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  Updated February, 5 2013 465.484 documents processed, 11.198.332 references and 4.512.497 citations

 

 
 

Games and Economic Behavior / Elsevier Science Economics Articles Archive

Raw citation data, Main indicators, Most cited papers , cites used to compute the impact factor (2011), Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19900.330.082541921700.04
19910.20.0832422469010.030.04
19920.160.0837291579020.050.04
19930.10.0934715697030.090.05
19940.20.16110387114030.050.05
19950.340.19691832953215.6120.170.07
19960.380.23971488130500150.150.1
19970.570.29638861669412.8310.490.1
19980.560.2961624160897.9130.210.11
19990.340.34637301244211.9190.30.15
20000.620.4367819124776.5320.480.17
20010.60.4575676130789220.290.17
20020.760.466872414210812300.440.21
20030.670.4888853143967.3320.360.21
20040.830.558810861561306.2530.60.23
20051.150.57806991762036.9520.650.24
20061.150.548310181681944.6790.950.22
20071.30.48816171632126.1600.740.19
20081.350.51315231642224.1460.350.22
20090.970.511544262122059.3680.440.21
20100.680.4612725628519510.8540.430.17
20110.690.641241452811934.1480.390.26
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
II: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y

 

Main indicators

Most cited documents in this series:
YearTitleCited
1995Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:122-142 [Citation Analysis]
650
2006A theory of reciprocity
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:293-315 [Citation Analysis]
349
2004A theory of sequential reciprocity
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:268-298 [Citation Analysis]
335
1994Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:3:p:346-380 [Citation Analysis]
309
1994Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:347-369 [Citation Analysis]
284
1995Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:1:p:164-212 [Citation Analysis]
242
1996Potential Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:124-143 [Citation Analysis]
236
1990Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:29-46 [Citation Analysis]
186
1989Psychological games and sequential rationality
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:60-79 [Citation Analysis]
173
1996Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:16:y:1996:i:2:p:181-191 [Citation Analysis]
167
1989Renegotiation in repeated games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:327-360 [Citation Analysis]
166
1995Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:1:p:56-90 [Citation Analysis]
159
1993The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:387-424 [Citation Analysis]
159
2004How to identify trust and reciprocity
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:260-281 [Citation Analysis]
156
2007A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:59:y:2007:i:1:p:17-45 [Citation Analysis]
118
2000Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:30:y:2000:i:2:p:163-182 [Citation Analysis]
116
1989Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:170-190 [Citation Analysis]
112
1999A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:26:y:1999:i:2:p:286-336 [Citation Analysis]
108
2002The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:2:p:201-230 [Citation Analysis]
106
1995Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:95-121 [Citation Analysis]
103
1996Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:90-123 [Citation Analysis]
103
1995Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:6-38 [Citation Analysis]
102
1995On Players Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:218-254 [Citation Analysis]
101
1997Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:2:p:201-237 [Citation Analysis]
97
1993Learning Mixed Equilibria
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:320-367 [Citation Analysis]
93

repec:eee:gamebe:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:217-226 [Citation Analysis]
92
1991Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:82-100 [Citation Analysis]
87
1997Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:19:y:1997:i:1:p:46-76 [Citation Analysis]
83
1996Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:15:y:1996:i:2:p:132-148 [Citation Analysis]
82
2001The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:1:p:161-169 [Citation Analysis]
75
1995Commitment and observability in games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:2:p:271-280 [Citation Analysis]
73
1993Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:4:p:514-531 [Citation Analysis]
72
1989Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:295-326 [Citation Analysis]
71
1994Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:1:p:62-91 [Citation Analysis]
68
2006Network formation with heterogeneous players
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:353-372 [Citation Analysis]
67
1993An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:425-454 [Citation Analysis]
65
1998More Is Better, But Fair Is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:23:y:1998:i:2:p:247-265 [Citation Analysis]
65
1994A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:445-468 [Citation Analysis]
65
1996Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:13:y:1996:i:1:p:100-110 [Citation Analysis]
64
1999The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:13-24 [Citation Analysis]
63
1995Social Norms and Random Matching Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:79-109 [Citation Analysis]
62
2001A Dynamic Model of Network Formation
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:331-341 [Citation Analysis]
61
1989Cooperation and bounded recall
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:5-39 [Citation Analysis]
61
2006Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:1:p:1-24 [Citation Analysis]
60
1997On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:1:p:3-24 [Citation Analysis]
59
2003Networks of collaboration in oligopoly
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:43:y:2003:i:1:p:57-85 [Citation Analysis]
58
1995Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:1:p:6-19 [Citation Analysis]
57
1990Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:4:p:378-394 [Citation Analysis]
56
1996Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:1-18 [Citation Analysis]
56
1997Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:21:y:1997:i:1-2:p:40-55 [Citation Analysis]
55

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 193:
YearTitleSee
2011Solution Concepts for Cooperative Games with Circular Communication Structure
RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2011100
[Citation Analysis]
2011Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:2:p:331-349
[Citation Analysis]
2011Solution Concepts for Games with General Coalitional Structure (Replaces CentER DP 2011-025)
RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2011119
[Citation Analysis]
2011The prenucleolus for games with communication structures
RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2011_010
[Citation Analysis]
2011Inter and intra-group conflicts as a foundation for contest success functions
RePEc:pra:mprapa:31468
[Citation Analysis]
2011Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games.
RePEc:urb:wpaper:11_12
[Citation Analysis]
2011Capacity Constraint, Price Discrimination, and Oligopoly
RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2011-04
[Citation Analysis]
2011The strategic timing of R&D agreements.
RePEc:urb:wpaper:11_04
[Citation Analysis]
2011Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable rules
RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:3:p:151-161
[Citation Analysis]
2011The Difference Indifference Makes in Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects
RePEc:col:000089:008746
[Citation Analysis]
2011On the number of blocks required to access the coalition structure core
RePEc:pra:mprapa:29755
[Citation Analysis]
2011Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes
RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:1:p:65-70
[Citation Analysis]
2011Tanítás értelmezhetõ-e, mint egy kooperatív dinamikus játék?
RePEc:pkk:meb011:379-386
[Citation Analysis]
2011Does consultation improve decision making?
RePEc:not:notcdx:2011-08
[Citation Analysis]
2011Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products
RePEc:pra:mprapa:28262
[Citation Analysis]
2011Control and Efficiency in the Nonprofit Sector: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment
RePEc:hhs:uulswp:2011_006
[Citation Analysis]
2011Control and Efficiency in the Nonprofit Sector Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment
RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2011_008
[Citation Analysis]
2011Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control
RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20110115
[Citation Analysis]
2011Team governance: Empowerment or hierarchical control
RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:78:y:2011:i:1-2:p:1-13
[Citation Analysis]
2011Procurement auctions with avoidable fixed costs: an experimental approach
RePEc:pra:mprapa:32163
[Citation Analysis]
2011Learning about a Class of Belief-Dependent Preferences without Information on Beliefs
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5957
[Citation Analysis]
2011Learning about a Class of Belief-Dependent Preferences without Information on Beliefs
RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1125
[Citation Analysis]
2011The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: Can it be good for efficiency?
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:128-131
[Citation Analysis]
2011Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3547
[Citation Analysis]
2011The Dark Side of Reciprocity
RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-052
[Citation Analysis]
2011Worker Characteristics and Wage Differentials: Evidence from a Gift-Exchange Experiment
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3637
[Citation Analysis]
2011Team Incentives and Reference-Dependent Preferences
RePEc:kgu:wpaper:70
[Citation Analysis]
2011Real Effort, Real Leisure and Real-time Supervision: Incentives and Peer Pressure in Virtual Organizations.
RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-05
[Citation Analysis]
2011Inequality aversion and externalities
RePEc:zbw:tbsifw:if36v1
[Citation Analysis]
2011Relative performance or team evaluation? Optimal contracts for other-regarding agents
RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:79:y:2011:i:3:p:183-193
[Citation Analysis]
2011SEA Presidential address: Group connectivity and cooperation
RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:2:p:139-158
[Citation Analysis]
2011Dictator games: a meta study
RePEc:kap:expeco:v:14:y:2011:i:4:p:583-610
[Citation Analysis]
2011Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks
RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:5:p:641-658
[Citation Analysis]
2011Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems
RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2011-14
[Citation Analysis]
2011Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences
RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:6:p:2226-2251
[Citation Analysis]
2011Competition for procurement shares
RePEc:pra:mprapa:32078
[Citation Analysis]
2011Competition for Procurement Shares
RePEc:ris:qmetal:2011_003
[Citation Analysis]
2011Fast Convergence in Population Games
RePEc:oxf:wpaper:570
[Citation Analysis]
2011Double-edged transparency in teams
RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:7:p:531-542
[Citation Analysis]
2011Size matters - when it comes to lies
RePEc:iaa:wpaper:20110517
[Citation Analysis]
2011Disadvantageous lies in individual decisions
RePEc:twi:respas:0071
[Citation Analysis]
2011Motivational Cherry Picking
RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-029
[Citation Analysis]
2011Moral Emotions and Partnership
RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-028
[Citation Analysis]
2011We Are Not Alone: The Impact of Externalities on Public Good Provision
RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_29
[Citation Analysis]
2011Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5884
[Citation Analysis]
2011Let Me See You! A Video Experiment on the Social Dimension of Risk Preferences
RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2011_211
[Citation Analysis]
2011Farmers adoption of integrated crop protection and organic farming: Do moral and social concerns matter?
RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:70:y:2011:i:8:p:1536-1545
[Citation Analysis]
2011Are nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers?
RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:32:y:2011:i:5:p:818-831
[Citation Analysis]
2011A general framework for rational learning in social networks
RePEc:the:publsh:1015
[Citation Analysis]
2011DO AUCTION BIDS BETRAY EXPECTATIONS-BASED REFERENCE DEPENDENT PREFERENCES? A TEST, EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE, AND ESTIMATES OF LOSS AVERSION
RePEc:cde:cdewps:206
[Citation Analysis]
2011Shunning Uncertainty: The Neglect of Learning Opportunities
RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp11-044
[Citation Analysis]
2011Shunning Uncertainty: The Neglect of Learning Opportunities
RePEc:hrv:hksfac:5347068
[Citation Analysis]
2011Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:351-365
[Citation Analysis]
2011Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature
RePEc:kap:expeco:v:14:y:2011:i:1:p:47-83
[Citation Analysis]
2011How does income inequality affect cooperation and punishment in public good settings?
RePEc:mar:magkse:201138
[Citation Analysis]
2011The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia
RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:55:y:2011:i:2:p:193-210
[Citation Analysis]
2011Altruistic punishment and the threat of feuds
RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:78:y:2011:i:3:p:319-332
[Citation Analysis]
2011Ultimata bargaining: generosity without social motives
RePEc:pra:mprapa:33613
[Citation Analysis]
2011Is It How You Look or Speak That Matters? - An Experimental Study Exploring the Mechanisms of Ethnic Discrimination
RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2011_0012
[Citation Analysis]
2011Is It How You Look or Speak That Matters? - An Experimental Study Exploring the Mechanisms of Ethnic Discrimination
RePEc:hhs:sulcis:2011_003
[Citation Analysis]
2011Stereotypes and madrassas: experimental evidence from Pakistan
RePEc:fip:fednsr:501
[Citation Analysis]
2011Gender Differences in Bar gaining Outcomes: A Field Experiment on Discrimination
RePEc:gms:wpaper:1029
[Citation Analysis]
2011Gender Differences in Bargaining Outcomes: A Field Experiment on Discrimination
RePEc:pit:wpaper:450
[Citation Analysis]
2011Negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium
RePEc:ucy:cypeua:14-2011
[Citation Analysis]
2011Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence
RePEc:bir:birmec:11-15
[Citation Analysis]
2011Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence
RePEc:man:sespap:1119
[Citation Analysis]
2011Electoral competition in 2-dimensional ideology space with unidimensional commitment
RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:36:y:2011:i:1:p:1-24
[Citation Analysis]
2011Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a Continuous Policy Space
RePEc:bge:wpaper:529
[Citation Analysis]
2011Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence
RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp682
[Citation Analysis]
2011The lambda model and rule of thumb consumers: An estimation problem in existing studies
RePEc:eee:soceco:v:40:y:2011:i:4:p:381-384
[Citation Analysis]
2011A generalized Tullock contest
RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:147:y:2011:i:3:p:413-420
[Citation Analysis]
2011Signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings
RePEc:zbw:dicedp:35
[Citation Analysis]
2011Endowment effects in contests
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:3:p:217-219
[Citation Analysis]
2011Bowling alone but tweeting together: the evolution of human interaction in the social networking era
RePEc:pra:mprapa:34232
[Citation Analysis]
2011Agreeing to disagree: a syntactic approach
RePEc:pra:mprapa:29066
[Citation Analysis]
2011Generalisation of Samets (2010) agreement theorem
RePEc:pra:mprapa:29067
[Citation Analysis]
2011Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction
RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:1:p:52-86:d:11354
[Citation Analysis]
2011Correlation through Bounded Recall Strategies
RePEc:huj:dispap:dp579
[Citation Analysis]
2011Nonspecific Networking
RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:1:p:87-113:d:11358
[Citation Analysis]
2011Potential games in volatile environments
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:271-287
[Citation Analysis]
2011Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration
RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:126:y:2011:i:2:p:947-985
[Citation Analysis]
2011Understanding some recent existence results for discontinuous games
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:48:y:2011:i:1:p:31-45
[Citation Analysis]
2011Secure implementation in Shapley–Scarf housing markets
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:48:y:2011:i:1:p:147-169
[Citation Analysis]
2011Investments as Signals of Outside Options
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8366
[Citation Analysis]
2011The importance of moral reflection and self-reported data in a dictator game with production
RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:36:y:2011:i:1:p:105-120
[Citation Analysis]
2011A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:1:p:15-17
[Citation Analysis]
2011Desert and Inequity Averson in Teams
RePEc:oxf:wpaper:563
[Citation Analysis]
2011Stable and efficient coalitional networks
RePEc:cor:louvco:2011039
[Citation Analysis]
2011Asymmetric discounting of gains and losses: A query theory account
RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:43:y:2011:i:2:p:107-126
[Citation Analysis]
2011Does nurture matter: Theory and experimental investigation on the effect of working environment on risk and time preferences
RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:43:y:2011:i:3:p:245-270
[Citation Analysis]
2011Non-parametric test of time consistency: Present bias and future bias
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:456-478
[Citation Analysis]
2011Information Markets, Elections and Contracts
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3327
[Citation Analysis]
2011A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:15:y:2011:i:4:p:337-342
[Citation Analysis]
2011The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
RePEc:pra:mprapa:32716
[Citation Analysis]
2011SMOOTH POLITICIANS AND PATERNALISTIC VOTERS: A THEORY OF LARGE ELECTIONS
RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000250
[Citation Analysis]
2011Smooth Politicians and Paternalistic Voters: A Theory of Large Elections
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17397
[Citation Analysis]
2011Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish
RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0171
[Citation Analysis]
2011The Multi-item Bisection Auction
RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2011_031
[Citation Analysis]
2011Competition and the signaling role of prices
RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:4:p:412-425
[Citation Analysis]
2011The Cycles Approach
RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2011-547
[Citation Analysis]
2011Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks
RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:5:p:641-658
[Citation Analysis]
2011The lifeboat problem
RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2011106
[Citation Analysis]
2011The Lifeboat Problem
RePEc:mpi:wpaper:the_lifeboat_problem
[Citation Analysis]
2011The dynamic instability of dispersed price equilibria
RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:1796-1827
[Citation Analysis]
2011Stable and efficient coalitional networks
RePEc:cor:louvco:2011039
[Citation Analysis]
2011Influence functions, followers and command games
RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00583867
[Citation Analysis]
2011Nonspecific Networking
RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:1:p:87-113:d:11358
[Citation Analysis]
2011Social interactions and spillovers.
RePEc:ner:carlos:info:hdl:10016/12914
[Citation Analysis]
2011Influence functions, followers and command games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:123-138
[Citation Analysis]
2011Social interactions and spillovers
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:339-360
[Citation Analysis]
2011Beliefs about overconfidence
RePEc:kap:theord:v:70:y:2011:i:4:p:475-500
[Citation Analysis]
2011One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?
RePEc:nam:wpaper:1113
[Citation Analysis]
2011Belief Elicitation: A Horse Race among Truth Serums
RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2011117
[Citation Analysis]
2011Environmental Assessment Methodologies for Commercial Buildings: An Elicitation Study of U.S. Building Professionals’ Beliefs on Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)
RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:3:y:2011:i:12:p:2392-2412:d:15184
[Citation Analysis]
2011So you want to run an experiment, now what? Some simple rules of thumb for optimal experimental design
RePEc:kap:expeco:v:14:y:2011:i:4:p:439-457
[Citation Analysis]
2011Remain silent and ye shall suffer: seller exploitation of reticent buyers in an experimental reputation system
RePEc:kap:expeco:v:14:y:2011:i:2:p:273-285
[Citation Analysis]
2011Social science and neuroscience: how can they inform each other?
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY

Recent citations received in: 2011

YearTitleSee
2011Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogeneous Tasks and NIMBY Problems
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[Citation Analysis]
2011Finite-Population Mass-Action and Evolutionary Stability
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[Citation Analysis]
2011Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games
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2011Investments as Signals of Outside Options
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[Citation Analysis]
2011Vulnerable Markets
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2011Lying About What you Know or About What you Do? (replaces CentER DP 2010-033)
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[Citation Analysis]
2011Lying About What you Know or About What you do? (replaces TILEC DP 2010-016)
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[Citation Analysis]
2011An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC
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[Citation Analysis]
2011Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
2011Context and interpretation in laboratory experiments: The case of reciprocity
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[Citation Analysis]
2011Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games
RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:4:p:531-540
[Citation Analysis]
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RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:6:p:760-767
[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
2011Unraveling Public Good Games
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2010

YearTitleSee
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:1:p:184-188
[Citation Analysis]
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RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:346-364
[Citation Analysis]
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RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:289-303
[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:74:y:2010:i:1-2:p:82-103
[Citation Analysis]
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RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:3:p:1164-1187
[Citation Analysis]
2010Kernel-based type spaces
RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:6:p:2483-2495
[Citation Analysis]
2010Fairness perceptions and prosocial emotions in the power to take
RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:31:y:2010:i:6:p:908-922
[Citation Analysis]
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RePEc:eee:labeco:v:17:y:2010:i:3:p:598-607
[Citation Analysis]
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RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:5:p:912-924
[Citation Analysis]
2010The uniform rule with several commodities: A generalization of Sprumonts characterization
RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:6:p:952-964
[Citation Analysis]
2010Public-good games and the Balinese
RePEc:eme:ijsepp:v:37:y:2010:i:9:p:660-675
[Citation Analysis]
2010Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature
RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:4:p:551-585:d:10210
[Citation Analysis]
2010Contrôle de linformation et crowdsourcing
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4782
[Citation Analysis]
2010Competition and innovation: an experimental investigation
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[Citation Analysis]
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RePEc:kap:expeco:v:13:y:2010:i:4:p:476-499
[Citation Analysis]
2010Bounding Preference Parameters under Different Assumptions about Beliefs: a Partial Identification Approach
RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1017
[Citation Analysis]
2010Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets
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[Citation Analysis]
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RePEc:ner:louvai:info:hdl:2078.1/30406
[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Market games and clubs
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
2010A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms
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[Citation Analysis]
2010On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games
RePEc:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2010-18
[Citation Analysis]
2010Directed generosity and network formation: Network dimension matters
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game
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[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2009

YearTitleSee
2009Departure Times in Y-Shaped Traffic Networks with Multiple Bottlenecks
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Contracts, cost sharing and consistency
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Game Mining: How to Make Money from those about to Play a Game
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Elicited Beliefs and Social Information in Modified Dictator Games: What Do Dictators Believe Other Dictators Do?
RePEc:bge:wpaper:405
[Citation Analysis]
2009Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable-set solutions in the assignment market
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Altruism, Turnout and Strategic Voting Behavior
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
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[Citation Analysis]
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RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:2:p:632-642
[Citation Analysis]
2009Status, affluence, and inequality: Rank-based comparisons in games of status
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:552-568
[Citation Analysis]
2009Optimum tariffs and retaliation: How country numbers matter
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