UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.16 1 0 6 0 0.07 1997 0.17 2 0 6 0 0.09 1998 0.19 1 0 3 0 0.12 1999 0.29 1 0 3 0 0.19 2000 0.39 37 23 2 0 3 0.08 0.2 2001 0.03 0.34 25 40 38 1 0 4 0.16 0.18 2002 0.21 0.39 10 16 62 13 0 0.2 2003 0.26 0.41 4 0 35 9 0 0.21
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:cla:penntw:d3d043317c8e26c4039c21aa0b769a3f Love and Money: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Household Sorting and Inequality (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 16 times.

(2) RePEc:cla:penntw:2772f94306e08ef72929455880130824 ef=CARESSpdf/95-17.pdf >95-17 A Rudimentary Model of Search with Divisible Money and Prices (0000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 11 times.

(3) RePEc:cla:penntw:ab67d13cfae3b5b56b7b9df3bc7e7758 Contagion (0000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 8 times.

(4) RePEc:cla:penntw:3756d78204ca49d92aaf1c17c05928c1 Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance Mechanism (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 6 times.

(5) RePEc:cla:penntw:ca48ba70927f48a4e11034658453afb0 Affirmative Action in a Competitive Economy (0000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 6 times.

(6) RePEc:cla:penntw:5d82f80bcea2483b6387c5b68db8a6c2 Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (2000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 6 times.

(7) RePEc:cla:penntw:40893328535d25cf3e69a981aa646d1a Is Bigger Better? Investing in Reputation (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 5 times.

(8) RePEc:cla:penntw:d93eb6f40c65728f9e1a7b11423f1641 Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Private Monitoring (0000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 5 times.

(9) RePEc:cla:penntw:08d6793d32cab8f6e1f46dac0dbb3611 Efficient Non-Contractible Investments (2000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 5 times.

(10) RePEc:cla:penntw:49355d43c11f2314075e8b54e0c7759e The Timing of Births: A Marriage Market Analysis (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 4 times.

(11) RePEc:cla:penntw:90ff654ed11b714e3f7530c57af25d2c Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search (2000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 4 times.

(12) RePEc:cla:penntw:95ec48d1c0f2065e1d4aaeb9935660a9 Product Quality, Reputation and Turnover (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 4 times.

(13) RePEc:cla:penntw:7f6ff09d59945e06909ce4fa4e11ae69 Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (2006). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 4 times.

(14) RePEc:cla:penntw:592e9328faf6e775bf331e1c08707dd2 The Incentive Effects of Interim Performance Evaluations (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 3 times.

(15) RePEc:cla:penntw:f8c083d9257897f97ff49d054e345737 Foreign Direct Investment and Exports with Growing Demand (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 3 times.

(16) RePEc:cla:penntw:6f8dbf67d492ff8a10975496b3a2d69d Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project (0000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 3 times.

(17) RePEc:cla:penntw:c01a38364dc5936be7b40274d09c6f20 Multilateral Negotiations and Formation of Coalitions (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 2 times.

(18) RePEc:cla:penntw:058589d20e3fbe4e559adb44b3d24651 An Alternative Approach to Market Frictions: An Application to the Market for Taxicab Rides (2005). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 2 times.

(19) RePEc:cla:penntw:5ecbb5c20d3d547f357aa130654099f3 Applying Artificial Neural Networks to Business, Economics and Finance (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 2 times.

(20) RePEc:cla:penntw:dfdfbbfe0a5b0e04217a58a9319b4963 Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 2 times.

(21) RePEc:cla:penntw:9c26245814018c6e9fadb3767c054fb0 Justifying Rational Expectations (2000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 2 times.

(22) RePEc:cla:penntw:1879bf5487d743edef7f32bb2949354e Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching (0000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 2 times.

(23) RePEc:cla:penntw:452f3f87415f37596752b399575585f0 Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy (1995). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 2 times.

(24) RePEc:cla:penntw:1a3065cabe91a2a7ec65d93b0bd9e028 Endogenous Lob (2000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 2 times.

(25) RePEc:cla:penntw:ee2dae6cb07096d09f83c7bca7bfd056 Vintage Capital, Distortions and Development (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:cla:penntw:0915aad416461c93559b9430d6e89727 Is Bargaining over Prices Efficient? (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:cla:penntw:b8d506ba7aa15345b602bb4ebcc6d293 Co-operation and Timing (2000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 1 times.

(28) RePEc:cla:penntw:269cceedcbd401a5e46548b88874373f The Revelation of Information and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs (2000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 1 times.

(29) RePEc:cla:penntw:d12f7936881423171f6589501c00cc2d Speculative Investor Behavior and Learning (1995). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 1 times.

(30) RePEc:cla:penntw:ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c84801ca5 An Economic Model of Representative Democracy (2000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 1 times.

(31) RePEc:cla:penntw:e7304519c6d1562163dbaf18101da17e Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 1 times.

(32) RePEc:cla:penntw:3b8e0b3847b08b90e8570987ca5d133b Screening Through Bundling (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 1 times.

(33) RePEc:cla:penntw:bb127ee2a4b562b26fd991e9fe26ad0b On Preservation of Increasing Hazard Rate Under Convolution (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:cla:penntw:db8edf1dce2468924aca9e50160e7919 The Drawbacks of Electoral Competition (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:cla:penntw:4e07391e101139fde2f8e70d4bc5a0b3 Ergodicity and Clustering in Opinion Formation (0000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:cla:penntw:471ab9dee66c9aa1d3ef23dd9ba1ceb3 Capital Accumulation under Non-Gaussian Processes and the Marshallian Law (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:cla:penntw:cae679cdc2e020f74d692ae73e6d291c Utilizing Artificial Neural Network Model to Predict Stock Markets (2000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:cla:penntw:e9e0aca257b20d3bb6bb4a52a98edeb8 Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (0000). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers
Cited: 1 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000

Latest citations received in: 2003

Latest citations received in: 2002

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:cla:penntw:bb127ee2a4b562b26fd991e9fe26ad0b On Preservation of Increasing Hazard Rate Under Convolution (2001). UCLA Department of Economics / Penn CARESS Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2699 Quantity Discounts for Time-Varying Consumers (2001). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200139 The nucleolus as a consistent power index in noncooperative majority games (2001). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(4) RePEc:gco:abcdef:31 Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

Latest citations received in: 2000

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_317 Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem? (2000). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1296 CK-Equilibria and Informational Efficiency in a Competitive Economy (2000). Econometric Society / Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers

(3) RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1330 Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Private Monitoring (2000). Econometric Society / Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.