:v:39:y:2011:i:1:p:145-158	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Coordinated Effects in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines RePEc:kap:revind:v:39:y:2011:i:1:p:39-56	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines RePEc:kap:revind:v:39:y:2011:i:1:p:107-125	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Harm to Competition Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines RePEc:kap:revind:v:39:y:2011:i:1:p:3-18	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Single-product versus uniform SSNIPs RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:31:y:2011:i:2:p:142-146	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Merger simulations with observed diversion ratios RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:31:y:2011:i:2:p:83-91	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Default and Systemic Risk in Equilibrium RePEc:arx:papers:1108.1133	[Citation Analysis]
2011	A new equilibrium in the one-sided asymmetric information market with pairwise meetings RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:61:y:2011:i:3:p:152-156	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Team governance: Empowerment or hierarchical control RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:78:y:2011:i:1-2:p:1-13	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Career Concerns: A Human Capital Perspective RePEc:red:sed011:1274	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Do Bayesians learn their way out of ambiguity? RePEc:rza:wpaper:240	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Uncertainty averse preferences RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:4:p:1275-1330	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Regularity and Stability in Monotone Bayesian Games RePEc:oxf:wpaper:587	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Adaptive social learning RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00572528	[Citation Analysis]
2011	A model of consumption-dependent temptation RePEc:kap:theord:v:70:y:2011:i:1:p:83-93	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Temptation and Social Preference RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2011-040	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter? RePEc:pra:mprapa:30993	[Citation Analysis]
2011	The demand for income tax progressivity in the growth model RePEc:fip:fedcwp:1106	[Citation Analysis]
2011	On favoritism in auctions with entry RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:3:p:265-267	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Money is an Experience Good: Competition and Trust in the Private Provision of Money RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2011/24	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Contraction consistent stochastic choice correspondence RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:643-658	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Stochastic revealed preference and rationalizability RePEc:kap:theord:v:71:y:2011:i:4:p:575-592	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Default Penalty as a Selection Mechanism Among Multiple RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000060	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Why a clean politician supports dirty politics: A game-theoretical explanation for the persistence of political corruption RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:80:y:2011:i:3:p:498-510	[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY