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 Updated May, 1 2008 147.392 documents processed, 3.154.300 references and 1.403.701 citations

 

 
 

Journal of Economic Theory

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.260.17112729166430110.10.08
19970.190.2121833198380180.150.08
19980.30.23102901233690160.160.1
19990.480.32804722231070180.230.16
20000.70.43734331821270160.220.19
20010.530.3989644153810380.430.17
20020.640.421288341621030560.440.2
20031.080.471094522172350420.390.22
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
 
Impact Factor:
 
Immediacy Index:
 
Documents published:
 
Citations received:
 

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:4:y:1972:i:2:p:103-124 Expectations and the neutrality of money (1972). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 386 times.

(2) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:21:y:1979:i:2:p:265-293 Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 294 times.

(3) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:2:y:1970:i:3:p:225-243 Increasing risk: I. A definition (1970). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 229 times.

(4) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:18:y:1978:i:2:p:301-317 Monopoly and product quality (1978). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 229 times.

(5) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:13:y:1976:i:3:p:341-360 The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing (1976). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 218 times.

(6) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:27:y:1982:i:2:p:245-252 Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma (1982). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 182 times.

(7) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:71:y:1996:i:1:p:44-74 A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 179 times.

(8) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:27:y:1982:i:2:p:253-279 Reputation and imperfect information (1982). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 175 times.

(9) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:20:y:1979:i:3:p:381-408 Martingales and arbitrage in multiperiod securities markets (1979). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 167 times.

(10) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:3:y:1971:i:2:p:156-168 A model of price adjustment (1971). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 162 times.

(11) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:50:y:1990:i:2:p:237-264 Liquidity and interest rates (1990). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 153 times.

(12) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:29:y:1983:i:2:p:265-281 Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 146 times.

(13) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:3:y:1971:i:4:p:373-413 Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time model (1971). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 142 times.

(14) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:2:y:1970:i:3:p:244-263 On the measurement of inequality (1970). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 126 times.

(15) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:63:y:1994:i:1:p:19-41 Indeterminacy and Increasing Returns (1994). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 122 times.

(16) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:42:y:1987:i:1:p:1-12 Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts (1987). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 117 times.

(17) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:20:y:1979:i:3:p:340-359 Price competition, quality and income disparities (1979). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 109 times.

(18) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:4:y:1972:i:3:p:479-513 Optimal economic growth and uncertainty: The discounted case (1972). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 108 times.

(19) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:48:y:1989:i:2:p:337-368 Convergence of least squares learning mechanisms in self-referential linear stochastic models (1989). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 106 times.

(20) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:81:y:1998:i:2:p:232-251 Money Is Memory, (1998). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 92 times.

(21) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:58:y:1992:i:2:p:410-452 Projection methods for solving aggregate growth models (1992). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 91 times.

(22) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:27:y:1982:i:2:p:280-312 Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence (1982). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 90 times.

(23) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:26:y:1982:i:1:p:17-27 Information, trade and common knowledge (1982). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 87 times.

(24) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:63:y:1994:i:1:p:42-72 Real Business Cycles and the Animal Spirits Hypothesis (1994). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 77 times.

(25) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:38:y:1986:i:2:p:211-232 Financial intermediary-coalitions (1986). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 76 times.

(26) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:7:y:1974:i:2:p:188-209 Equilibrium search and unemployment (1974). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 76 times.

(27) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:25:y:1981:i:3:p:380-396 Self-fulfilling prophecies (1981). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 76 times.

(28) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:39:y:1986:i:1:p:191-225 Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames (1986). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 74 times.

(29) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:96:y:2001:i:1-2:p:40-69 The Perils of Taylor Rules (2001). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 72 times.

(30) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:79:y:1998:i:1:p:1-45 Empirical Implications of Alternative Models of Firm Dynamics, (1998). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 70 times.

(31) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:39:y:1986:i:1:p:251-269 Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (1986). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 70 times.

(32) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:67:y:1995:i:2:p:467-496 Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining (1995). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 70 times.

(33) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:22:y:1980:i:3:p:477-498 On the aggregation of information in competitive markets (1980). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 69 times.

(34) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:3:y:1971:i:1:p:66-84 Increasing risk II: Its economic consequences (1971). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 67 times.

(35) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:76:y:1997:i:2:p:322-344 Stable Networks, (1997). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 65 times.

(36) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:8:y:1974:i:4:p:500-524 An equilibrium model of the international capital market (1974). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 65 times.

(37) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:39:y:1986:i:1:p:155-190 Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture (1986). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 64 times.

(38) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:52:y:1990:i:1:p:45-67 Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices (1990). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 63 times.

(39) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:73:y:1997:i:1:p:30-78 Equilibrium Binding Agreements, (1997). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 63 times.

(40) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:114:y:2004:i:2:p:198-230 Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices (2004). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 62 times.

(41) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:16:y:1977:i:2:p:167-207 A model of insurance markets with incomplete information (1977). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 60 times.

(42) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:5:y:1972:i:3:p:308-335 Consumption decisions under uncertainty (1972). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 60 times.

(43) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:58:y:1992:i:2:p:317-334 Agricultural productivity, comparative advantage, and economic growth (1992). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 59 times.

(44) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:5:y:1972:i:3:p:395-418 Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs (1972). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 59 times.

(45) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:10:y:1975:i:2:p:187-217 Strategy-proofness and Arrows conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 58 times.

(46) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:39:y:1986:i:1:p:83-96 Finite automata play the repeated prisoners dilemma (1986). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 57 times.

(47) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:63:y:1994:i:1:p:113-142 Uniqueness and Indeterminacy: On the Dynamics of Endogenous Growth (1994). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 57 times.

(48) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:6:y:1973:i:1:p:12-36 Pure exchange equilibrium of dynamic economic models (1973). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 57 times.

(49) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:81:y:1998:i:2:p:462-492 Expectation Traps and Discretion, (1998). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 56 times.

(50) RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:36:y:1985:i:2:p:195-213 Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud (1985). Journal of Economic Theory
Cited: 55 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:93:y:2003:i:2:p:31-38 The Future of the IMF (2003). American Economic Review

(2) RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-24 Unemployment and Indeterminacy (2003). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(3) RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:wp4-03 Speculation in Second-Price Auctions with Resale (2003). Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara / University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series

(4) RePEc:cfs:cfswop:wp200337 Monetary Policy, Indeterminacy and Learning (2003). Center for Financial Studies / CFS Working Paper Series

(5) RePEc:cie:wpaper:0301 Government Policy and the Probability of Coordination Failures (2003). Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM / Working Papers

(6) RePEc:cie:wpaper:0305 Discount Window Policy, Banking Crises, and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium (2003). Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM / Working Papers

(7) RePEc:cla:levrem:506439000000000246 Speculation in Second-Price Auctions with Resale (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(8) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000077 Bank Portfolio Restrictions and Equilibrium Bank Runs (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(9) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000302 Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(10) RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000420 Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics (2003). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Bibliography

(11) RePEc:col:000094:001899 TESTABLE RESTRICTIONS ON THE EQUILIBRIUM MANIFOLD UNDER RANDOM PREFERENCES (2003). TITULARIZADORA COLOMBIANA / INFORMES

(12) RePEc:col:000094:003556 Testable Restrictions og General Equilibrium Theory in Exchange Economies with Externalities (2003). TITULARIZADORA COLOMBIANA / INFORMES

(13) RePEc:cte:werepe:we035722 INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND PRICING UNDER MORAL HAZARD (2003). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(14) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1412 Dynamic Price Competition (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(15) RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1433 Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises (2003). Cowles Foundation, Yale University / Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

(16) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200310 Procedural group identification (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(17) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200349 Good and bad objects: cardinality-based rules (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(18) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200389 On the axiomatic characterization of who is a j? (2003). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(19) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20030076 Harsanyi Solutions in Line-graph Games (2003). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(20) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:7:y:2003:i:6:p:1-11 The Influence of Large Creditors on Creditor Coordination (2003). Economics Bulletin

(21) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.20 Monopoly with Resale (2003). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(22) RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.59 Special Interests and Technological Change (2003). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei / Working Papers

(23) RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0310 A theory of money and banking (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland / Working Paper

(24) RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-03-11 A structural empirical model of firm growth, learning, and survival (2003). Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago / Working Paper Series

(25) RePEc:hhs:bofrdp:2003_023 Simulating interbank payment and securities settlement mechanisms with the BoF-PSS2 simulator (2003). Bank of Finland / Research Discussion Papers

(26) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp332 Learning the decisions of small committees (2003). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(27) RePEc:imf:imfwpa:03/205 Financial Development in the CIS-7 Countries: Bridging the Great Divide (2003). International Monetary Fund / IMF Working Papers

(28) RePEc:nav:ecupna:0303 Blowing the Whistle (2003). Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra / Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navar

(29) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9570 On the International Financial Architecture: Insuring Emerging Markets (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(30) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9712 A Structural Empirical Model of Firm Growth, Learning, and Survival (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(31) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9931 Micro-Foundations of Urban Agglomeration Economies (2003). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc / NBER Working Papers

(32) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1379 Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoly with Entry and Exit (2003). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(33) RePEc:pen:papers:03-031 Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium (2003). Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania / PIER Working Paper Archive

(34) RePEc:pra:mprapa:1555 Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics (2003). University Library of Munich, Germany / MPRA Paper

(35) RePEc:sef:csefwp:104 Financial Contracting and Macroeconomic Stability (2003). Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy / CSEF Working Papers

(36) RePEc:stn:sotoec:0307 Independence And Heterogeneity In Games Of Incomplete Information (2003). Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton / Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics

(37) RePEc:trf:wpaper:2 Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication (2003). SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, University of Mannheim / Discussion Papers

(38) RePEc:vie:viennp:0318 Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics (2003). University of Vienna, Department of Economics / Vienna Economics Papers

(39) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0212001 A Dynamic Homotopy Interpretation of Quantal Response Equilibrium Correspondences (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

(40) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0301011 The Value of a Reputation System (2003). EconWPA / Industrial Organization

(41) RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0310003 A Theory of Money and Banking (2003). EconWPA / Macroeconomics

(42) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0308001 Speculation in First-Price Auctions with Resale (2003). EconWPA / Microeconomics

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:525.02 Taxation of banks: A theoretical framework (2002). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:aub:autbar:530.02 The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study (2002). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(3) RePEc:aub:autbar:531.02 Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments (2002). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(4) RePEc:aub:autbar:554.02 Efficient Priority Rules (2002). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(5) RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse29_2002 Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly (2002). University of Bonn, Germany / Bonn Econ Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:bro:econwp:2002-10 Testable Implications of General Equilibrium Theory: a differentiable approach (2002). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(7) RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:19-02 Double Auctions, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, and the Hold-Up Problem (2002). Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara / University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series

(8) RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:wp19-02 Double Auctions, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, and the Hold-Up Problem (2002). Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara / University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series

(9) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_762 Costly Enforcement of Property Rights and the Coase Theorem (2002). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(10) RePEc:cla:levarc:391749000000000503 Coordination in the static and the dynamic (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(11) RePEc:cla:levarc:625018000000000192 Perfectly Competitive Innovation (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Levine's Working Paper Archive

(12) RePEc:cla:princt:9817a118e65062903de7c3577d29be36 Rationalization and Incomplete Information (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers

(13) RePEc:cla:uclaol:208 Public Announcements, Adjustment Delays, and the Business Cycle (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / UCLA Economics Online Papers

(14) RePEc:cla:uclaol:209 Coordination and Policy Traps (joint with Marios Angeletos, MIT, and Alessandro Pavan, Northwestern) (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / UCLA Economics Online Papers

(15) RePEc:cla:uclaol:211 Imperfect Common Knowledge of Preferences in Global Coordination Games (October 2002) (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / UCLA Economics Online Papers

(16) RePEc:cla:uclatw:357966000000000093 Optimal Repeated Auction with Tacit Collusion (joint with Atila Abdulkadiroglu) (2002). UCLA Department of Economics / Theory workshop papers

(17) RePEc:clm:clmeco:2002-30 Seller Cheap Talk in Common Value Auctions (2002). Claremont Colleges / Claremont Colleges Working Papers

(18) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1130 Ambiguity from the Differential Viewpoint (2002). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(19) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1138 The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study (2002). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(20) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1156 Principles of network development and evolution: An experimental study (formally - Networks: An Experimental Study) (2002). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(21) RePEc:clu:wpaper:0102-68 Mechanism design with tacit collusion (2002). Columbia University, Department of Economics / Discussion Papers

(22) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3330 Aggregate Risk, Political Constraints and Social Security Design (2002). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(23) RePEc:cte:werepe:we024617 THE VALUE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION IN A COURNOT DUOPOLY (2002). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(24) RePEc:ctl:louvir:2002014 Early mortality declines at the dawn of modern growth (2002). Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) / Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Eco

(25) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200271 Competitive equilibria in economies with multiple divisible and multiple indivisible commodities (2002). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(26) RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20020086 Monotone Methods for Markovian Equilibrium in Dynamic Economies (2002). Tinbergen Institute / Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers

(27) RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:112:y:2002:i:476:p:133-146 Insecure Property and the Efficiency of Exchange (2002). Economic Journal

(28) RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2002/11 Early Mortality Declines at the Dawn of Modern Growth (2002). European University Institute / Economics Working Papers

(29) RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0207 A simple search model of money with heterogeneous agents and partial acceptability (2002). Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland / Working Paper

(30) RePEc:gco:abcdef:10 Stable Organizations with Externalities (2002). Grand Coalition Web Site / Grand Coalition

(31) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp284 Long Cheap Talk (2002). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

(32) RePEc:ibm:ibmecp:wpe_20 On the Long-Run Distribution of Wealth in a Competitive Growth Model with Endogenous Fertility (2002). Ibmec Working Paper, Ibmec São Paulo / Ibmec Working Papers

(33) RePEc:icr:wpmath:17-2002 Ambiguity from the Differential Viewpoint. (2002). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series

(34) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp585 Human Capital Formation, Life Expectancy and the Process of Economic Development (2002). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) / IZA Discussion Papers

(35) RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2002/09 Licensing in a Vertically Separated Industry (2002). Centre for Economic Research, Keele University / Keele Economics Research Papers

(36) RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2002/13 Licensing under Asymmetric information (2002). Centre for Economic Research, Keele University / Keele Economics Research Papers

(37) RePEc:mlb:wpaper:834 Random Dynamical Systems with Multiplicative Noise (2002). The University of Melbourne / Department of Economics - Working Papers Series

(38) RePEc:oxf:wpaper:114 Ellsberg`s 2-Color Experiment, Bid-Ask Behavior and Ambiguity (2002). University of Oxford, Department of Economics / Economics Series Working Papers

(39) RePEc:oxf:wpaper:125 Dynamic Interactive Epistemology (2002). University of Oxford, Department of Economics / Economics Series Working Papers

(40) RePEc:oxf:wpaper:132 Supermajority Voting Rules: Balancing Commitment and Flexibility (2002). University of Oxford, Department of Economics / Economics Series Working Papers

(41) RePEc:pit:wpaper:244 Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games (2002). University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(42) RePEc:red:issued:v:5:y:2002:i:4:p:892-931 Bequests, Inter Vivos Transfers, and Wealth Distribution (2002). Review of Economic Dynamics

(43) RePEc:rut:rutres:200207 Walrasian Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities (2002). Rutgers University, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

(44) RePEc:soz:wpaper:0208 Acquisitions versus Entry: The Evolution of Concentration (2002). University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute / Working Papers

(45) RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf154 Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts (2002). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

(46) RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf175 Economics of Self-Feeding Fear (2002). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

(47) RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf176 Irreversible Investment and Knightian Uncertainty (2002). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

(48) RePEc:trn:utwpce:0211 Games and phone numbers: do short term memory bounds affect strategic behavior? (2002). Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia / CEEL Working Papers

(49) RePEc:uct:uconnp:2002-06 On the Existence and Characterization of Markovian Equilibrium in Models with Simple Non-Paternalistic Altruism (2002). University of Connecticut, Department of Economics / Working papers

(50) RePEc:vie:viennp:0302 Rationalizable Foresight Dynamics: Evolution and Rationalizability (2002). University of Vienna, Department of Economics / Vienna Economics Papers

(51) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0211005 Licensing in a Vertically Separated Industry (2002). EconWPA / Industrial Organization

(52) RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0211007 Licensing under Asymmetric information (2002). EconWPA / Industrial Organization

(53) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0211005 The Strategy-Proof Provision of Public Goods under Congestion and Crowding Preferences (2002). EconWPA / Microeconomics

(54) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0211010 Equilibrium Agenda Formation (2002). EconWPA / Microeconomics

(55) RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0212001 Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation (2002). EconWPA / Public Economics

(56) RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:4195 Optimal factor taxation under wage bargaining – a dynamic perspective (2002). Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre / Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:att:bielme:2001322 Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory? (2001). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(2) RePEc:att:wimass:200115 Negative externalities and evolutionary implementation (2001). Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems / Working papers

(3) RePEc:att:wimass:200116 Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation (2001). Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems / Working papers

(4) RePEc:att:wimass:20017 Evolutionary dynamics in financial markets with many trader types (2001). Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems / Working papers

(5) RePEc:aub:autbar:479.01 Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments (2001). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(6) RePEc:aub:autbar:492.01 Candidate Stability and Voting Correspondences (2001). Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) / UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(7) RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:2001-12 Almost-Objective Uncertainty (2001). Department of Economics, UC San Diego / University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series

(8) RePEc:chb:bcchwp:112 Inflation Targeting and the Liquidity Trap (2001). Central Bank of Chile / Working Papers Central Bank of Chile

(9) RePEc:cpm:cepmap:0110 Real business cycles and the animal spirits hypothesis in a CIA economy (2001). CEPREMAP / CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange)

(10) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2948 Avoiding Liquidity Traps (2001). C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers / CEPR Discussion Papers

(11) RePEc:cte:werepe:we016121 BARGAINING IN NETWORKS AND THE MYERSON VALUE (2001). Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía / Economics Working Papers

(12) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2001009 Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games. (2001). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(13) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2001011 Intertemporal Market Divison (2001). Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization / Research Memoranda

(14) RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01d40001 On the theory of equalizing differences; Increasing abundances of types of workers may increase their earnings (2001). Economics Bulletin

(15) RePEc:fgv:epgewp:420 Exact Arbitrage, Well-Diversified Portfolios and Asset Pricing in Large Markets (2001). Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil) / Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE)

(16) RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0116 Taylor rules in a model that satisfies the natural rate hypothesis (2001). Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland / Working Paper

(17) RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2001:i:nov.:p:29-40:n:v.83no.6 Dollarization as a monetary arrangement for emerging market economies (2001). Review

(18) RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2000-027 The value of inside and outside money (2001). Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis / Working Papers

(19) RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2001-011 The value of inside and outside money: expanded version (2001). Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis / Working Papers

(20) RePEc:hhs:aareco:2001_003 Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model (2001). Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(21) RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0038 Why Does Technology Advance in Cycles? (2001). Göteborg University, Department of Economics / Working Papers in Economics

(22) RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0564 On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption (2001). The Research Institute of Industrial Economics / IUI Working Paper Series

(23) RePEc:icr:wpmath:09-2001 Subcalculus for set functions and cores of TU games. (2001). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series

(24) RePEc:icr:wpmath:21-2001 Risk, ambiguity, and the separation of utility and beliefs. (2001). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series

(25) RePEc:icr:wpmath:29-2001 BV as a dual space. (2001). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series

(26) RePEc:mlb:wpaper:787 Stochastic Growth: Asymptotic Distributions. (2001). The University of Melbourne / Department of Economics - Working Papers Series

(27) RePEc:mlb:wpaper:788 Log-Linearization of Perturbed Dynamical Systems, With Applications to Optimal Growth. (2001). The University of Melbourne / Department of Economics - Working Papers Series

(28) RePEc:mlb:wpaper:812 An Evolutionary Model of Reciprocity (2001). The University of Melbourne / Department of Economics - Working Papers Series

(29) RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-02 Ranking Sets of Objects (2001). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche

(30) RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-27 Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules. (2001). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche

(31) RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-30 Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice (2001). Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques / Cahiers de recherche

(32) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1315 Asymptotically Optimal Market Mechanisms (2001). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(33) RePEc:rut:rutres:200109 Chaotic Interest Rate Rules (2001). Rutgers University, Department of Economics / Departmental Working Papers

(34) RePEc:sef:csefwp:55 Competitive Prices in Markets with Search and Information Frictions (2001). Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Salerno, Italy / CSEF Working Papers

(35) RePEc:ssb:dispap:307 Equality of Opportunity versus Equality of Outcome in Analysing Optimal Income Taxation Empirical Evidence based on Italian Data (2001). Research Department of Statistics Norway / Discussion Papers

(36) RePEc:tky:fseres:2001cf123 The Folk Theorem with Private Monitoring (2001). CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo / CIRJE F-Series

(37) RePEc:van:wpaper:0113 Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice (2001). Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University / Working Papers

(38) RePEc:wop:wisule:01-06 Noise, Real Estate Markets, and Options on Real Assets: Applications (2001). University of Wisconsin Center for Urban Land Economic Research / Wisconsin-Madison CULER working papers

Latest citations received in: 2000

(1) RePEc:att:wimass:20005 Evolution with diverse preferences (2000). Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems / Working papers

(2) RePEc:bdr:borrec:229 Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains (2000). Banco de la Republica de Colombia / Borradores de Economia

(3) RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-22 Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey (2000). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(4) RePEc:cer:papers:wp165 Capital Accumulation in an Economy with Heterogeneous Agents and Moral Hazard (2000). The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Intitute, Prague / CERGE-EI Working Papers

(5) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_343 Efficiency, Equity, and Generalized Lorenz Dominance (2000). CESifo GmbH / CESifo Working Paper Series

(6) RePEc:cie:wpaper:0001 Monetary Stability and Liquidity Crises: The Role of the Lender of Last Resort (2000). Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM / Working Papers

(7) RePEc:clt:sswopa:1085 Risk, Ambigity and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs (2000). California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences / Working Papers

(8) RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0690 Victory and Defeat in a Model of Behavior in Games and Toward Risk (2000). Econometric Society / Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers

(9) RePEc:fip:fedawp:2000-22 A theory of transactions privacy (2000). Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta / Working Paper

(10) RePEc:fip:fedfpb:00-03 Pegging and macroeconomic performance in East Asia (2000). Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco / Pacific Basin Working Paper Series

(11) RePEc:fip:fedrwp:00-02 Optimal taxation in life-cycle economies (2000). Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond / Working Paper

(12) RePEc:igi:igierp:191 Vector-Adjusted Expected Utility (2000). IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University / Working Papers

(13) RePEc:tor:tecipa:faig-00-01 MONEY WITH IDIOSYNCRATIC UNINSURABLE RETURNS TO CAPITAL (2000). University of Toronto, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(14) RePEc:tor:tecipa:peters-00-01 Competing Pre-marital Investments (2000). University of Toronto, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(15) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:219 Money, Credit and Banking (2000). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

(16) RePEc:zur:iewwpx:237 An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance (2000). Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW / IEW - Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

©2008 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es