Games and Economic Behavior

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.17 0.17 97 597 110 19 0 8 0.08 0.08 1997 0.24 0.2 63 356 146 35 0 13 0.21 0.08 1998 0.23 0.23 61 238 160 36 0 5 0.08 0.1 1999 0.22 0.32 63 281 124 27 0 7 0.11 0.16 2000 0.4 0.43 67 356 124 49 0 26 0.39 0.19 2001 0.32 0.39 75 267 130 41 0 19 0.25 0.17 2002 0.45 0.42 68 272 142 64 0 28 0.41 0.2 2003 0.52 0.47 87 334 143 74 0 22 0.25 0.22
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:122-142 Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History (1995). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 204 times.

(2) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:6-38 Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games (1995). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 122 times.

(3) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:124-143 Potential Games (1996). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 99 times.

(4) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:268-298 A theory of sequential reciprocity (2004). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 87 times.

(5) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:387-424 The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction (1993). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 86 times.

(6) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:347-369 Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments (1994). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 85 times.

(7) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:3:p:346-380 Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games (1994). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 81 times.

(8) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:60-79 Psychological games and sequential rationality (1989). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 81 times.

(9) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:327-360 Renegotiation in repeated games (1989). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 78 times.

(10) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:29-46 Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria (1990). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 69 times.

(11) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:26:y:1999:i:2:p:286-336 A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures (1999). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 56 times.

(12) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:90-123 Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division (1996). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 56 times.

(13) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:2:p:201-230 The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 54 times.

(14) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:218-254 On Players Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence (1995). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 54 times.

(15) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:170-190 Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs (1989). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 49 times.

(16) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:16:y:1996:i:2:p:181-191 Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games (1996). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 45 times.

(17) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:95-121 Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining (1995). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 45 times.

(18) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:320-367 Learning Mixed Equilibria (1993). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 43 times.

(19) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:2:p:201-237 Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities (1997). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 42 times.

(20) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:293-315 A theory of reciprocity (2006). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 42 times.

(21) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:82-100 Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games (1991). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 39 times.

(22) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:260-281 How to identify trust and reciprocity (2004). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 38 times.

(23) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:30:y:2000:i:2:p:163-182 Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game (2000). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 37 times.

(24) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:19:y:1997:i:1:p:46-76 Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results (1997). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 37 times.

(25) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:13:y:1996:i:1:p:100-110 Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs (1996). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 37 times.

(26) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:15:y:1996:i:2:p:132-148 Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games (1996). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 35 times.

(27) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:13-24 The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations (1999). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 35 times.

(28) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:4:p:378-394 Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility (1990). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 34 times.

(29) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:1:p:62-91 Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game (1994). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 33 times.

(30) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:295-326 Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games (1989). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 33 times.

(31) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:445-468 A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects (1994). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 33 times.

(32) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:79-109 Social Norms and Random Matching Games (1995). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 32 times.

(33) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:425-454 An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction (1993). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 31 times.

(34) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:41:y:2002:i:2:p:265-291 On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games (2002). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 29 times.

(35) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:331-341 A Dynamic Model of Network Formation (2001). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 29 times.

(36) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:12:y:1996:i:2:p:187-218 Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoners Dilemma Games (1996). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 29 times.

(37) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:2:p:295-300 The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice (1994). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 28 times.

(38) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:4:p:514-531 Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games (1993). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 26 times.

(39) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:21:y:1997:i:1-2:p:40-55 Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium (1997). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 25 times.

(40) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:5-39 Cooperation and bounded recall (1989). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 24 times.

(41) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:25:y:1998:i:2:p:147-148 Introduction (1998). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 24 times.

(42) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:217-226 The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games (2003). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 24 times.

(43) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:1:p:134-158 An experimental study of price dispersion (2006). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 23 times.

(44) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:177-199 Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium (2001). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 23 times.

(45) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:111-145 The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision (1995). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 23 times.

(46) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:60-81 Bayesian learning in normal form games (1991). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 23 times.

(47) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:45:y:2003:i:1:p:97-113 Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games (2003). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 22 times.

(48) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:55:y:2006:i:2:p:297-320 Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction (2006). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 21 times.

(49) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:43:y:2003:i:1:p:57-85 Networks of collaboration in oligopoly (2003). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 21 times.

(50) RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:33:y:2000:i:2:p:206-230 On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings (2000). Games and Economic Behavior
Cited: 21 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:att:wimass:200320 Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs (2003). Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems / Working papers

(2) RePEc:bol:bodewp:495 Dynamic R&D with Spillovers: Competition vs Cooperation (2003). Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna / Working Papers

(3) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse6_2003 Splitting Leagues (2003). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:cir:cirwor:2003s-32 Testing Equilibrium Behaviour At First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auctions With Discrete Bid Increments (2003). CIRANO / CIRANO Working Papers

(5) RePEc:cla:levarc:666156000000000374 A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(6) RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000042 Excess Payoff Dynamics, Potential Dynamics, and Stable Games (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Theory workshop papers

(7) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1185 A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2003). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(8) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3784 Delay in Contests (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3884 Are we Better Off if our Politicians Have More Information? (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1423 Multidimensional Private Value Auctions (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(11) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20030041 Hybrid R&D (2003). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(12) RePEc:esx:essedp:563 Learning in Networks: a survey (2003). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers

(13) RePEc:esx:essedp:564 Hybrid R&D (2003). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers

(14) RePEc:got:cegedp:21 Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict (2003). Center for Globalization and Europeanization of the Economy, University of Goettingen (Germany). / CeGE Discussion Papers

(15) RePEc:hal:papers:hal-00242993_v1 Geometry, Correlated Equilibria and Zero-Sum Games (2003). HAL, CCSd/CNRS / Pre- and Post-Print documents

(16) RePEc:hhs:osloec:2003_005 The semantics of preference-based belief operators. (2003). Oslo University, Department of Economics / Memorandum

(17) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp318 Dissolving a Common Value Partnership in a Repeated queto Game (2003). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(18) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1372 Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms (2003). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(19) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1373 No-Regret with Bounded Computational Capacity (2003). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(20) RePEc:pen:papers:03-027 Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information (2003). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(21) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0306002 Bargaining with commitments (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(22) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0311001 Stable Outcomes For Contract Choice Problems (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:523.02 24 (2002). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:aub:autbar:539.02 Stable Condorcet Rules (2002). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(3) RePEc:boc:bocoec:478 Coalition Formation as a Dynamic Process (2002). Boston College Department of Economics / Boston College Working Papers in Economics

(4) RePEc:cam:camdae:0205 Modelling Experience as Signal Accumulation (2002). Faculty of Economics (formerly DAE), University of Cambridge / Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

(5) RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:19-02 Double Auctions, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, and the Hold-Up Problem (2002). Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara / University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series

(6) RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:wp19-02 Double Auctions, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, and the Hold-Up Problem (2002). Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara / University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series

(7) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1149 Social Networks in Determing Employment and Wages: Patterns, Dynamics, and Inequality (2002). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(8) RePEc:clu:wpaper:0102-64 The relation between implementability and the core (2002). Columbia University, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:clu:wpaper:0102-65 Random paths to stability in the roommate problem (2002). Columbia University, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200226 Two-stage bargaining with reversible coalitions : the case of apex games (2002). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(11) RePEc:ebg:heccah:0757 Perturbed Markov Chains (2002). Groupe HEC / Les Cahiers de Recherche

(12) RePEc:esi:discus:2002-29 A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility (2002). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(13) RePEc:gco:abcdef:19 NP-completeness in Hedonic Games (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(14) RePEc:gco:abcdef:20 Unique Stability in Simple Coalition Formation Games (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(15) RePEc:gco:abcdef:49 Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(16) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp284 Long Cheap Talk (2002). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(17) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp295 Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax (2002). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(18) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp297 Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests. (2002). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(19) RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:115 The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games (2002). Institute for Advanced Studies / Economics Series

(20) RePEc:ind:isipdp:02-04 Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games (2002). Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India / Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers

(21) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2002-26 BUILDING UP SOCIAL CAPITAL IN A CHANGING WORLD (2002). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

(22) RePEc:nid:ovolij:016 A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility (2002). Oscar Volij / Economic theory and game theory

(23) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1341 Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring (2002). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(24) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1342 Perturbed Markov Chains (2002). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(25) RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2002-01 The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, Punishments, and Cooperation (2002). University of Oregon Economics Department / University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers

(26) RePEc:trn:utwpce:0214 Coordination and information in critical mass games: an experimental study (2002). Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia / CEEL Working Papers

(27) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0211005 The Strategy-Proof Provision of Public Goods under Congestion and Crowding Preferences (2002). EconWPA / Microeconomics

(28) RePEc:wrk:warwec:640 DYNAMIC CLUB FORMATION WITH COORDINATION (2002). University of Warwick, Department of Economics / The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:5:p:1402-1422 Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions (2001). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:5:p:1521-1538 Minimax Play at Wimbledon (2001). American Economic Review

(3) RePEc:att:wimass:200116 Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation (2001). Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems / Working papers

(4) RePEc:att:wimass:200125 A dynamic theory of holdup (2001). Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems / Working papers

(5) RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:2001-16 Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions (2001). Department of Economics, UC San Diego / University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series

(6) RePEc:cte:werepe:we015417 GENERALIZED EXTERNALITY GAMES (2001). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(7) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200186 Family versus public solidarity : theory and experiment (2001). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(8) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2001002 Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games (2001). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(9) RePEc:exc:wpaper:2006-01 Assigning Intentions when Actions are Unobservable: the Impact of Trembling in the Trust Game (2001). Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University / Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series

(10) RePEc:gco:abcdef:7 Strongly Stable Networks (2001). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(11) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp264 Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation (2001). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(12) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp395 Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes (2001). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(13) RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2003-01 The Structure of Information Networks (2001). Department of Economics, Louisiana State University / Departmental Working Papers

(14) RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-14 Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games (2001). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche

(15) RePEc:nys:sunysb:01-05 Does Wealth Affect Fairness Considerations? (2001). SUNY-Stony Brook, Department of Economics / Department of Economics Working Papers

(16) RePEc:osu:osuewp:01-08 On the Evolution of Comparative Advantage in a Matching Model (2001). Ohio State University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(17) RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2001/15 Coordination, Local Interactions and Endogenous Neighborhood Formation (2001). Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy / LEM Papers Series

(18) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0112001 Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes (2001). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(19) RePEc:wrk:warwec:589 Some First Results for Noncooperative Pregames : Social Conformity and Equilibrium in Pure Strategies. (2001). University of Warwick, Department of Economics / The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)

Latest citations received in: 2000

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:1:p:166-193 ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition (2000). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:aub:autbar:448.00 ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF PARTNERSHIPS WITH MORAL HAZARD. (2000). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(3) RePEc:aub:autbar:461.00 BIDDING FOR THE SURPLUS: A NON-COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO THE SHAPLEY VALUE. (2000). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(4) RePEc:aub:autbar:464.00 Endogeneizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments (2000). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(5) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_290 Strategic Delegation in Experimental Markets (2000). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(6) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_331 Evolutionary Norm Enforcement (2000). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(7) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2622 Endogenizing Know-How Flows Through the Nature of R&D Investments (2000). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200043 Semi-infinite assignment and transportation games (2000). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(9) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200049 The Owen set and the core of semi-infinite linear production situations (2000). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(10) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200071 The limit of public policy : endogenous preferences (2000). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(11) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200084 Directed communication networks (2000). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(12) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200089 On the core of semi-infinite transportation games with divisible goods (2000). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(13) RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0428 Endogenizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments (2000). IESE Business School / IESE Research Papers

(14) RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0704 A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure (2000). Econometric Society / Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers

(15) RePEc:gco:abcdef:1 Stable Hedonic Cooperation Structures (2000). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(16) RePEc:gco:abcdef:2 On the Stability of Cooperation Structures (2000). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(17) RePEc:igi:igierp:190 Rationalizable Bidding in General First-Price Auctions (2000). IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University / Working Papers

(18) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1311 The Dynamics of the Nash Equilibrium Correspondence and n-Player Stochastic Games (2000). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(19) RePEc:oxf:wpaper:039 Bribing Voters (2000). University of Oxford, Department of Economics / Economics Series Working Papers

(20) RePEc:oxf:wpaper:040 Money Burning and Stealing in the Laboratory: How Conflicting Ideologies Emerge (2000). University of Oxford, Department of Economics / Economics Series Working Papers

(21) RePEc:red:issued:v:3:y:2000:i:2:p:247-282 Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics (2000). Review of Economic Dynamics

(22) RePEc:uwo:uwowop:200010 The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements (2000). University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics / UWO Department of Economics Working Papers

(23) RePEc:vie:viennp:0005 Learning by Imitation when Playing the Field (2000). University of Vienna, Department of Economics / Vienna Economics Papers

(24) RePEc:vie:viennp:0008 Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria (2000). University of Vienna, Department of Economics / Vienna Economics Papers

(25) RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv00-17 Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-Robustness (2000). Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competitiveness and Industrial Change (CIC) / CIC Working Papers

(26) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:067 Random Dynamical Systems in Economics (2000). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.