Most cited documents in this series:

Year	Title	Cited
1995	The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:11:y:1995:i:02:p:227-253_00 [Citation Analysis]	84
2002	Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:18:y:2002:i:01:p:89-110_00 [Citation Analysis]	56
1995	Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome? RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:11:y:1995:i:01:p:25-55_00 [Citation Analysis]	36
1986	The Case for a Multiple-Utility Conception RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:2:y:1986:i:02:p:159-184_00 [Citation Analysis]	29
1987	Modeling Rational Players: Part I RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:3:y:1987:i:02:p:179-214_00 [Citation Analysis]	26
1996	Knowledge, Belief and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:12:y:1996:i:02:p:133-163_00 [Citation Analysis]	19
1991	The Market as a Creative Process RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:7:y:1991:i:02:p:167-186_00 [Citation Analysis]	18
2000	Team Preferences RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:16:y:2000:i:02:p:175-204_00 [Citation Analysis]	15
2009	THE AMBIGUITY AVERSION LITERATURE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:25:y:2009:i:03:p:249-284_99 [Citation Analysis]	15
2003	COMMON KNOWLEDGE, SALIENCE AND CONVENTION: A RECONSTRUCTION OF DAVID LEWIS GAME THEORY RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:19:y:2003:i:02:p:175-210_00 [Citation Analysis]	14
2008	FRATERNITY: WHY THE MARKET NEED NOT BE A MORALLY FREE ZONE RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:24:y:2008:i:01:p:35-64_00 [Citation Analysis]	14
1990	Private and Public Preferences RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:6:y:1990:i:01:p:1-26_00 [Citation Analysis]	14
1988	Modeling Rational Players: Part II RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:4:y:1988:i:01:p:9-55_00 [Citation Analysis]	13
1989	What Should We Do About Future Generations? RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:5:y:1989:i:02:p:235-253_00 [Citation Analysis]	13
1992	Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:8:y:1992:i:02:p:249-267_00 [Citation Analysis]	12
1989	A Methodological Assessment of Multiple Utility Frameworks RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:5:y:1989:i:02:p:189-208_00 [Citation Analysis]	12
1985	Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating some Categories of Economic Discourse RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:1:y:1985:i:01:p:7-21_00 [Citation Analysis]	12
1991	Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than Collective Choice? RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:7:y:1991:i:02:p:143-165_00 [Citation Analysis]	11
1990	Beyond Self-Interest and Altruism: A Reconstruction of Adam Smiths Theory of Human Conduct RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:6:y:1990:i:02:p:255-273_00 [Citation Analysis]	11
1991	Hayeks Theory of Cultural Evolution: An Evaluation in the Light of Vanbergs Critique RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:7:y:1991:i:01:p:67-82_00 [Citation Analysis]	11
1993	On the Foundations of Hysteresis in Economic Systems RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:9:y:1993:i:01:p:53-74_00 [Citation Analysis]	10
1998	Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:14:y:1998:i:02:p:283-306_00 [Citation Analysis]	10
2000	An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:16:y:2000:i:02:p:247-266_00 [Citation Analysis]	10
2000	Moral canals: trust and social capital in the work of Hume, Smith and Genovesi RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:16:y:2000:i:01:p:21-45_00 [Citation Analysis]	10
1994	Law as a Private Good: A Response to Tyler Cowen on the Economics of Anarchy RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:10:y:1994:i:02:p:319-327_00 [Citation Analysis]	9
1985	Weakness of Will and the Free-Rider Problem RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:1:y:1985:i:02:p:231-265_00 [Citation Analysis]	9
1990	Keynesian Uncertainty and the Weight of Arguments RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:6:y:1990:i:02:p:275-292_00 [Citation Analysis]	9
1992	Gender, Metaphor, and the Definition of Economics RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:8:y:1992:i:01:p:103-125_00 [Citation Analysis]	9
1997	Sacrificing the Patrol: Utilitarianism, Future Generations and Infinity RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:13:y:1997:i:02:p:159-174_00 [Citation Analysis]	9
1985	Liberty, Preference, and Choice RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:1:y:1985:i:02:p:213-229_00 [Citation Analysis]	9
2001	The impartial observer theorem of social ethics RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:17:y:2001:i:02:p:147-179_00 [Citation Analysis]	8
2008	NEUROECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMIC SCIENCES RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:24:y:2008:i:03:p:345-368_00 [Citation Analysis]	8
2007	STRATEGY-PROOF JUDGMENT AGGREGATION RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:23:y:2007:i:03:p:269-300_00 [Citation Analysis]	8
2008	NEUROECONOMICS: A CRITICAL RECONSIDERATION RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:24:y:2008:i:03:p:303-344_00 [Citation Analysis]	8
1997	The Logic of Belief Persistence RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:13:y:1997:i:01:p:39-59_00 [Citation Analysis]	8
1993	The Scope and Limits of Preference Sovereignty RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:9:y:1993:i:02:p:253-269_00 [Citation Analysis]	7
1986	Spontaneous Market Order and Social Rules RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:2:y:1986:i:01:p:75-100_00 [Citation Analysis]	7
2005	WHY EXACTLY IS COMMITMENT IMPORTANT FOR RATIONALITY? RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:21:y:2005:i:01:p:5-14_00 [Citation Analysis]	6
1993	The Utility of Multiple Utility: A Comment on Brennan RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:9:y:1993:i:01:p:145-154_00 [Citation Analysis]	6
1985	Equality of Talent RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:1:y:1985:i:02:p:151-188_00 [Citation Analysis]	6
1991	The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:7:y:1991:i:01:p:37-65_00 [Citation Analysis]	6
1989	Economics and Hermeneutics RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:5:y:1989:i:02:p:209-234_00 [Citation Analysis]	6
1990	The Ethical Limitations of the Market RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:6:y:1990:i:02:p:179-205_00 [Citation Analysis]	6
1994	If Government is so Villainous, How come Government Officials dont seem like Villains? RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:10:y:1994:i:01:p:91-106_00 [Citation Analysis]	6
2005	WHAT DO ECONOMISTS ANALYZE AND WHY: VALUES OR FACTS? RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:21:y:2005:i:02:p:221-278_00 [Citation Analysis]	6
1998	The Concept of Well-Being RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:14:y:1998:i:01:p:51-73_00 [Citation Analysis]	6
2000	Egalitarianism: Is Leximin the Only Option? RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:16:y:2000:i:02:p:229-245_00 [Citation Analysis]	6
2010	OPPORTUNITY AS MUTUAL ADVANTAGE RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:26:y:2010:i:01:p:47-68_00 [Citation Analysis]	5
1999	Taking the Coase Theorem Seriously RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:15:y:1999:i:02:p:235-247_00 [Citation Analysis]	5
2004	BELIEF REVISION IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:20:y:2004:i:01:p:89-115_00 [Citation Analysis]	5

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 14:

Year	Title	See
2011	Sugden’s critique of Sen’s capability approach and the dangers of libertarian paternalism RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:58:y:2011:i:1:p:21-42	[Citation Analysis]
2011	The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: games in transition function form RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:37:y:2011:i:4:p:683-706	[Citation Analysis]
2011	How the market responds to dynamically inconsistent preferences RePEc:uea:wcbess:11-04	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Happiness Is Absolute, Universal, Ultimate, Unidimensional, Cardinally Measurable and Interpersonally Comparable: A Basis for the Environmentally Responsible Happy Nation Index RePEc:mos:moswps:2011-16	[Citation Analysis]
2011	On the ‘cashing out’ hypothesis and ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policies RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:4:p:601-610	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Smooth Ambiguity Aversion in the Small and in the Large RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/95831	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Decision theory with prospect interference and entanglement RePEc:kap:theord:v:70:y:2011:i:3:p:283-328	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Dynamic consistency for non-expected utility preferences RePEc:spr:joecth:v:48:y:2011:i:2:p:493-518	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Adaptive social learning RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00572528	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Ambiguity and the Bayesian Paradigm RePEc:igi:igierp:379	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Ambiguity in Asset Pricing and Portfolio Choice: A Review of the Literature RePEc:igi:igierp:417	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Adaptive social learning RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00572528	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Aggregation of multiple prior opinions. RePEc:ner:sciepo:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09iepso50rh	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Economics and Interdisciplinary Exchange in Catholic Social Teaching and “Caritas in Veritate” RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:100:y:2011:i:1:p:41-54	[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY