Most cited documents in this series:

Year	Title	Cited
1998	Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:269-299 [Citation Analysis]	108
1990	Evolutionary Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1990:i:1:p:59-89 [Citation Analysis]	81
1998	The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:379-401 [Citation Analysis]	81
1986	On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:15:y:1986:i:3:p:187-200 [Citation Analysis]	80
1996	On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:289-301 [Citation Analysis]	69
1993	Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:2:p:171-98 [Citation Analysis]	62
1998	Link formation in cooperative situations RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:245-256 [Citation Analysis]	48
1998	Population uncertainty and Poisson games RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:3:p:375-392 [Citation Analysis]	47
1992	Games with Permission Structures: The Conjunctive Approach. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:277-93 [Citation Analysis]	44
1994	Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:75-83 [Citation Analysis]	43
1999	Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:131-152 [Citation Analysis]	43
1995	An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:4:p:323-44 [Citation Analysis]	40
1999	Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:3:p:263-300 [Citation Analysis]	38
2006	Unequal connections RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:3:p:319-349 [Citation Analysis]	38
1989	The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:4:p:389-407 [Citation Analysis]	37
1989	A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:273-91 [Citation Analysis]	35
1992	The Shapley Value for Cooperative Games under Precedence Constraints. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:3:p:249-66 [Citation Analysis]	31
1988	An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:17:y:1988:i:2:p:89-99 [Citation Analysis]	31
1998	Ternary Voting Games RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:335-351 [Citation Analysis]	30
1992	Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:393-418 [Citation Analysis]	29
1996	Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:303-27 [Citation Analysis]	29
1992	Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:419-27 [Citation Analysis]	29
1989	A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:37-44 [Citation Analysis]	28
2005	A characterization of the position value* RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:4:p:505-514 [Citation Analysis]	27
2000	Loss aversion equilibrium RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:269-287 [Citation Analysis]	27
2001	When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2001:i:4:p:495-515 [Citation Analysis]	26
1996	Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:385-406 [Citation Analysis]	26
1999	Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:4:p:511-520 [Citation Analysis]	26
1996	The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:245-58 [Citation Analysis]	25
1989	Credible Coalitions and the Core. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:2:p:185-87 [Citation Analysis]	24
1998	An Axiomatization of the Disjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Permission Structure RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:27-43 [Citation Analysis]	23
1989	Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:57-89 [Citation Analysis]	23
1999	Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:241-252 [Citation Analysis]	23
1996	Mediated Talk. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:177-88 [Citation Analysis]	22
1990	Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games with Semi-standard Information. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1990:i:2:p:191-217 [Citation Analysis]	22
1999	How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:3:p:409-434 [Citation Analysis]	21
2001	Assignment games with stable core RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:177-185 [Citation Analysis]	21
1989	A Value for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:2:p:227-40 [Citation Analysis]	20
1999	Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:53-68 [Citation Analysis]	20
1996	The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:1:p:13-34 [Citation Analysis]	20
1998	Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:223-227 [Citation Analysis]	19
1994	The Theory of Normal Form Games form the Differentiable Viewpoint. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:3:p:207-36 [Citation Analysis]	19
2008	Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:537-569 [Citation Analysis]	19
1995	Hierarchical Organization Structures and Constraints on Coalition Formation. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:2:p:147-63 [Citation Analysis]	19
1998	The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:61-73 [Citation Analysis]	19
1992	Weighted Values and the Core. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:1:p:27-39 [Citation Analysis]	18
2000	The selectope for cooperative games RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:23-38 [Citation Analysis]	18
1996	An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:269-87 [Citation Analysis]	18
1996	Ultimatums in Two-Person Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty: Offer Games. RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:4:p:475-94 [Citation Analysis]	17
2000	Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:63-79 [Citation Analysis]	17

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 23:

Year	Title	See
2011	A Continuous Time Approach for the Asymptotic Value in Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00609476	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Zero-Sum Repeated Games: Recent Advances and New Links with Differential Games RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:1:y:2011:i:1:p:172-207	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Zero-Sum Repeated Games: Recent Advances and New Links with Differential Games RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:1:y:2011:i:1:p:172-207	[Citation Analysis]
2011	On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality RePEc:spr:joecth:v:48:y:2011:i:1:p:87-123	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Voluntary Participation and the Provision of Public Goods in Large Finite Economies RePEc:boc:bocoec:776	[Citation Analysis]
2011	On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:3:p:243-246	[Citation Analysis]
2011	On the number of blocks required to access the coalition structure core RePEc:pra:mprapa:29755	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria RePEc:roc:wallis:wp62	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2011205	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Set-valued solution concepts using interval-type payoffs for interval games RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:4:p:621-626	[Citation Analysis]
2011	The prenucleolus for games with communication structures RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2011_010	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00633881	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Solution Concepts for Cooperative Games with Circular Communication Structure RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2011100	[Citation Analysis]
2011	The Average Tree Solution for Multi-choice Forest Games RePEc:pra:mprapa:28739	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products RePEc:pra:mprapa:28262	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Social interactions and spillovers. RePEc:ner:carlos:info:hdl:10016/12914	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Social interactions and spillovers RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:339-360	[Citation Analysis]
2011	On Large Games with a Bio-Social Typology RePEc:jhu:papers:585	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Ultimata bargaining: generosity without social motives RePEc:pra:mprapa:33613	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Binomial menu auctions in government formation RePEc:pra:mprapa:28576	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Subgame-Perfection in Free Transition Games RePEc:dgr:umamet:2011047	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Pareto-Optimal Assignments by Hierarchical Exchange RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_11	[Citation Analysis]
2011	The Diffusion Approximation of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics: Mean Effective Fixation Time and the Significance of the One-Third Law RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:1:y:2011:i:3:p:462-477	[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY