International Journal of Game Theory

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Latest citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.02 0.17 30 131 45 1 0 3 0.1 0.08 1997 0.18 0.2 0 55 10 0 0.08 1998 0.13 0.23 81 257 30 4 0 8 0.1 0.1 1999 0.14 0.32 35 119 81 11 0 1 0.03 0.16 2000 0.37 0.43 31 47 116 43 0 7 0.23 0.19 2001 0.26 0.39 29 48 66 17 0 5 0.17 0.17 2002 0.2 0.42 29 21 60 12 0 2 0.07 0.2 2003 0.19 0.47 28 24 58 11 0 4 0.14 0.22
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:269-299 Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness (1998). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 52 times.

(2) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:245-256 Link formation in cooperative situations (1998). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 38 times.

(3) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:4:p:323-44 An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives. (1995). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 32 times.

(4) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:2:p:171-98 Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information. (1993). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 32 times.

(5) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:379-401 The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities (1998). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 30 times.

(6) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:289-301 On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games. (1996). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 30 times.

(7) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:15:y:1986:i:3:p:187-200 On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse. (1986). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 27 times.

(8) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1990:i:1:p:59-89 Evolutionary Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties. (1990). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 26 times.

(9) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:273-91 A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games. (1989). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 23 times.

(10) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:3:p:375-392 Population uncertainty and Poisson games (1998). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 22 times.

(11) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:131-152 Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study (1999). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 17 times.

(12) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:277-93 Games with Permission Structures: The Conjunctive Approach. (1992). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 16 times.

(13) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:245-58 The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments. (1996). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 15 times.

(14) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:303-27 Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment. (1996). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 14 times.

(15) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:3:p:263-300 Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge (1999). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 14 times.

(16) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:419-27 Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games. (1992). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 14 times.

(17) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:393-418 Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information. (1992). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 13 times.

(18) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2001:i:4:p:487-494 Stability in coalition formation games (2001). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 12 times.

(19) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:75-83 Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities. (1994). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 12 times.

(20) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:241-252 Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game (1999). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 12 times.

(21) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:37-44 A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games. (1989). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 12 times.

(22) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:2:p:185-87 Credible Coalitions and the Core. (1989). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 12 times.

(23) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:385-406 Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation. (1996). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 12 times.

(24) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:113-136 Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form (1998). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 12 times.

(25) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:3:p:249-66 The Shapley Value for Cooperative Games under Precedence Constraints. (1992). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 11 times.

(26) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:4:p:389-407 The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games. (1989). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 11 times.

(27) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:293-310 On Equilibria in Repeated Games with Absorbing States. (1989). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 11 times.

(28) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:57-89 Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions. (1989). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 11 times.

(29) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:4:p:511-520 Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems (1999). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 11 times.

(30) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:27-43 An Axiomatization of the Disjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Permission Structure (1998). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 10 times.

(31) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:3:p:399-424 Cores of non-atomic market games (2006). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 9 times.

(32) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:223-227 Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games (1998). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 9 times.

(33) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:269-287 Loss aversion equilibrium (2000). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 9 times.

(34) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:335-351 Ternary Voting Games (1998). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 9 times.

(35) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:1:p:27-39 Weighted Values and the Core. (1992). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 9 times.

(36) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:17:y:1988:i:4:p:279-300 Bargaining in Cooperative Games. (1988). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 8 times.

(37) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:157-171 The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach (1999). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 8 times.

(38) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:4:p:505-514 A characterization of the position value* (2005). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 8 times.

(39) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:17:y:1988:i:2:p:89-99 An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value. (1988). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 8 times.

(40) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:1:p:13-25 Cautious Utility Maximization and Iterated Weak Dominance. (1992). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 8 times.

(41) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:269-87 An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games. (1996). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 8 times.

(42) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:111-130 Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games (1999). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 8 times.

(43) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:2:p:227-40 A Value for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation. (1989). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 8 times.

(44) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1990:i:2:p:191-217 Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games with Semi-standard Information. (1990). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 8 times.

(45) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:177-88 Mediated Talk. (1996). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 8 times.

(46) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:1-14 The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications (1999). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 7 times.

(47) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:3:p:261-81 Collusion Properties of Values. (1994). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 7 times.

(48) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:31:y:2002:i:1:p:69-89 On the impact of low-balling: Experimental results in asymmetric auctions (2002). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 7 times.

(49) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:3:p:279-302 Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games. (1993). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 7 times.

(50) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:211-26 On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. (1992). International Journal of Game Theory
Cited: 7 times.

Latest citations received in: | 2003 | 2002 | 2001 | 2000

Latest citations received in: 2003

(1) RePEc:icr:wpmath:25-2003 Archimedean Copulae and Positive Dependence. (2003). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series

(2) RePEc:icr:wpmath:28-2003 Some Counterexamples in Positive Dependence. (2003). ICER - International Centre for Economic Research / ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series

(3) RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0310003 Learning about Learning in Games through Experimental Control of Strategic Interdependence (2003). EconWPA / Experimental

(4) RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0312004 A Wide Range No-Regret Theorem (2003). EconWPA / Game Theory and Information

Latest citations received in: 2002

(1) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1356 Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations (2002). Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science / Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0205002 The Amsterdam Auction (2002). EconWPA / Microeconomics

Latest citations received in: 2001

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0011 The Demand Bargaining Set: General Characterization and Application to Majority Games (2001). Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science / Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:att:bielme:2001324 The dummy paradox of the bargaining set (2001). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(3) RePEc:att:bielme:2001325 Reconfirming the prenucleolus (2001). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(4) RePEc:att:bielme:2001326 The positive core of a cooperative game (2001). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(5) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp267 Reconfirming the Prenucleolus (2001). Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem / Discussion Paper Series

Latest citations received in: 2000

(1) RePEc:att:bielme:2000318 The endogenous formation of cartels (2000). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(2) RePEc:att:bielme:2000319 Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus (2000). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(3) RePEc:att:bielme:2000320 Cartels via the modiclus (2000). University of Bielefeld, Insitute of Mathematical Economics / Working papers

(4) RePEc:bro:econwp:2000-22 Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey (2000). Brown University, Department of Economics / Working Papers

(5) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2000117 Tree-connected peer group situations and peer group games (2000). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(6) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200073 On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs (2000). Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research / Discussion Paper

(7) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2000-02 - SHAPLEY-SHUBIK AND BANZHAF INDICES REVISITED. (2000). Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) / Working Papers. Serie AD

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.