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  Updated February, 5 2013 465.484 documents processed, 11.198.332 references and 4.512.497 citations

 

 
 

Boston University - Industry Studies Programme / BibEc Project

Raw citation data, Main indicators, Most cited papers , cites used to compute the impact factor (2011), Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19900.09650010.170.04
19910.117676010.060.05
19920.040.09205923100.05
19930.080.1101137300.05
19940.070.121210930200.04
19950.140.1785022300.09
19960.20.2245520400.09
19970.340.211318321100.09
19980.160.22162137600.13
19990.10.29217293010.50.15
20000.110.4539182010.20.15
20010.290.3807200.18
20020.40.4105200.2
20030.440000.2
20040.460000.2
20050.460000.25
20060.490000.22
20070.420000.19
20080.430000.19
20090.40000.19
20100.330000.16
20110.50000.27
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
II: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y

 

Main indicators

Most cited documents in this series:
YearTitleCited
1994Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives
RePEc:fth:bostin:0047 [Citation Analysis]
103
1991Physician Response to Fee Changes with Multiple Payers
RePEc:fth:bostin:0015 [Citation Analysis]
41
1995Machine Replacement and the Business Cycle: Lumps and Bumps
RePEc:fth:bostin:0062 [Citation Analysis]
34
1992Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoners Dilemma Games.
RePEc:fth:bostin:36 [Citation Analysis]
26
2000Competition Policy as Strategic Trade
RePEc:fth:bostin:0100 [Citation Analysis]
20
1992Competition and Bank Performance: A Theoretical Perspective
RePEc:fth:bostin:0026 [Citation Analysis]
19
1996A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure.
RePEc:fth:bostin:68 [Citation Analysis]
19
1999Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form
RePEc:fth:bostin:0096 [Citation Analysis]
17
2000Using Diagnoses to Describe Populations and Predict Costs
RePEc:fth:bostin:0099 [Citation Analysis]
15
1998The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design
RePEc:fth:bostin:0093 [Citation Analysis]
12
1996Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability
RePEc:fth:bostin:0065 [Citation Analysis]
11
1996Contract Complexity, Incentives and the Value of Delegation
RePEc:fth:bostin:0070 [Citation Analysis]
8
1997Cost and Quality Incentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers
RePEc:fth:bostin:0084 [Citation Analysis]
7
1991A Cross Country Comparison of Seasonal Cycles and Business Cycles
RePEc:fth:bostin:0011 [Citation Analysis]
7
1993Generalized Solutions of Stochastic Differential Games in One Dimension.
RePEc:fth:bostin:44 [Citation Analysis]
6
1996Budgeting and Hierarchical Control.
RePEc:fth:bostin:71 [Citation Analysis]
6
1998Environmental Regulation and Productivity: Evidence from Oil Refineries
RePEc:fth:bostin:0091 [Citation Analysis]
6
1995Explaining the Choice Among Regulatory Plans in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry
RePEc:fth:bostin:0055 [Citation Analysis]
5
1996Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm
RePEc:fth:bostin:0064 [Citation Analysis]
5
1996Competition and Incentives with Non-Exclusive Contracts
RePEc:fth:bostin:0075 [Citation Analysis]
4
1991Hospital Cost Function Estimation When Firms May Not Try to Minimize Total Costs
RePEc:fth:bostin:0029 [Citation Analysis]
4
1995Ex Post Regret and the Decentralized Sharing of Information
RePEc:fth:bostin:0058 [Citation Analysis]
4
1994Equilibria and Pareto Optima of Markets with Adverse Selection
RePEc:fth:bostin:0046 [Citation Analysis]
4
1997Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care
RePEc:fth:bostin:0080 [Citation Analysis]
4
1992Informational Capacity and Financial Collapse
RePEc:fth:bostin:0038 [Citation Analysis]
4
1995Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies
RePEc:fth:bostin:0056 [Citation Analysis]
4
1990Macroeconomic Implications of Production Bunching: Factor Demand Linkages
RePEc:fth:bostin:0001 [Citation Analysis]
3
2000Price and Quality Competition under Adverse Selection: Market Organization and Efficiency
RePEc:fth:bostin:0102 [Citation Analysis]
3
1995Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies and Common Values
RePEc:fth:bostin:0060 [Citation Analysis]
3
1993Asking Prices as Commitment Devices.
RePEc:fth:bostin:42 [Citation Analysis]
3
1991BANK RUNS: Liquidity and Incentives
RePEc:fth:bostin:0022 [Citation Analysis]
3
1991The Economics of Referrals
RePEc:fth:bostin:0020 [Citation Analysis]
3
1997Environmental Regulation and Labor Demand: Evidence from the South Coast Air Basin
RePEc:fth:bostin:0082 [Citation Analysis]
3
1992The Learning Curve, Market Dominance and Predatory Pricing
RePEc:fth:bostin:0039 [Citation Analysis]
3
1997Environmental Regulation and Labor demand: Evidence from the South Coast Air Basin.
RePEc:fth:bostin:82 [Citation Analysis]
3
1996Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm.
RePEc:fth:bostin:64 [Citation Analysis]
3
1996Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device.
RePEc:fth:bostin:73 [Citation Analysis]
2
1997On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-value Auctions
RePEc:fth:bostin:0077 [Citation Analysis]
2
1996A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure
RePEc:fth:bostin:0068 [Citation Analysis]
2
1992Quality Competition, Welfare, and Regulation
RePEc:fth:bostin:0024 [Citation Analysis]
2
1993Generalized Solutions of Stochastic Differential Games in One Dimension
RePEc:fth:bostin:0044 [Citation Analysis]
2
1991Medicare Payment to Psychiatric Facilities: Unfair and Inefficient?
RePEc:fth:bostin:0008 [Citation Analysis]
2
1996Health Premium Payment Systems for State Employees
RePEc:fth:bostin:0066 [Citation Analysis]
2
1995Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment
RePEc:fth:bostin:0059 [Citation Analysis]
2
1991Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
RePEc:fth:bostin:0007 [Citation Analysis]
2
1990The Seasonal Cycle in U.S. Manufacturing
RePEc:fth:bostin:0012 [Citation Analysis]
2
1996Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device
RePEc:fth:bostin:0073 [Citation Analysis]
2
1992Autos and the National Industrial Recovery Act: Evidence on Industry Complementarities
RePEc:fth:bostin:0028 [Citation Analysis]
2
1992Dynamic Duopoly with Slowly Changing Customer Loyalties.
RePEc:fth:bostin:37 [Citation Analysis]
2
1998Moral Hazard, Insurance, and Some Collusion
RePEc:fth:bostin:0089 [Citation Analysis]
1

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 0:
YearTitleSee

Cites in year: CiY

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

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