Most cited documents in this series:

Year	Title	Cited
1994	Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:173-203 [Citation Analysis]	36
1999	Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:35-55 [Citation Analysis]	28
1996	On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:193-209 [Citation Analysis]	23
1994	Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:1-14 [Citation Analysis]	23
1998	Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:371-387 [Citation Analysis]	23
2003	Optimal two-object auctions with synergies RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:143-164 [Citation Analysis]	21
1999	Monotonic extensions on economic domains RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:13-33 [Citation Analysis]	19
1999	Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:255-272 [Citation Analysis]	19
2002	Achieving the first best in sequencing problems RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:75-91 [Citation Analysis]	15
1998	Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:137-147 [Citation Analysis]	15
2000	original papers : Spatial social networks RePEc:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:3:p:273-299 [Citation Analysis]	14
2007	Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:101-124 [Citation Analysis]	12
2004	Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:383-411 [Citation Analysis]	12
2004	Link bidding in laboratory networks RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:359-372 [Citation Analysis]	12
1997	Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:29-43 [Citation Analysis]	11
1999	Feasible implementation of taxation methods RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:57-72 [Citation Analysis]	11
2000	original papers : Auctions with endogenous participation RePEc:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:1:p:71-89 [Citation Analysis]	11
1999	A profit-center game with incomplete information RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:307-343 [Citation Analysis]	10
2000	original papers : A strategic analysis of network reliability RePEc:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:3:p:205-228 [Citation Analysis]	10
1998	The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Efficient networks RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:93-127 [Citation Analysis]	10
1996	Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:147-162 [Citation Analysis]	10
1998	Managerial costs for one-shot decentralized information processing RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:329-345 [Citation Analysis]	9
2006	New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:73-84 [Citation Analysis]	9
1997	Redistribution and individual characteristics RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:45-55 [Citation Analysis]	9
1996	Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:311-324 [Citation Analysis]	9
2001	original papers : On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:1:p:99-111 [Citation Analysis]	9
1999	A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:219-230 [Citation Analysis]	9
2002	Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:27-43 [Citation Analysis]	9
2003	Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:205-215 [Citation Analysis]	8
1994	Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:275-287 [Citation Analysis]	8
1999	Organizational restructuring in response to changes in information-processing technology RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:295-305 [Citation Analysis]	8
1998	Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:257-269 [Citation Analysis]	8
1999	Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:357-379 [Citation Analysis]	8
1998	A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:237-255 [Citation Analysis]	8
2006	Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:3:p:183-203 [Citation Analysis]	8
1997	The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Essential networks RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:15-27 [Citation Analysis]	8
2000	original papers : Network formation with sequential demands RePEc:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:3:p:229-249 [Citation Analysis]	8
2007	The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:165-174 [Citation Analysis]	7
2007	Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:3:p:175-184 [Citation Analysis]	7
2002	First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:461-480 [Citation Analysis]	7
2000	original papers : The stability and efficiency of directed communication networks RePEc:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:3:p:251-272 [Citation Analysis]	7
2007	The theory of contests: a survey RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:69-100 [Citation Analysis]	7
2005	The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:2:p:73-90 [Citation Analysis]	6
1996	Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:325-337 [Citation Analysis]	6
2007	Network potentials RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:1:p:13-52 [Citation Analysis]	6
2002	How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:45-56 [Citation Analysis]	6
2005	Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:4:p:377-396 [Citation Analysis]	6
1999	Natural and double implementation of public ownership solutions in differentiable production economies RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:2:p:127-151 [Citation Analysis]	5
1997	Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:75-89 [Citation Analysis]	5
2007	The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:3:p:199-216 [Citation Analysis]	5

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 6:

Year	Title	See
2011	Choosing and sharing RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:1:p:296-300	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Voluntary Participation and the Provision of Public Goods in Large Finite Economies RePEc:boc:bocoec:776	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? RePEc:aub:autbar:892.11	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Two Necessary Conditions for Strategy-Proofness: on What Domains are they also Sufficient? RePEc:bge:wpaper:598	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:79:y:2011:i:1-2:p:3-19	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:1:p:99-103	[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY