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  Updated February, 5 2013 465.484 documents processed, 11.198.332 references and 4.512.497 citations

 

 
 

Theoretical Economics / Theoretical Economics

Raw citation data, Main indicators, Most cited papers , cites used to compute the impact factor (2011), Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19900.090000.04
19910.10000.05
19920.090000.05
19930.10000.05
19940.120000.04
19950.170000.09
19960.20000.09
19970.210000.09
19980.220000.13
19990.290000.15
20000.40000.15
20010.380000.18
20020.410000.2
20030.440000.2
20040.460000.2
20050.460000.25
20060.491819300160.890.22
20071.330.421612018240130.810.19
20081.380.4317683447060.350.19
20091.580.48243352010.130.19
20100.80.3315222520050.330.16
20110.650.521322315070.330.27
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
II: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y

 

Main indicators

Most cited documents in this series:
YearTitleCited
2006Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations
RePEc:the:publsh:144 [Citation Analysis]
31
2006Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability
RePEc:the:publsh:163 [Citation Analysis]
25
2007Interim correlated rationalizability
RePEc:the:publsh:140 [Citation Analysis]
23
2007Can intergenerational equity be operationalized?
RePEc:the:publsh:309 [Citation Analysis]
17
2006A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets
RePEc:the:publsh:139 [Citation Analysis]
16
2007Secure implementation
RePEc:the:publsh:229 [Citation Analysis]
16
2007Noisy talk
RePEc:the:publsh:263 [Citation Analysis]
16
2006Topologies on types
RePEc:the:publsh:141 [Citation Analysis]
15
2006Optimal auctions with ambiguity
RePEc:the:publsh:203 [Citation Analysis]
14
2006Group formation and voter participation
RePEc:the:publsh:266 [Citation Analysis]
14
2006Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent
RePEc:the:publsh:199 [Citation Analysis]
12
2007Updating preferences with multiple priors
RePEc:the:publsh:215 [Citation Analysis]
12
2006A model of choice from lists
RePEc:the:publsh:164 [Citation Analysis]
11
2006Financial equilibrium with career concerns
RePEc:the:publsh:165 [Citation Analysis]
10
2007Coarse contingencies and ambiguity
RePEc:the:publsh:223 [Citation Analysis]
10
2006Information, evolution and utility
RePEc:the:publsh:166 [Citation Analysis]
10
2008Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics
RePEc:the:publsh:194 [Citation Analysis]
9
2006A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
RePEc:the:publsh:211 [Citation Analysis]
9
2008Consumer optimism and price discrimination
RePEc:the:publsh:326 [Citation Analysis]
8
2008Contagion through learning
RePEc:the:publsh:416 [Citation Analysis]
8
2006Competitive markets with externalities
RePEc:the:publsh:168 [Citation Analysis]
8
2009Strategy-proofness and single-crossing
RePEc:the:publsh:399 [Citation Analysis]
8
2006Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria
RePEc:the:publsh:159 [Citation Analysis]
8
2008Many inspections are manipulable
RePEc:the:publsh:398 [Citation Analysis]
8
2008Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces
RePEc:the:publsh:334 [Citation Analysis]
8
2008Caller Number Five and related timing games
RePEc:the:publsh:375 [Citation Analysis]
7
2009Robust virtual implementation
RePEc:the:publsh:453 [Citation Analysis]
6
2010Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
RePEc:the:publsh:507 [Citation Analysis]
6
2007Complementarities in information acquisition with short-term trades
RePEc:the:publsh:294 [Citation Analysis]
6
2012Implementation with evidence
RePEc:the:publsh:723 [Citation Analysis]
6
2007A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence
RePEc:the:publsh:277 [Citation Analysis]
6
2006Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
RePEc:the:publsh:167 [Citation Analysis]
6
2008Price dispersion and loss leaders
RePEc:the:publsh:362 [Citation Analysis]
5
2011Dynamic choice under ambiguity
RePEc:the:publsh:571 [Citation Analysis]
5
2011Intertemporal substitution and recursive smooth ambiguity preferences
RePEc:the:publsh:843 [Citation Analysis]
5
2007Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies
RePEc:the:publsh:176 [Citation Analysis]
4
2009Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship
RePEc:the:publsh:442 [Citation Analysis]
4
2008Nonlinear pricing, market coverage, and competition
RePEc:the:publsh:336 [Citation Analysis]
4
2008Subjective expected utility in games
RePEc:the:publsh:302 [Citation Analysis]
4
2006Endogenous incomplete markets, enforcement constraints, and intermediation
RePEc:the:publsh:204 [Citation Analysis]
4
2006Ex post implementation in environments with private goods
RePEc:the:publsh:182 [Citation Analysis]
4
2010Rationalizable voting
RePEc:the:publsh:425 [Citation Analysis]
4
2012Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
RePEc:the:publsh:898 [Citation Analysis]
3
2011Search, choice, and revealed preference
RePEc:the:publsh:592 [Citation Analysis]
3
2011Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy
RePEc:the:publsh:567 [Citation Analysis]
3
2010Supermodular mechanism design
RePEc:the:publsh:604 [Citation Analysis]
3
2011Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games
RePEc:the:publsh:795 [Citation Analysis]
3
2009Choice deferral and ambiguity aversion
RePEc:the:publsh:498 [Citation Analysis]
3
2012A partial folk theorem for games with private learning
RePEc:the:publsh:913 [Citation Analysis]
3
2011Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
RePEc:the:publsh:771 [Citation Analysis]
3

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 15:
YearTitleSee
2011Vote Revelation: Empirical Characterization of Scoring Rules
RePEc:cie:wpaper:1102
[Citation Analysis]
2011Foundations of spatial preferences
RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:2:p:200-205
[Citation Analysis]
2011Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games
RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:1:p:300-325
[Citation Analysis]
2011Asset Pricing under Rational Learning about Rare Disasters
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8514
[Citation Analysis]
2011Should the Flatterers be Avoided?
RePEc:red:sed011:1273
[Citation Analysis]
2011High profit equilibria in directed search models
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:1:p:224-234
[Citation Analysis]
2011Common Agency with Informed Principals: Menus and Signals
RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1541
[Citation Analysis]
2011Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games
RePEc:pra:mprapa:32871
[Citation Analysis]
2011Public Good Provision with Convex Costs
RePEc:pra:mprapa:36984
[Citation Analysis]
2011Ambiguity and Robust Statistics
RePEc:igi:igierp:382
[Citation Analysis]
2011On the multi-utility representation of preference relations
RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:4:p:554-563
[Citation Analysis]
2011Matching Through Position Auctions
RePEc:nod:wpaper:001
[Citation Analysis]
2011Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences
RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:2:p:180-185
[Citation Analysis]
2011Robust implementation in general mechanisms
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:261-281
[Citation Analysis]
2011A robustness result for rationalizable implementation
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:301-305
[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY

Recent citations received in: 2011

YearTitleSee
2011Preference for Variety
RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2011-13
[Citation Analysis]
2011Voluntary Participation and the Provision of Public Goods in Large Finite Economies
RePEc:boc:bocoec:776
[Citation Analysis]
2011Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?
RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000316
[Citation Analysis]
2011Strictly Dominated Strategies in the Replicator-Mutator Dynamics
RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:3:p:355-364:d:13950
[Citation Analysis]
2011A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17163
[Citation Analysis]
2011Fast Convergence in Population Games
RePEc:oxf:wpaper:570
[Citation Analysis]
2011Asset Priving and Ambiguity: Empirical Evidence
RePEc:ste:nystbu:11-10
[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2010

YearTitleSee
2010Threshold uncertainty in the private-information subscription game
RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:11-12:p:848-861
[Citation Analysis]
2010Revealed Political Power
RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~10-10-01
[Citation Analysis]
2010On Games of Strategic Experimentation
RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00579613
[Citation Analysis]
2010Prediction Markets to Forecast Electricity Demand
RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1529
[Citation Analysis]
2010Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice
RePEc:tul:wpaper:1006
[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2009

YearTitleSee
2009Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: a Unified Approach ot Exact and Approximate Implementation
RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-11
[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2008

YearTitleSee
2008Log-linear Dynamics and Local Potential
RePEc:ads:wpaper:0085
[Citation Analysis]
2008Speculative Attacks: A Laboratory Study in Continuous Time
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2420
[Citation Analysis]
2008Investment dynamics with common and private values
RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:143:y:2008:i:1:p:114-139
[Citation Analysis]
2008Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests
RePEc:pen:papers:08-014
[Citation Analysis]
2008Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests
RePEc:pen:papers:08-015
[Citation Analysis]
2008Log-linear Dynamics and Local Potential
RePEc:rut:rutres:200807
[Citation Analysis]

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

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