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 Updated May, 1 2008 147.392 documents processed, 3.154.300 references and 1.403.701 citations

 

 
 

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.070.179319319213010.010.08
19970.060.25412119111070.130.08
19980.090.2314548614713040.030.1
19990.160.327332619931070.10.16
20000.330.4383320218710290.350.19
20010.350.398224115654070.090.17
20020.390.4296239165640120.130.2
20030.350.4790287178620350.390.22
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
 
Impact Factor:
 
Immediacy Index:
 
Documents published:
 
Citations received:
 

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:3:y:1982:i:4:p:367-388 An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining (1982). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 162 times.

(2) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:3:y:1982:i:4:p:323-343 A theory of anticipated utility (1982). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 121 times.

(3) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:27:y:1995:i:1:p:35-47 Will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of all? (1995). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 104 times.

(4) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:5:y:1984:i:3-4:p:287-320 Schumpeterian competition in alternative technological regimes (1984). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 56 times.

(5) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:1-30 Understanding corporate coherence : Theory and evidence (1994). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 44 times.

(6) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:13:y:1990:i:1:p:63-76 How corruption may corrupt (1990). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 43 times.

(7) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:3:y:1982:i:1:p:39-63 Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm (1982). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 42 times.

(8) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:42:y:2000:i:2:p:265-277 The moonlighting game: An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution (2000). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 42 times.

(9) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:4:y:1983:i:1:p:1-24 Collective invention (1983). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 39 times.

(10) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:54:y:2004:i:1:p:89-109 The role of income aspirations in individual happiness (2004). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 38 times.

(11) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:52:y:2003:i:2:p:267-275 Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games (2003). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 38 times.

(12) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:45:y:2001:i:3:p:251-278 Relative-income effects on subjective well-being in the cross-section (2001). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 36 times.

(13) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:14:y:1990:i:3:p:299-329 Bulls, bears and market sheep (1990). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 36 times.

(14) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:34:y:1998:i:2:p:193-209 Is altruism evolutionarily stable? (1998). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 35 times.

(15) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:7:y:1986:i:1:p:47-70 End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoners Dilemma supergames A learning theory approach (1986). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 34 times.

(16) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:39:y:1999:i:2:p:179-200 Are wages habit-forming? evidence from micro data (1999). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 33 times.

(17) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:41:y:2000:i:3:p:299-314 Thinking like a game theorist: factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play (2000). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 31 times.

(18) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:223-247 Economies of scope and the scope of the enterprise (1980). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 30 times.

(19) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:34:y:1998:i:4:p:517-539 An experimental solidarity game (1998). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 29 times.

(20) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:11:y:1989:i:3:p:399-422 The main bank system and corporate monitoring and control in Japan (1989). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 29 times.

(21) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:49:y:2002:i:2:p:149-171 The price dynamics of common trading strategies (2002). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 28 times.

(22) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:34:y:1998:i:1:p:143-161 Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing (1998). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 27 times.

(23) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:35:y:1998:i:2:p:161-177 Imagination and leadership - The neglected dimension of an evolutionary theory of the firm (1998). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 26 times.

(24) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:25:y:1994:i:3:p:373-389 The role of envy in ultimatum games (1994). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 25 times.

(25) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:44:y:2001:i:1:p:31-54 Making sense of institutions as a factor shaping economic performance (2001). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 25 times.

(26) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:25:y:1994:i:3:p:309-327 Experimental evidence on players models of other players (1994). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 25 times.

(27) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:12:y:1989:i:1:p:87-106 Cooperation in a repeated prisoners dilemma with ostracism (1989). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 25 times.

(28) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:43:y:2000:i:1:p:101-113 Does economics make citizens corrupt? (2000). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 24 times.

(29) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:25:y:1994:i:1:p:1-24 On limiting or encouraging rivalry in technical progress: The effect of patent scope decisions (1994). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 24 times.

(30) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:53:y:2004:i:4:p:435-446 Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies (2004). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 22 times.

(31) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:39:y:1999:i:4:p:341-369 Collective action as a social exchange (1999). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 22 times.

(32) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:38:y:1999:i:2:p:155-178 Loss aversion in a consumption-savings model (1999). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 21 times.

(33) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:55:y:2004:i:4:p:447-465 Is trust a risky decision? (2004). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 21 times.

(34) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:38:y:1999:i:1:p:43-57 The sound of silence in prisoners dilemma and dictator games (1999). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 21 times.

(35) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:12:y:1989:i:3:p:305-327 Agency costs and innovation (1989). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 21 times.

(36) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:42:y:2000:i:3:p:375-384 Responsibility and effort in an experimental labor market (2000). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 21 times.

(37) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:55:y:2004:i:4:p:467-484 Trust, risk and betrayal (2004). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 21 times.

(38) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:32:y:1997:i:1:p:137-154 Expected and realized income changes: Evidence from the Dutch socio-economic panel (1997). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 20 times.

(39) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:33:y:1998:i:2:p:167-184 The disposition effect in securities trading: an experimental analysis (1998). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 20 times.

(40) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:45:y:2001:i:3:p:301-328 Relative payoffs and happiness: an experimental study (2001). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 20 times.

(41) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:51:y:2003:i:1:p:29-49 The anatomy of subjective well-being (2003). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 20 times.

(42) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:40:y:1999:i:4:p:409-426 A panel data model for subjective information on household income growth (1999). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 20 times.

(43) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:33:y:1998:i:2:p:143-165 The socio-economic dynamics of speculative markets: interacting agents, chaos, and the fat tails of return distributions (1998). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 19 times.

(44) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:39:y:1999:i:4:p:437-453 A general equilibrium model of crime and punishment (1999). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 18 times.

(45) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:29:y:1996:i:1:p:113-140 Evolutionary stability and social norms (1996). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 18 times.

(46) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:29:y:1996:i:1:p:87-112 The coevolution of automata in the repeated Prisoners Dilemma (1996). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 18 times.

(47) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:51:y:2003:i:2:p:195-216 Playing both roles in the trust game (2003). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 18 times.

(48) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:38:y:1999:i:1:p:1-25 Social relations and cooperation in organizations (1999). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 17 times.

(49) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:2:y:1981:i:4:p:335-357 The quasifirm in the construction industry (1981). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 17 times.

(50) RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:49:y:2002:i:1:p:19-37 Modularity in technology and organization (2002). Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Cited: 17 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:aal:abbswp:03-01 Knowledge Flows through Informal Contacts in Industrial Clusters: Myths or Realities? (2003). DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies / DRUID Workin

(2) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:3:p:465-508 Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics (2003). American Economic Review

(3) RePEc:bol:bodewp:499 Prices vs. Quantities in Health Insurance Reimbursement (2003). Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna / Working Papers

(4) RePEc:cca:wplabo:32 On the Use of Agent-Based Simulations (2003). LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies / Working Papers

(5) RePEc:cea:doctra:e2003_19 Gender Differences in Prisoners Dilemma (2003). Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces / Economic Working Papers at centrA

(6) RePEc:cea:doctra:e2003_50 Poverty in Dictator Games: Awakening Solidarity (2003). Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces / Economic Working Papers at centrA

(7) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3860 Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaption? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism (2003). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(8) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2003124 Job market signaling and screening: an experimental comparison (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(9) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200347 On representative trust (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(10) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200360 Does it take three to make two happy? An experimental study on bargaining with mediation (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(11) RePEc:dgr:umamer:2003003 Knowledge Dynamics in a Network Industry (2003). Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology / Research Memoranda

(12) RePEc:eab:microe:450 Optimal Capital Investment, Uncertainty and Outsourcing (2003). East Asian Bureau of Economic Research / Microeconomics Working Papers

(13) RePEc:esa:iesawp:0303 Poverty in Dictator Games: Awakening Solidarity (2003). Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research / IESA Working Papers Series

(14) RePEc:esi:discus:2003-23 When the past is present – The ratchet effect in the local commons (2003). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(15) RePEc:esi:discus:2003-25 On the nature of fair behavior and its development with age – (2003). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(16) RePEc:esx:essedp:563 Learning in Networks: a survey (2003). University of Essex, Department of Economics / Economics Discussion Papers

(17) RePEc:hhs:osloec:2003_031 Green consumers and public policy: On socially contingent moral motivation (2003). Oslo University, Department of Economics / Memorandum

(18) RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2003_0003 Promises & Partnership (2003). Stockholm University, Department of Economics / Research Papers in Economics

(19) RePEc:hrr:papers:0305 Economic and Hypothetical Dictator Game Experiments: Incentive Effects at the Individual Level (2003). Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus) / Working Papers

(20) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp887 Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations (2003). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(21) RePEc:lmu:muenec:40 Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences (2003). University of Munich, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers in Economics

(22) RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:03-29 Pro-social Behavior in the Global Commons: A North-South Experiment (2003). Middlebury College, Department of Economics / Middlebury College Working Paper Series

(23) RePEc:mlb:wpaper:875 Gender Differences in Trust and Reciprocity (2003). The University of Melbourne / Department of Economics - Working Papers Series

(24) RePEc:mtl:montde:2003-20 Yesterday’s Games: Contingency Learning and the Growth of Public Spending, 1890-1938 (2003). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche

(25) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9736 Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(26) RePEc:tky:fseres:2003cf244 Implementation and Preference for Honesty (2003). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

(27) RePEc:tky:fseres:2003cf254 Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation (2003). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

(28) RePEc:usi:wpaper:407 Financial Fragility and Economic Fluctuations: Numerical Simulations and Policy Implications (2003). Department of Economics, University of Siena / Experimental Economics

(29) RePEc:vie:viennp:0320 The Asset Market Game (2003). University of Vienna, Department of Economics / Vienna Economics Papers

(30) RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0303002 Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests (2003). EconWPA / General Economics and Teaching

(31) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0305010 Psychological Foundations of Incentives (2003). EconWPA / Microeconomics

(32) RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0309001 What sustains social norms and how they evolve? The case of tipping (2003). EconWPA / Others

(33) RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0309002 The implications of tipping for economics and management (2003). EconWPA / Others

(34) RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0309006 The Social Norm of Tipping: A Review (2003). EconWPA / Others

(35) RePEc:wrk:warwec:685 Unhappiness and Crime : Evidence from South Africa (2003). University of Warwick, Department of Economics / The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:aal:abbswp:02-15 The Organization of Industry Re-visited (2002). DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies / DRUID Workin

(2) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse27_2002 Contests Among Bureaucrats (2002). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-29 Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments (2002). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(4) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01c90001 Reciprocal strategies and aspiration levels in a Cournot-Stackelberg experiment (2002). Economics Bulletin

(5) RePEc:esi:discus:2002-07 The Coevolution of Trust and Institutions in Anonymous and Non-anonymous Communities (2002). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(6) RePEc:esi:discus:2002-27 Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments (2002). Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group / Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction

(7) RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2002_0013 Price Floors and Competition (2002). Stockholm University, Department of Economics / Research Papers in Economics

(8) RePEc:hrr:papers:0206 Trust, Communication and Contracts: An Experiment (2002). Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus) / Working Papers

(9) RePEc:iii:wpeiii:2002-6 Convergence and diversity of the adoption of modular production in aircraft and automobile industries in Europe (In French) (2002). Equipe Industries Innovation Institutions, Université Bordeaux IV, France / Working Papers of E3i

(10) RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0205 Professional Advice: The Theory of Reputational Cheap Talk. (2002). University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics (formerly Institute of Economics) / Discussion Papers

(11) RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0217 Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects and Inequality (2002). Department of Economics, Tufts University / Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University

(12) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0202002 On the Reliability of Trusting (2002). EconWPA / Microeconomics

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2994 Blessing or Curse? Domestic Plants Survival and Employment Prospects After Foreign Acquisition (2001). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp265 The Anatomy of Subjective Well-Being (2001). DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research / Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin

(3) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp396 Exploring the Economic and Social Determinants of Psychological and Psychosocial Health (2001). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:3:y:2001:i:5:p:249-257 Las instituciones Colombianas en el siglo XX de Salomón Kalmanovitz (2001). Revista de Economía Institucional

(5) RePEc:wop:humbsf:2001-34 Predating Predators (2001). Humboldt Universitaet Berlin / Sonderforschungsbereich 373

(6) RePEc:wop:humbsf:2001-42 Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism in the Internet - A Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining (2001). Humboldt Universitaet Berlin / Sonderforschungsbereich 373

(7) RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0012002 Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model (2001). EconWPA / General Economics and Teaching

Latest citations received in: 2000

(1) RePEc:aea:jecper:v:14:y:2000:i:3:p:159-181 Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity (2000). Journal of Economic Perspectives

(2) RePEc:cam:camdae:0022 Intra-Firm Retail Contracting: Survey Evidence from the UK (2000). Faculty of Economics (formerly DAE), University of Cambridge / Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

(3) RePEc:cdl:econwp:1030 Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model (2000). Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley / Department of Economics, Working Paper Series

(4) RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:2000-25 Why Is There Money? Endogenous Derivation of Money as the Most Liquid Asset: A Class of Examples (2000). Department of Economics, UC San Diego / University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series

(5) RePEc:cer:papers:wp162 Barter Economies and Centralized Merchants (2000). The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Intitute, Prague / CERGE-EI Working Papers

(6) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_336 Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity (2000). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(7) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1098 EWA Learning in Bilateral Call Markets. (2000). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(8) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200053 Does auctioning of entry licenses affect consumer prices? : an experimental study (2000). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(9) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20000046 Does Auctioning of Entry Licenses affect Consumer Prices? An Experimental Study (2000). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1389 An Experimental Bribery Game (2000). Econometric Society / Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers

(11) RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1483 Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model (2000). Econometric Society / Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers

(12) RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1631 Money, Intermediaries and Cash-in-Advance Constraints (2000). Econometric Society / Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers

(13) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1304 On the Evolutionary Emergence of Optimism (2000). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(14) RePEc:oxf:wpaper:040 Money Burning and Stealing in the Laboratory: How Conflicting Ideologies Emerge (2000). University of Oxford, Department of Economics / Economics Series Working Papers

(15) RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp00-03 Allocating Control Over Firms: Stock Markets Versus Membership Markets (2000). Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University / Discussion Papers

(16) RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp00-16 The Ultimate Control Group (2000). Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University / Discussion Papers

(17) RePEc:ssb:dispap:290 An Economic Model of Moral Motivation (2000). Research Department of Statistics Norway / Discussion Papers

(18) RePEc:upf:upfgen:441 Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model (2000). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

(19) RePEc:upf:upfgen:491 Do Market Conditions Affect Preferences? Evidence from Experimental Markets with Excess Supply and Excess Demand (2000). Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Economics Working Papers

(20) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:019 Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation (2000). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

(21) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:034 Do Incentive Contracts Crowd out Voluntary Cooperation? (2000). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

(22) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:063 Testing Theories of Fairness - Intentions Matter (2000). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

(23) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:069 Political Economists are Neither Selfish nor Indoctrinated (2000). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

(24) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:079 Homo Oeconomicus Versus Homo Reciprocans: Ansätze für ein Neues Wirtschaftspolitisches Leitbild? (2000). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

(25) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:084 Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition, (2000). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

(26) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:095 Psychological Foundations of Incentives (2000). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

(27) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:103 Selfish and Indoctrinated Economists? (2000). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

(28) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:104 Two Concerns about Rational Choice: Indoctrination and Imperialism (2000). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

(29) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:120 Do High Stakes and Competition Undermine Fairness'DONE' Evidence from Russia (2000). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2008 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es