Contributions to Theoretical Economics

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.17 0 0 0 0.08 1997 0.2 0 0 0 0.08 1998 0.23 0 0 0 0.1 1999 0.32 0 0 0 0.16 2000 0.43 0 0 0 0.19 2001 0.39 6 8 0 0 1 0.17 0.17 2002 0.17 0.42 4 9 6 1 0 0.2 2003 0.3 0.47 9 31 10 3 0 3 0.33 0.22
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1058-1058 Homothetic or Cobb-Douglas Behavior Through Aggregation (2003). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 12 times.

(2) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1084-1084 Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information (2003). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 9 times.

(3) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:4:y:2004:i:1:p:1158-1158 Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry (2004). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 8 times.

(4) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:1:y:2001:i:contributions/1/1:p:1030-1030 Bilateral Trade and Opportunism in a Matching Market (2001). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 7 times.

(5) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:2:y:2002:i:1:p:1046-1046 Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (2002). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 5 times.

(6) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1048-1048 Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments (2003). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 4 times.

(7) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:5:y:2005:i:1:p:1129-1129 On the Welfare Evaluation of Income and Opportunity (2005). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 3 times.

(8) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:4:y:2004:i:1:p:1109-1109 Players With Limited Memory (2004). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 3 times.

(9) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1080-1080 Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders (2003). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 3 times.

(10) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:2:y:2002:i:1:p:1016-1016 Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending (2002). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 2 times.

(11) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1060-1060 Competitive Equilibria With Incomplete Markets and Endogenous Bankruptcy (2003). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 1 times.

(12) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:1:y:2001:i:contributions/1/1:p:1017-1017 Incomplete Contracts. Non-Contractible Quality, and Renegotiation (2001). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 1 times.

(13) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:2:y:2002:i:1:p:1053-1053 The Noisy Duopolist (2002). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 1 times.

(14) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:2:y:2002:i:1:p:1040-1040 Bargaining over Risky Assets (2002). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 1 times.

(15) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1074-1074 Adverse Selection and Insurance Contracting: A Rank-Dependent Utility Analysis (2003). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 1 times.

(16) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:1219-1219 Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions (2007). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 1 times.

(17) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:2:y:2003:i:1:p:1055-1055 Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion (2003). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 1 times.

(18) RePEc:bep:thecon:v:4:y:2004:i:1:p:1103-1103 A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities (2004). Contributions to Theoretical Economics
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000280 Putting Your Ballot Where you Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(2) RePEc:cla:uclawp:827 Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication* (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / UCLA Economics Working Papers

(3) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1411 Committee Design in the Presence of Communication (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Latest citations received in: 2002

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse28_2001 Holdups, Quality Choice, and the Achilles Heel in Government Contracting (2001). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

Latest citations received in: 2000

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.