Most cited documents in this series:

Year	Title	Cited
2003	Tax Morale, Rule-Governed Behaviour and Trust RePEc:kap:copoec:v:14:y:2003:i:2:p:119-140 [Citation Analysis]	33
2000	The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View RePEc:kap:copoec:v:11:y:2000:i:1:p:27-39 [Citation Analysis]	26
2008	Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness RePEc:kap:copoec:v:19:y:2008:i:4:p:356-360 [Citation Analysis]	17
1999	Economic Freedom and the Quality of Life: An Empirical Analysis RePEc:kap:copoec:v:10:y:1999:i:2:p:185-197 [Citation Analysis]	15
1991	Institutional framing and perceptions of fairness RePEc:kap:copoec:v:2:y:1991:i:3:p:329-370 [Citation Analysis]	12
2005	The Constitution of the Not-For-Profit Organisation: Reciprocal Conformity to Morality RePEc:kap:copoec:v:16:y:2005:i:3:p:249-276 [Citation Analysis]	11
2004	The Status Quo in Contractarian-Constitutionalist Perspective RePEc:kap:copoec:v:15:y:2004:i:2:p:153-170 [Citation Analysis]	11
1992	The taming of Leviathan: Competition among governments RePEc:kap:copoec:v:3:y:1992:i:2:p:177-196 [Citation Analysis]	11
2006	Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan RePEc:kap:copoec:v:17:y:2006:i:2:p:117-132 [Citation Analysis]	10
1997	Convention, Social Order, and the Two Coordinations RePEc:kap:copoec:v:8:y:1997:i:4:p:319-335 [Citation Analysis]	9
1998	Hayek contra Pangloss on Evolutionary Systems RePEc:kap:copoec:v:9:y:1998:i:1:p:45-66 [Citation Analysis]	8
2001	Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal Decentralization RePEc:kap:copoec:v:12:y:2001:i:2:p:93-121 [Citation Analysis]	8
2004	The Optimal Decentralisation of Government Activity: Normative Recommendations for the European Constitution RePEc:kap:copoec:v:15:y:2004:i:1:p:27-76 [Citation Analysis]	8
1999	Enforcing Competition Among Governments: Theory and Application to the European Union RePEc:kap:copoec:v:10:y:1999:i:4:p:327-338 [Citation Analysis]	7
2003	A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement RePEc:kap:copoec:v:14:y:2003:i:3:p:167-190 [Citation Analysis]	7
2001	On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy RePEc:kap:copoec:v:12:y:2001:i:3:p:193-215 [Citation Analysis]	7
2008	Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism RePEc:kap:copoec:v:19:y:2008:i:3:p:226-248 [Citation Analysis]	7
2003	Judicial Branch, Checks and Balances and Political Accountability RePEc:kap:copoec:v:14:y:2003:i:1:p:47-70 [Citation Analysis]	6
1998	Constitutional Constraints on Governments in a Global Economy RePEc:kap:copoec:v:9:y:1998:i:3:p:171-186 [Citation Analysis]	6
2002	Expressive Constitutionalism RePEc:kap:copoec:v:13:y:2002:i:4:p:299-311 [Citation Analysis]	6
2002	Subjective Diversity and Social Learning: A Cognitive Perspective for Understanding Institutional Behavior RePEc:kap:copoec:v:13:y:2002:i:2:p:197-210 [Citation Analysis]	6
1998	Constitutional “Rules” and Intergenerational Fiscal Policy RePEc:kap:copoec:v:9:y:1998:i:1:p:67-74 [Citation Analysis]	6
1991	Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions RePEc:kap:copoec:v:2:y:1991:i:3:p:303-328 [Citation Analysis]	6
1994	Political credibility and economic growth in less developed countries RePEc:kap:copoec:v:5:y:1994:i:1:p:23-43 [Citation Analysis]	6
1994	Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach RePEc:kap:copoec:v:5:y:1994:i:2:p:193-219 [Citation Analysis]	5
1994	Reassessing the role of the independent judiciary in enforcing interest-group bargains RePEc:kap:copoec:v:5:y:1994:i:1:p:1-21 [Citation Analysis]	5
1997	Secession Clauses: A Tool for the Taming of an Arising Leviathan in Brussels? RePEc:kap:copoec:v:8:y:1997:i:1:p:57-70 [Citation Analysis]	5
1999	Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions RePEc:kap:copoec:v:10:y:1999:i:3:p:283-300 [Citation Analysis]	5
2003	The Core, Transaction Costs, and the Coase Theorem RePEc:kap:copoec:v:14:y:2003:i:4:p:287-299 [Citation Analysis]	5
2004	Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies RePEc:kap:copoec:v:15:y:2004:i:3:p:239-259 [Citation Analysis]	5
1999	On Amending Constitutions RePEc:kap:copoec:v:10:y:1999:i:4:p:385-396 [Citation Analysis]	5
2009	Constitutions and economic reforms in transition: an empirical study RePEc:kap:copoec:v:20:y:2009:i:1:p:1-41 [Citation Analysis]	5
1990	The domain of constitutional economics RePEc:kap:copoec:v:1:y:1990:i:1:p:1-18 [Citation Analysis]	5
2000	Constitutional Choice and Prosperity: A Factor Analysis RePEc:kap:copoec:v:11:y:2000:i:3:p:265-279 [Citation Analysis]	5
2000	Institutional Reform and Co-Decision in the European Union RePEc:kap:copoec:v:11:y:2000:i:1:p:41-57 [Citation Analysis]	4
2005	Constitutional Foundations of Economic Freedom: A Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis RePEc:kap:copoec:v:16:y:2005:i:4:p:327-346 [Citation Analysis]	4
1992	Reviews RePEc:kap:copoec:v:3:y:1992:i:2:p:267-287 [Citation Analysis]	4
1997	The Formation of Economic Policy: A Cognitive-Evolutionary Approach to Policy-Making RePEc:kap:copoec:v:8:y:1997:i:3:p:225-254 [Citation Analysis]	4
2006	Reflections on the Origins of the Polis RePEc:kap:copoec:v:17:y:2006:i:1:p:31-48 [Citation Analysis]	4
2007	Saving government failure theory from itself: recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective RePEc:kap:copoec:v:18:y:2007:i:2:p:127-143 [Citation Analysis]	4
1998	Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order: An Advance Sketch RePEc:kap:copoec:v:9:y:1998:i:1:p:19-44 [Citation Analysis]	4
2001	An Entrepreneurial Perspective of Institutional Change RePEc:kap:copoec:v:12:y:2001:i:3:p:217-236 [Citation Analysis]	4
2002	Democracy and Opinion Falsification: Towards a New Austrian Political Economy RePEc:kap:copoec:v:13:y:2002:i:3:p:223-246 [Citation Analysis]	4
1995	Economizing on virtue RePEc:kap:copoec:v:6:y:1995:i:1:p:35-56 [Citation Analysis]	4
2008	Same players, different game: how better rules make better politics RePEc:kap:copoec:v:19:y:2008:i:3:p:171-179 [Citation Analysis]	4
1993	Ownership of firms and efficiency: The competence argument RePEc:kap:copoec:v:4:y:1993:i:3:p:349-392 [Citation Analysis]	4
2002	Was Hayek a Panglossian Evolutionary Theorist? A Reply to Whitman RePEc:kap:copoec:v:13:y:2002:i:3:p:275-285 [Citation Analysis]	4
2003	The Disunity of Unanimity RePEc:kap:copoec:v:14:y:2003:i:2:p:83-94 [Citation Analysis]	4
2003	Cognitive Rules, Institutions, and Competition RePEc:kap:copoec:v:14:y:2003:i:3:p:213-233 [Citation Analysis]	4
2006	Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members RePEc:kap:copoec:v:17:y:2006:i:3:p:207-216 [Citation Analysis]	4

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 6:

Year	Title	See
2011	Contractual preferences and moral biases: social identity and procedural fairness in the exclusion game experiment RePEc:kap:copoec:v:22:y:2011:i:4:p:373-397	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Federalism and exit costs RePEc:kap:copoec:v:22:y:2011:i:2:p:191-197	[Citation Analysis]
2011	A political economy perspective of direct democracy in ancient Athens RePEc:kap:copoec:v:22:y:2011:i:1:p:58-82	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Towards a Better Understanding of the Informal Economy RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:873-en	[Citation Analysis]
2011	The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration RePEc:kap:copoec:v:22:y:2011:i:4:p:325-354	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Has assistance from USAID been successful in promoting and sustaining democracy? Evidence from the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Eurasia RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-017	[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY